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Abstract
This thesis comprises of five chapters. The first chapter gives a brief introduc-
tion on the existing literature about the optimal trading order execution problem,
the concept of limit order book, market impact models and their underlying market
microstructure. We will also provide some brief review on the regularity problem
of market impact model and the resilience eﬀect of the LOB market. Some no-
tions about the limit order book trading will also be introduced in this chapter.
The second chapter, a game theoretical model given by Rosu [74] is introduced and
the same side and opposite side resilience are reinterpreted for this model. The
solution structure of a Markov equilibrium of this model is obtained for the same
side resilience by providing a rigourous mathematical analysis. We also provide a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of real-valued solutions under this situation.
We also reproduce the results in Rosu [74] about the opposite side resilience in
this LOB model. In the third chapter, we extend the LOB market impact model
in Obizhaeva and Wang [65] by introducing two sides resilience and a general LOB
shape function. Two existing LOB market impact models are then replicated by our
extended model, allowing the cross-impact resilience rate going to zero and infinity
respectively. In the last two chapters, we conduct two applications of our extended
market impact model. These two applications are able to help us study the optimal
execution problem and the market regularity issues. We find out that the minimum
cost of the zero-spread LOB model is a lower bound of the minimum cost of our
extended market impact LOB model and those models with zero bid-ask spread
have weaker regularity conditions than those with a non-zero bid-ask spread.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In section 1.1, we will briefly review the existing literature about the optimal
trading order execution problem, the concept of limit order book (LOB), market
impact models and the market microstructure underlying these models. Moreover,
we will also provide some brief review on the regularity problem of market impact
model and the resilience eﬀect of the LOB market. Since our research is conducted
on the limit order book structure, some notions about the order book trading will
be introduced in section 1.2. These notions are used throughout this thesis. Then
in section 1.3, we would like to present the motivation of this research. Finally, in
section ??, we will give the structure of this thesis and our main contributions.
1.1 Literature review
1.1.1 Optimal trading order execution problem
With or without private information, there are some cases in which a trader
needs to liquidate a large amount of some asset. As proposed in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen [19] some examples are hedge funds with margin calls, traders who uses
portfolio insurance, stop loss options, or other risk management strategies, a short
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seller who may need to respond to the price increases1. Because of the limited
liquidity in the financial market, trading a large amount of any asset has an impact
on its prices, and usually this price shift is against the trader’s interest. This trading
incurred price shift is called the price impact.
The basic observation is that the costs of the price impact of a large trade
can be reduced significantly by splitting the large trade into a sequence of smaller
trades. To this end, we adopt the view of Bertsimas and Lo [13] and Gatheral
[33] about the order execution process. They suggested that the trading process
is separated into three layers: The first layer is called macro-trader and this layer
decides about the timing of trading and about the order sizes; The second layer
called micro-trader. Given a slice of the order placed by the macro-trader, the
second layer decides whether to place market orders or limit orders. If a limit order
is placed, at which price to trade; The third layer is the smart order router. Here a
decision is made about which trading venue to send the orders to.
Although it is desirable to have an integrable model for all layers of the
trading process, such a model might be overly complex as suggested in Bertsimas and
Lo [13]. The market impact models we consider in this thesis are models developed
for solving the first layer optimal execution problem. We will review the market
impact models in detail in the section 1.1.2. Apart from the market impact models,
there are other first layer related studies focusing on optimal trading times, such as
Kharroubi and Pham [51] and Lehalle et al. [59], or the studies focusing on order
split between transparent and hidden, such as Buti and Rindi [20], Cebirogˇlu and
Horst [22], Esser and Mo¨nch [29] and Kratz and Scho¨neborn [55]. The second layer
execution usually involves limit order placement, such as Avellaneda and Stoikov
[10], Bayraktar and Ludkovski [11], Gue´ant and Lehalle [41], Gue´ant et al. [42],
Harris [45], Hollifield et al. [47], Kovaleva and Iori [54]. There is also some research
which combines both the first and the second layer, for example Guibaud and Pham
1As stated in Madhavan [62], this is the case that ‘issues of how investors trade are decoupled
from issues of why they trade’. Even though an ideal framework should combine the optimal trading
strategy problem and dynamic portfolio problem, it is very helpful to have a full understanding on
the trading part itself at first.
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[43], Guilbaud and Pham [44], Huitema [50], Naujokat and Westray [64]. For the
layer of smart order router, one can refer to Cont and Kukanov [24] and Laruelle
et al. [57] and the references therein.
1.1.2 The market microstructure underlying market impact models
The market microstructure endogenously explain the formation of the price
impact, and the motivation of trading activities, etc. To build a both mathematically
tractable and well rounded market impact model, it is desirable to gain a better
understanding of the endogenous market microstructure that underlies the market
impact models. Some recent books and articles, such as Biais et al. [15], Lehalle
[58], Madhavan [62], O’Hara [66], summarised the market microstructure literature
from the aspects of theoretical, empirical and experimental study.
In a market impact model, the relation between the transacted order volume
and the consequent price shift is described by the price impact function. The price
impact function is an abstract microstructure description of the interactions between
traders and the liquidity in the market. In other words, it does not model the
dynamics of price impact via interactions of trades at a microscopic level as in a
market microstructure model, but emphasise on a direct relation between a large
order and the price dynamics. As in Alfonsi et al. [5], Almgren and Chriss [9],
Gatheral [32] and Obizhaeva and Wang [65], the asset price in a market impact
model is in the form of
St = S
0
t + Price impact function
where S0 is an exogenously given process to describe the asset price when it is
unaﬀected by the price impact.
Both the unaﬀected price process and the price impact function are required
to be specified in a market impact model. As suggested in Gatheral and Schied [35]
and Schied and Slynko [78], there are two generations of market impact models. The
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first generation market impact models distinguish between two price impact compo-
nents, namely the temporary impact and permanent impact. The second generation
market impact models is based on the subsequently decay of price impact, which
is called the transient impact. In the rest of this section, we will briefly review the
market microstructure that underline the first and the second generations of market
impact models.
The first generation market impact models and dealer market
Madhavan [62] attributes the cause of temporary and permanent price impact
to three types of costs when one trades in a dealer market. On a dealer market,
liquidity is provided by a specialist who is contractually obliged to always stand
ready to buy at quoted bid and sell at quoted ask. Price is determined via the
specialist’s auction and the trader’s bidding.
The temporary price impact reflects the transitory cost of demanding liq-
uidity, such as order handling fee in Roll [72] and inventory cost in Stoll [81]. The
temporary price impact only aﬀects the individual transaction that has triggered it.
The permanent price impact reflects the specialist’s price update based the
information transmitted to the market by the buy/sell order flows. Thus the perma-
nent price impact is due to the costs of being adversely selected by informed traders
as discussed in Easley and O’Hara [28], Glosten and Milgrom [38], Kyle [56]. The
permanent impact does not only influence the price of the current trade but also
the prices of all subsequent trades.
This kind of market impact models are first introduced in Bertsimas and Lo
[13], Almgren and Chriss [9] and Almgren [8]. The framework of Almgren and Chriss
[9] has now been a basis for practical applications used in the financial industry.
Some variants of the Almgren-Chriss framework are:
1. Adapting the optimal execution strategy for various risk criteria, such as the
mean-variance optimisation utilised in Almgren [8] and Huberman and Stanzl
4
[49] and the expected utility maximisation applied in Schied et al. [79] and
Schied and Scho¨neborn [77].
2. Introducing the optimal adaptive strategy, for example, Lorenz and Almgren
[61];
3. Applying more general unaﬀected price processes, other than the Bachelier
model, such as the geometric Brownian motion applied in the work of Schied
[76] and Gatheral and Schied [34].
The second generation market impact models and LOB market
On a LOB market, there is no designated liquidity provider. Liquidity is
oﬀered in a self-organised way. In other words, any agent can choose, at any instant
of time, to either provide liquidity or consume liquidity. A satisfactory LOB mi-
crostructure model should be able to include the interactions of diﬀerent traders and
explain how the bid and ask prices are aﬀected by the interactions. Particularly in
this thesis, it is desirable to reflect the same side and opposite side resilience eﬀect
in a LOB model.
We list some survey papers focusing on the market microstructure of the
LOB. They are Bouchaud et al. [18], Gould et al. [40] and Parlour and Seppi [68].
Following the view of Abergel and Jedidi [1] on the classification of LOB microstruc-
ture models, two research methods could be outlined. The first method is a game
theory approach, such as Foucault et al. [30], Goettler and Rajan [39], Parlour [67],
Rosu [74] and Rosu [75]. Among these, the eﬀect of asymmetric information on LOB
trading activities is considered in Bloomfield et al. [16], Goettler and Rajan [39],
Harris [45] and Rosu [75]. In such a trading game, traders are assumed to arrive at
the LOB market randomly and trade strategically by endogenously choosing their
trading decisions as solutions to individual utility maximisation problems. The LOB
dynamics is then the collections of equilibrium strategies of all active traders.
The other method focuses on modelling the LOB microstructure in the zero-
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intelligence models, such as Abergel and Jedidi [1], Cont and Larrard [25], Cont and
Larrard [25], Smith et al. [80] and Toke [82]. Zero-intelligence means the focus of this
approach is more on reproducing the mechanics properties of the order book without
assuming the strategic interactions between agents. The arrivals of diﬀerent order
flows are assumed to be independently and identically distributed point processes.
More empirical studies suggest that price impact is transient, but is not sep-
arated into two parts, namely the permanent price impact and temporary price
impact. In other words, an order creates some immediate price impact that subse-
quently decays over time. Bouchaud et al. [17], Bouchaud et al. [18], Potters and
Bouchaud [70], Weber and Rosenow [85], Wyart et al. [87] are among those empiri-
cal LOB studies which support this transient decay idea. Obizhaeva and Wang [65]
adopted the transient price impact with the same side resilience into the market
impact models. In their research, the LOB is defined via a block shaped and time
independent function. The same side resilience factor was defined via a determinis-
tic exponential function. In recent years, there are some research extended the work
of Obizhaeva and Wang [65]:
1. In Gatheral et al. [37] and Alfonsi et al. [6], the same side resilience factor
follows other deterministic functions.
2. In Alfonsi et al. [4], Alfonsi and Schied [3], Predoiu et al. [71] and Alfonsi
et al. [5], the shape function of the LOB is also defined as a time independent
function but not in block shape.
3. In Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2] and Fruth et al. [31], the LOB shape function is
assumed to be a block shaped function but not independent with time.
4. In Fruth et al. [31] and Weiss [86], the same side resilience factor is considered
to be stochastic.
5. More general unaﬀected price process is applied in Lorenz and Schied [60].
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1.1.3 Regularity of market impact models
The optimisation problem brings us the issue of regularity of a market im-
pact model. A minimal regularity condition is the existence of admissible optimal
execution strategy. This existence of an optimal solution is guaranteed by the ab-
sence of the price manipulation strategy (PMS) and the positivity of liquidation cost
(PLC). Moreover, the resulting optimal strategies should be well-behaved. For in-
stance, we do not want to follow a trading strategy that strongly oscillates between
buy and sell since there is usually additional fees for trading market order. This
oscillation strategy can be excluded by the absence of the transaction-triggered price
manipulation (TTPM) in a market impact model. The notions of these irregularity
conditions of market impact model will be introduced in section 3.3.
However, we should note that these arbitrage opportunities in market im-
pact models are diﬀerent from the arbitrage in derivative pricing models and are
also distinguished from the arbitrage opportunities generated by asymmetric infor-
mation as discussed in Allen and Gorton [7]. So even a martingale assumption on
the unaﬀected price process will not exclude these irregularities in market impact
models.
Huberman and Stanzl [48] initiate the research on arbitrage opportunity in
market impact models and link this to the arbitrage in derivative pricing framework
via so called quasi-arbitrage. They find that the linearity of the permanent price
impact function is a necessary condition for the absence of the PMS. Their results
are further confirmed in transient models of Gatheral [32] and Gatheral et al. [36].
Alfonsi et al. [6] and Gatheral et al. [37] both research on linear transient LOB model
with general decay factor. They find out a necessary condition on the decay factor for
absence of both PMS and TTPM. Alfonsi and Schied [3] and Klo¨ck [52] represent two
extensions of the linear transient impact model. Alfonsi and Schied [3] generalise
their results with the non-linear price impact function. Klo¨ck [52] introduce the
eﬀect of stochastic linear price impact into market irregularity investigation and
propose the notion of PLC.
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1.1.4 The resilience of the market impact
In this section, we provide an overview of some theoretical and empirical
studies on the order book resilience. In market impact modelling framework, the
resilience means the price impact induced by a large trade can be reduced if extra
time is given for the market to recover. The resiliency in a LOB is quantified in
three respects:
1. Magnitude, i.e. how much will the best bid or ask price recover.
2. Speed, i.e. how quick will the best or ask price recover.
3. Direction, i.e. same side resilience or opposite side resilience2.
In particular, we will have a discussion on the same side and opposite side resilience
after a trade incurs price impact.
Theoretical studies on the resilience of the market impact
The resilience study in Bouchaud et al. [17] and Bouchaud et al. [18] is
conducted via analysing the diﬀusive behaviour of mid-price (average of the best
bid price and the best ask price) process. They claim that the market observed
mean-reverting mid-price process holds if and only if the price impact decays slowly.
They oﬀer the rational behind price mean-reverting as: the liquidity provider needs
to close their position at a later time without trading at a much higher price. So
the liquidity provider needs to mean-revert their limit order prices after a large
order. The recovery direction is not clarified and their view about the time scale of
resilience is that the mean reversion cannot take place too quickly.
Via a study on high frequency (HF) trader’s optimal market making (i.e.
supplying liquidity with limit orders) strategy, Cartea et al. [21] oﬀer evidence on
opposite resilience in a LOB market on short time scale. The optimal solution
implies that the HF trader should correct the market making strategy in order to
2See section 1.2 for a detailed discussion
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mitigate the risk of being adverse selected, and exploit the short-term mid-price
deviation via directional strategy. In other words, after a large market buy order,
the HF trader posts further away from the mid-price on the ask side (avoid being
adversely selected) and puts closer to the mid-price on the bid side (exploiting the
short-term deviation by directional strategy). That is to say, HF market maker’s
directional strategy supports the opposite side resiliency of the order book on short
time scale.
Foucault et al. [30] applied a game theory to study continuous-time order
submission problem. To measure the resiliency they use two definitions, namely the
reservation spread and the competitive spread. Reservation spread is the smallest
price improvement by which a limit order trader could make a non-negative profit.
Competitive spread is the patient traders’ reservation spread. Resiliency is then
measured as the probability that the spread reverts to ‘competitive spread’ before
the next transaction. They find out that when traders have the same reservation
spread, the resilience is the fastest and when traders are heterogeneous, the more
the patient traders there are, the faster the price impact decays. There is no clear
results about the resiliency direction.
Empirical studies on resilience of the market impact
Ponzi et al. [69] and To´th et al. [83] are two empirical studies via event study
based on an order book. They both observe a power lay decay of price impact. In
other words, new limit orders are not placed simply in a way that immediately
reverts the spread back to its original value, but they are sequentially placed close
to the current best price and this leads to a slow decay of the spread. However, the
study of Ponzi et al. [69] does not distinguish the resilience between the same side
and the opposite side recovery. To´th et al. [83] separately measure the number of
queuing orders on each side of the order book before and after a large market order.
They show for price drop on the bid side the number of queuing limit buy orders
decreases to about half of the usual value. At the same time on the ask side the
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number of queuing limit sell orders increases and even stays very high for a long time
after the event. That is just the two-side resilience eﬀect which will be explained in
more detail in next section.
Another two important empirical study on order book resilience are: Biais
et al. [14] and Degryse et al. [27]. Biais et al. [14] find new in-spread limit orders
on the ask (bid) side of the market are particularly frequent after large market sell
(market buy) orders. This empirical observation is an evidence of opposite side
resilience. They attribute the co-movement eﬀect to information, in the sense that
part of the resilience in the same side could be mechanical, but the resilience in the
opposite side is believed to be due to the information arising from the shift in the
expected fundamental value. Degryse et al. [27] extend the work of Biais et al. [14]
by studying not only the next incoming limit order after the large market order but
also the sequential orders. They conduct a descriptive event study and they observe
that for small stocks the best ask price jumps up after a large market buy order,
while the best bid price increases as well but without a jump. So does after a large
market sell order. The resilience of two sides of the order book are diﬀerent to the
same large market order..
1.2 LOB and its execution rules
In most of the published literature on LOB, the following terminology has
been adopted. They will be widely used in this thesis too.
Market order and limit order
A limit order is an order to buy or sell some specified quantity of an asset
at a price specified by the trader. It is not executed immediately, instead it enters
the queue of outstanding limit orders. A market order of a given size is an order
that results in an immediate execution at the best available price upon submission.
Thus for market order traders, they only specify the amount to buy or sell without
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explicitly specifying a trading price. Market order is executed against the existing
limit orders. This is the interaction between market and limit orders.
Large order and child order
According to an empirical paper Biais et al. [14], trades are distinguished
by trading direction (buy or sell) and aggressiveness (patience for order execution).
The most aggressive order is placed via a market order to trade a large quantity of
shares which usually demand the execution of more limit orders than that available
at the best price.
In market impact models, a large order corresponds the most aggressive order
in market. In particular, it specifies a large amount of shares which is needed to
be split into smaller orders, so that the adverse price impact incurred by it can be
reduced. This sequential smaller order is called the child order.
Bid side and ask side
A LOB for a single asset is the collection of all active buy and sell limit orders
with the corresponding prices and volumes information. We call the collection of
limit buy orders the bid side of the LOB and the collection of limit sell orders the
ask side of the LOB. A snapshot of an order book is shown in Figure 1.1.
Order execution rules
Execution of outstanding limit orders by market orders is settled according
to a set of priority rules. Prevailing ones are price-time rule and pro-rata rule.
In this thesis, it is assumed that the LOB follows the price-time priority
rule. Price-time priority LOB markets give priority to orders submitted at more
competitive prices and to displayed orders over hidden orders at the same price level.
Orders with the same display status and submission price are usually matched on a
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Figure 1.1: A LOB Snapshot of AMZN on June 21, 2012.
first-come-first-serve basis. As a result, the price-time priority order execution rules
are:
1. When a market buy order arrives, limit sell orders in the ask side of the
LOB are executed, starting from the orders with the lowest price to the more
expensive ones until the total number of shares ordered is reached.
2. When a market sell order arrives, limit buy orders in the bid side of the LOB
are executed, starting from the most expensive orders to the less expensive
ones until the total number of shares ordered is reached.
Discrete price grids
In a real LOB, orders are placed at a pre-fixed discrete price grids. The grid
step is the smallest interval between two prices and it is called the tick size. The
tick sizes are diﬀerent between the exchanges and trading assets.
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LOB dynamics and order flow
The order book evolves over time according to the arrival of new orders. The
price is therefore the result of the interactions between the order book and order
flow. The dynamics of the LOB would be mainly aﬀected by the following four order
flow processes, namely market orders, limit orders placed in the bid-ask spread, limit
orders placed at prices worse than the best price and cancellation of limit orders.
Same side resilience and opposite side resilience
The same side resilience describes the following market situations:
1. After a market buy order, the ask side of the order book will be recovering to
its original status.
2. After a market sell order, the bid side of the order book will be recovering to
its original status.
Likewise, the opposite side resilience describes the following market situa-
tions:
1. After a market buy order, the bid side of the order book will be recovering to
its original status.
2. After a market sell order, the ask side of the order book will be recovering to
its original status.
In terms of order flow, the same side resilience means that:
1. After the arrival of a market buy order, there are new incoming limit sell
orders placed within the current bid-ask spread.
2. After the arrival of a market sell order, there are new incoming limit buy
orders placed within the current bid-ask spread.
Likewise, in terms of order flow, the opposite side resilience means that:
13
1. After the arrival of a market buy order, there are new incoming limit buy
orders placed within the current bid-ask spread.
2. After the arrival of a market sell order, there are new incoming limit sell orders
placed within the current bid-ask spread.
Two sides resilience means that, after the arrival of any market order, there are new
incoming limit buy and sell orders placed within the current bid-ask spread.
1.3 Motivations
As demonstrated in the section 1.1.4, empirical evidences of the same side
and opposite side resilience of the market impact are discovered in trading actives.
We believe that these resilience eﬀects are important academically and practically.
But because of the complexity of these features, they are still not well researched. In
Rosu [74], a microstructure LOB model is provided and to the best of our knowledge,
among other LOB models, this model can theoretically replicate the eﬀect of two-
side market impact resilience due to its mathematical tractability.
Diﬀerent from the microstructure LOB model provided by Rosu [74], a mar-
ket impact model based on the LOB is introduced by Obizhaeva and Wang [65]. As
reviewed in the last part of the section 1.1.2, the work of Obizhaeva and Wang [65]
is very popular in recent years and there are various modifications or generalisations
conducted by other academics. However, all these studies did not consider two sides
resilience. Usually, they simplify their models by zero-spread assumption or focusing
on only one-side of the order book.
This thesis fills a gap in literature by providing a mathematically rigourous
proof for the existence of the same side and the opposite side resilience in the
microstructure LOB model of Rosu [74]. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no published evidence which examines the eﬀects of the two sides resilience
in a market impact model. As a consequence, this thesis also fills another gap that
14
considering two sides resilience eﬀects with a non-zero bid-ask spread under the
Obizhaeva and Wang [65] market impact model.
After providing a generalised Obizhaeva andWang [65] market impact model,
which we call a cross-impact LOB model, research on the optimal execution problem
and the market regularity issues under this model is conducted for two reasons.
Firstly, Klo¨ck [52] and Fruth et al. [31] claimed, but did not prove, that the market
impact models with zero bid-ask spread has weaker regularity conditions than the
models with a non-zero bid-ask spread. So, we would like to verify this argument
in our cross-impact LOB model. Secondly, we want to investigate the eﬀects of two
sides resilience on the first layer optimal execution strategy, which has long been
neglected in the literature.
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Chapter 2
Resilience in LOB
microstructure model
In this chapter, our aim is to show the presence of same side resilience and
opposite side resilience in an order book market. We base our analysis on a game
theoretical model given by Rosu [74]. Compared to other game theoretical models
summarised in Section 1.1.2, there are several reasons to work on the model of
Rosu [74]. First, it allows for a flexible spread of the order book and for explicit
measurement of resiliency with enough mathematical tractability, compared to the
models of Parlour [67], Foucault et al. [30] and Goettler and Rajan [39]. Second, the
direction of the resilience is able to be reflected and modelled in this model, while
it is assumed a fixed one tick size spread in Parlour [67]. Third, the motivation
of trading is exogenous to the model, namely the eﬀect of asymmetric information
is not modelled. Rosu [75] provides an alternative model in which the information
eﬀect is considered. Fourth, it includes the execution time risk of limit orders into
the model formulation, as in Foucault et al. [30].
In Section 2.1 we summarise the model of Rosu [74]. It starts by reviewing
the main characteristics of this continuous time trading game proposed in Rosu [74].
We then introduce the construction of the rigid, competitive Markovian equilibrium
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in the one-side book case, since this case is quite intuitive and admits closed-from
equilibrium strategies. It turns out that the properties of one-side case can be easily
extended to the two-side case.
We present our main results in Section 2.2. In Section 2.2.1 we reinterpret
the same side resilience and opposite side resilience by notions of Rosu [74]’s trading
model. The same side resilience is reflected by the positivity of the diﬀerence between
same side temporary price impact and permanent price impact caused by a same
side market order. The opposite side resilience is measured by the positivity of the
non-execution side permanent price impact. This is an essential step since the price
adjustment in this continuous time trading game is taking place instantaneously,
while the transient resilience is a time-dependent feature of a LOB. Section 2.2.2
deals with the solutions of the Markov equilibrium obtained in the one-side order
book case. We present the solution structure in our Proposition 2.2.2 which is
distinguished from the results of Rosu [74]. In Section 2.2.3, we provide a rigourous
proof of the same side resilience by looking at the asymptotic behaviour of the
price impact functions under the assumption of fast decay arrival rates. We also
construct a counterexample of the same side resilient in Proposition 2.2.4 where the
fast decaying assumption did not hold. Section 2.2.4 reproduce the results in Rosu
[74] about the opposite side resilience in this LOB model.
2.1 The model description
2.1.1 Characteristics of the LOB trading game
The limit order book is of one asset with no dividend. The game is happening
on time interval [0,∞), and trading takes place in continuous time1. The tick size
of price grid is zero, i.e. the prices can take any real value. We take the reason to
trade for all traders to be exogenous to the model. All information about the order
1Since there is no universally accepted model of continuous time stochastic game and related
definitions, we follow Rosu [74] that adopts and extends the continuous time framework of Bergin
and Macleod [12] and Rosu [73].
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book and trader strategy are publicly available. Traders can choose between market
order and limit order. The execution of limit orders is subject to the price-time
priority rule as discussed in the Section 1.2. The limit order can be cancelled or
revised at will with no cost. After order execution, the agents exit the order book
forever. There is no delay in trading, in the sense that submitting or execution
happens instantaneously.
The players form a countable set. They are distinguished by the patience
and trading directions of buy or sell. More precisely, there are four types of traders
considered here: patient buyer, patient seller, impatient buyer, and impatient seller.
Each player’s choice of buy or sell, patience and amount of trading orders are ex-
ogenously given outside of the model and stay the same during the trading game.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the impatient traders only submit market order,
which is automatically executed against existing limit orders. Patient traders choose
strategically between market and limit order and the price to submit if a limit order
is used. The price of a limit sell order, PS , and the price of a limit buy order, PB,
is constrained to lie between [P , P ]. Moreover, it is assumed that there is an infinite
supply (demand) at price P (P ) which is provided exogenously. Patient traders ar-
rive with only one unit to trade. Impatient traders can submit up to k-unit market
orders for some constant k ≥ 1.
The arrivals of traders at the order book are modelled according to indepen-
dent Poisson processes with constant, exogenous intensity rates. Denote the arrival
rates for diﬀerent type of traders as following:
For i ≤ k, µi > 0 is the arrival rate of i-unit impatient buyer. If i > k, µi = 0;
For i ≤ k, λi > 0 is the arrival rate of i-unit impatient seller. If i > k, λi = 0;
µ > 0, arrival rate of patient seller;
λ > 0, arrival rate of patient buyer.
The utility function is a trade-oﬀ between higher execution price and lower wait-
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ing costs. More specifically, the utility function for market order traders is the
instantaneous best prices at the submitting time, since they do not need to wait for
execution. The expected utility functions for limit order seller and buyer at time
t ∈ [0,∞) are defined respectively as
f(PS , t) := Et[PS − r(τ − t)]
and
g(PB, t) := −Et[−PB − r(τ − t)],
where τ > t is the random execution time and r is the waiting cost discount factor
for patient agents. That is, limit order traders bear the execution time risk. There
are a few things we should note about these utility functions. First, −g represents
the expected utility of a buyer since the higher utility is obtained for a buyer by
lowering the price to pay. The sign ‘−’ was moved to the right hand side so that it
is convenient to maximise both f and g for buyer and seller at any time. Second,
by assuming a linear relationship between the execution price and the discounted
waiting cost, there is possibility that the utility becomes negative. One could instead
consider an alternative form of utility functions
f(PS , t) := E
￿
SPe−r(τ−t)
￿
and
f(PB, t) := E
￿
PBe−r(τ−t)
￿
.
However, the model is already too complicated to add more complexity from the
utility function. To this end, we can always choose the waiting cost discount factor r
such that the utility is positive. In fact, we will see in the sequel that in equilibrium
the utility has a positive constant lower bound.
The players can respond immediately in this continuous time trading setting.
In other words, the trader will keep the current order as long as the other agents
stays unchanged, but if some other agents deviate from the current state at some
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time t, this trader will immediately undercut her order price at t.
2.1.2 One-side order book game
In this section, we will consider firstly one-side of the order book. Without
loss of generality, we focus on the ask side of a LOB. For the ask side, the best bid
price is the reservation value of the limit order sellers, as they can always submit a
market sell order at the best bid price and exit the trading. So we set the lowest
price P to be the best bid price for sellers.
For description simplicity, we set Σ := lim
k→∞
￿k
i=1 µi and introduce the fol-
lowing notations:
m: the number of limit order sellers in the order book;
am(i): the ask price of the ith limit sell order counted from the best ask price, in
an order book with m limit order sellers with i = 1, ...,m;
am: the best ask price for a m limit order seller order book.
Firstly, we review the construction of the competitive Markovian equilibrium
in Rosu [74]. At the beginning, the order book is empty, i.e. m = 0. At some time t
patient seller 1 comes and places a limit order at the maximum price level a1 = P .
This is required by the Nash equilibrium since P is the highest price as long as
seller 1 is the only one in the order book. Suppose then a second patient seller 2
arrives. If immediate response is not allowed, seller 2 would secure earlier execution
by placing a limit order at a2 = a1− δ for some very small δ > 0. The limit order of
seller 2 gets executed before that of seller 1 with only infinitesimal price sacrifice, the
expected utility of seller 2 is strictly higher than that of seller 1. However, seller 1 is
allowed to undercut his limit order instantaneously to a1−2δ. So a price war would
follow. As the limit order price gets undercut, the utility for both of them decreases.
Therefore, in equilibrium, seller 2 should submit a limit order at a2 < a1 = P such
that both sellers have the same expected utility.
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The same idea works for m-seller order book as well. In equilibrium, the
sellers have their limit orders placed at diﬀerent prices but get the same expected
utility; otherwise, they would be undercut by each other. The same-utility property
reflects the assumption that the seller with a higher limit order price needs to wait
longer. As a result, we could show that in equilibrium the utility of limit order seller
depends only on the number of active sellers in the book m. Thereafter, we denote
the seller’s expected utility by fm. Since the arrival of patient sellers is modelled by
exogenously given independent Poisson processes, the state variable m is exogenous
and follows a Markov process. According to the definition of Markov strategy in
Maskin and Tirole [63], the state m utility function fm and the trading strategy
form a Markovian perfect equilibrium.
Apart from determining the price strategies in equilibrium, we also need to
know how limit sell order traders revise their orders when someone in the book
deviates. To this end, Rosu [74] applied the notion of competitive2 equilibrium,
in which a local deviation from one trader can be stopped by any other trader’s
immediate undercutting, assuming that the rest of the equilibrium does not change.
The features of large amount trader and instantaneous response make the choice of
competitive equilibrium natural3.
Then we consider some properties of the utility function fm, i.e. the boundary
conditions of fm. We should note that the state variable m is the only state member
and must be finite. Suppose m→∞, the expected execution time for the top seller,
i.e. the seller with the highest ask price, would be E[τ ]→∞. Hence the top seller’s
expected utility is E[am(m)− r(τ − t)]→ −∞. Instead, the top seller could at least
improve her trading by submitting a market order with price P which gives him the
reservation utility.
2An example of non-competitive equilibrium is given in the NASDAQ dealer market study by
Christie and Schults [23].
3By Rosu [73], an Markovian equilibrium is competitive if a restriction of the strategies on time
interval (t, t+ δ) is still a Markov equilibrium. This restriction can be made because of the Markov
condition with which pay-oﬀ related history is reduced to the limit of outcomes at a single time
point.
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In addition, from the economic point of view, we obtain that the expected
utility function fm decreases with m and the best ask price am is decreasing with m
(since more limit order sellers incur longer waiting time). Meanwhile, the minimum
value of a limit sell order should be no less than the reservation value P . In other
words, when the utility of waiting till execution is less than the utility of submitting
a market sell order at P (recall that P is defined to be the best bid price), some
seller would just cancel their limit orders and place market orders at P . Then
it is reasonable to define a maximum capacity M := max{m : fm ≥ P}4 and a
mixed strategy in which limit order trader randomly switches to a market order
with Poisson(ν). There are four types of mixed strategies that could happen when
there are M sellers. These are introduced in Proposition 12 and Corollary 2 in
Rosu [74]. In particular, the notion of rigid equilibrium is constructed here. Rigid
equilibrium means that if some agents have mixed strategies, mixing is done only
by the agents with the most competitive limit orders (highest bid or lowest ask).
Then, we derive a recursive system of utility functions fm to compute the
equilibrium strategy. For a book of m < M sellers in equilibrium, the market can
go to: state m+1 if a new limit order seller arrives with probability µµ+Σ , or to state
m− i with i = 1, ..., k if an i-unit market order buyer arrives with probability µiµ+Σ ,
where Σ =
￿
µi. Apart from this, patient sellers lost utility in a way proportional
to expected waiting time with discount factor r. One obtains the formula
fm =
µ
µ+ Σ
fm+1 +
k￿
i=1
µi
µ+ Σ
fm−i − r
µ+ Σ
.
Furthermore, we construct the individual limit sell order prices am(i) for i =
1, . . . ,min{m, k}. With rate µi, an impatient buyer arrives and places an i unit
market order. The ith seller will receives am(i). The non-executed sellers will have
4If fM < P , some of the sellers could always improve their utility by submitting a market order
directly at price P and get a better utility P > fM . This is a contradiction with the optimisation
of each trading strategy. If fM > P , let us consider what happens in state M + 1. If one agent
accepted h = P at some time and exited the game, the utility of the other agents would be fM > P .
The utility for the agent who accepts h is lower than fM . So no seller would accept h and everybody
waits. But this is in contradiction with M being the largest state in which agents wait.
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the same utility which is equal to fm−i with probability µiΣ . Since all sellers must
have the same expected utility in equilibrium, the ith price in a m-seller order book
am(i) must be equal to the expectation of all possible utilities, i.e.
am(i) =
￿
j≥i µjfm−j￿
j≥i µj
. (2.1.1)
Define by convention that fi = P for i ≤ 0.5
When the order book reaches its maximum capacity M , the arrival of a new
patient seller does not aﬀect the state of the order book since in equilibrium the new
arrival will immediately place a market order at price P and exit. With probability
µi
ν+Σ an i-unit market order buyer arrives, the system would go to state M − i. Or
with probability νν+Σ the bottom seller, i.e. the seller with the lowest ask price,
switches to a market order at P and exits by the rule of rigid equilibrium. Similarly
one obtains a formula for state M utility, which is
fM =
ν
ν + Σ
fM−1 +
k￿
i=1
µi
ν + Σ
fM−i − rν + Σ .
Theorem 2 in Rosu [74] provides the strategy in equilibrium: if m = 1, then place a
limit order at a1(1) = P ; If m = 2, ...,M−1, look at the bottom k levels (or at all m
levels if m < k), which are am(1), ..., am(k). If any of them is not occupied, occupy
it. Anything above am(k) does not matter; if m = M , the strategy is the same as
for m = 2, ...,M − 1, except for the bottom seller at aM (1), who exits (by placing
a market order at P ) after the first arrival in a Poisson process with intensity ν; If
m > M , then immediately place a market order at P . The equilibrium is unique
in the class of rigid equilibria, in the sense that any other rigid equilibrium leads to
the same evolution of the state variables.
5This can be seen by equation (2.1.1) and a1 = P . It is technically required that a1 = a1(1) =￿
j≥1 µjfm−j￿
j≥1 µj
= P , although for i ≤ 0 fi has no practical meaning.
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2.1.3 Two-side order book game
Now we are ready to review the two-side case in Rosu [74], since the derivation
of the opposite-side resilience depends on the knowledge of the best prices am,n and
bm,n. Similarly as in the one-side case, we will familiarize ourselves with the possible
trading activities, the set of state variables (m,n) where m is the number of patient
sellers and n the number of patient buyers in the book, and the recursive system of
utility functions fm,n and gm,n. Thereafter, if given a solution of the recursive system
of f , g, according to Definition 4 in Rosu [74] one can then obtain the formulas for
best prices am,n and bm,n.
For simplicity in the two-side game, we assume that the impatient traders
can only submit one-unit order, i.e. µi = 0 and λi = 0 if i > 1, and will denote by
m : the number of limit order sellers in the order book;
n: the number of limit order buyers in the order book;
am,n: the best ask price in a m limit sell and n limit buy order book;
bm,n: the best bid price in a m limit sell and n limit buy order book.
For illustration, let us see the trading activities for example at state (1, 0).
The market may go to:
(0, 0) if either an impatient buyer arrives after time T1 ∼ exp(µ1) and buy with a
market order at price a1,0 = P , since a1,0 = P is the highest possible sell price
to achieve for the patient seller in the range [P , P ]; or after some random time
T2 ∼ exp(λ) a patient buyer arrives and submits a limit buy order at price
h. The existing patient seller accepts to trade at h if the expected utility
of waiting till next arrival of a new agent is less than h according to the
Proposition 12 in Rosu [74].
(1, 1) if after some random time T2 ∼ exp(λ) a patient buyer arrives and submits a
limit buy order at price h, but the existing seller does not accept h. Then the
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patient buyer stays and behaves as a monopolist at the bid side by changing
bid price from h to a lowest buy price at B immediately.
(2, 0) if another impatient seller arrives after time T3 ∼ exp(λ1).
As in the one-side case, if an order book with m limit order sellers and n
limit order buyers is in equilibrium, all the m sellers must have the same expected
utility denoted by fm,n, and all the n buyers must have the same (minus) expected
utility denoted by gm,n. It is defined that the state region Ω as the set of all states
(m,n) where in equilibrium agents wait in expectation for some positive time. The
state variable m,n are finite because of the same reason as stated in the one-side
case.
Thereafter, we can summarize all possible trading activities. For any state
(m,n) ∈ Ω, the system can go to the following neighbouring states:
Activity A: leading to (m − 1, n), (1) if an impatient buyer arrives, or (2) if a
patient buyer arrives and place a market order to trade with the bottom limit
order seller at the best ask price am,n, or (3) if a patient seller cancels the limit
order and submits a market order at P when n = 0;
Activity B: leading to (m + 1, n), if a patient seller arrives and submits a limit
order;
Activity C: leading to (m,n − 1), (1) if an impatient seller arrives, or (2) if a
patient seller arrives and place a market order to trade with the top limit
order buyer at the best bid price bm,n, or (3) if a patient buyer cancels the
limit order and places a market order at P when m = 0;
Activity D: leading to (m,n + 1), if a patient buyer arrives and submits a limit
order;
Activity E: leading to (m − 1, n − 1), (1) if the existing bottom patient seller
switches to a limit order at a lower than best ask (bid) price h such that
h = fm,n = gm,n, and the existing top patient buyer immediately accepts it
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by placing a market order; (2) if the existing top patient buyer switches to a
limit order at a higher than best bid price h such that h = fm,n = gm,n, and
the existing bottom patient seller immediately accepts it by placing a market
order.
Now we are ready to define the mixed strategies under this two-side case.
First of all, it is observed from Proposition 12 case (1) that it must be fm,n > gm,n
if all traders prefer to wait in the order book. Otherwise, in state (m,n) with
fm,n < gm,n, the patient sellers could improve their utility by placing a limit order
at some price level h ∈ [fm,n, gm,n] and some patient buyer immediately accepts one
of the oﬀers by placing a market order. This is feasible by noting that −gm,n is
the expected utility for buyers. This reflects the fact that as new patient buyers
and sellers arrive, they place limit orders on both sides until it is better oﬀ to trade
immediately rather than wait. In case of state (m,n) with fm,n = gm,n, the order
book is defined to be full and the traders on both sides play a game of attrition. By
Proposition 12 and Corollary 2 in Rosu [74], according to a Poisson process with
intensity νm,n traders on both sides might apply mixed strategies. More specifically,
they are one of the following four cases of mixed strategies: A(3), C(3) and E(1),
E(2). The set of the states (m,n) at which mixed strategies take place is defined as
the boundary γ of Ω.
In the two-side limit order book, some typical points in Ω can be summarised
as in Figure 2.1, in which the big dots are boundary and small dots are the interior
of the state region. Notations in this figure follow those in Rosu [74]. We should
note that Ω does not have to be that specific shape.
For each point (m,n) in the state region, we can get a coupled system for
fm,n and gm,n and corresponding equations for am,n and bm,n. Recall that k is the
maximum units that a market order can trade with and r is the waiting discount
factor. For each boundary point (m,n) ∈ γ, a corresponding number νm,n ≥ 0 is the
intensity of a Poisson process with which some traders will have mixed strategies.
Let ν be the collection of all νm,n. Set Σ1 = µ+ λ+ µ1 + λ1, and Σ2 = µ+ λ+ λ1.
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Figure 2.1: Types of points in the state region Ω cited from Rosu [74]. The points
at boundary are types 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5. The types 0, 1, 2a, 2b are interior points.
Then define the recursive system associated to (Ω, k, ν) by considering the following
set of equations for each state (m,n) ∈ Ω .
First, we consider the interior points at which there are no mixed strategies.
If (m,n) is of type 0, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, we have m = 0 and n = 0. Then
we define by convention f0,0 = P and g0,0 = P . If (m,n) is of type 1, there are
four possible trading activities which can aﬀect the state. They are activities A(1),
C(1), B and D. One obtains the recursive equations
fm,n =
1
Σ1
[fm+1,nµ+ fm,n+1λ+ fm−1,nλ1 + fm,n−1µ1 − r]
and
gm,n =
1
Σ1
[gm+1,nµ+ gm,n+1λ+ gm−1,nλ1 + gm,n−1µ1 + r] .
If (m,n) is of type 2a, this is the state where there is no existing limit order sellers.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, we have m = 0. Then set f0,n = P . The arrivals of
patient seller, patient buyer and impatient seller might incur respectively activities
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B, D and C(1). One obtains the formula for g0,n as
g0,n =
1
Σ2
[g1,nµ+ g0,n+1λ+ g0,n−1λ1 + r] .
For type 2b, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, we have n = 0. So the recursive equations
under this situation, fm,0 and gm,0, are similar to those for type 2a.
Next, we look at the boundary states when mixed strategies might happen.
If state (m,n) is of type 3a, set by convention f0,n = P . Since the capacity of limit
order buyers reaches its maximum and there is no existing limit order sellers, event
E(2) is not possible but C(3) might happen at price P . The arrivals of new patient
seller will place a limit order and stay in the book, which implies activity B not
A(1). The arrival of new impatient seller incurs activity C(1). Thus, one get the
formula for limit order sellers’ utility
g0,n =
1
µ+ ν0,n + λ1
[g1,nµ+ g0,n−1ν0,n + g0,n−1λ1 + r] .
If (m,n) is of type 4a, existing limit order sellers reach its maximum capacity.
Therefore the limit order sellers will not wait but trade following activity E(1). If a
new patient seller arrives, she will immediately submit a market sell order and trade
with the top limit order buyer at bm,n. This implies that activity C(2) might happen.
If a fnew patient buyer arrives, it is still better to wait than trade immediately for
him. So event D is possible. The trading of impatient buyer and seller will incur
event A(1) and C(1). One obtains the utility functions
fm,n =
1
Σ1 + νm,n
[fm,n−1µ+ fm,n+1λ+ fm−1,nµ1
+ fm,n−1λ1 − r + fm−1,n−1νm,n]
and
gm,n =
1
Σ1 + νm,n
[gm,n−1µ+ gm,n+1λ+ gm−1,nµ1
+ gm,n−1λ1 + r + gm−1,n−1νm,n].
28
If (m,n) is of type 5, in the case of impatient traders arrival, they trade as normal
with market orders, which are events B and D. In the case of patient traders arrival,
the order book is in a state where it is better to trade immediately than wait. So
patient traders will either do E(1), E(2) or do A(2), C(2). Thus, one obtains the
formula
fm,n =
1
Σ1 + 2νm,n
[fm,n−1µ+ fm−1,nλ+ fm−1,nµ1
+ fm,n−1λ1 − r + 2fm−1,n−1νm,n]
and
gm,n =
1
Σ1 + 2νm,n
[gm,n−1µ+ gm−1,nλ+ gm−1,nµ1
+ gm,n−1λ1 + r + 2gm−1,n−1νm,n].
We can define am,n and bm,n based on the ideas of the same expected utility
in equilibrium as in the one-side case. More specifically, the one who is getting
executed must have the same expected utility as the other traders in the book on
the same side. They are given by the following formulas:
am,n = fm−1,n and bm,n = gm,n−1, if (m,n) is of type 1;
a0,n = P and b0,n = g0,n−1, if (m,n) is of type 2a;
am,0 = fm−1,0 and bm,0 = P , if (m,n) is of type 2b.
For those points on the boundary, without loss of generality, we will give the
derivation of am,n at state of type 5. There are three situations where the existing
bottom limit order seller gets executed: trade to a market buy order in cases of
A(1), A(2) or do mixed strategy E(1). With probability µ1+λµ1+λ+νm,n , the bottom
seller trades to market buy order and receives am,n, while the other limit order
sellers get fm−1,n. With probability
νm,n
µ1+λ+νm,n
, the bottom seller switches to a limit
order at some lower level h, and the top limit order buyer immediately switches to
a market buy order and accepts the oﬀer at h. This price h should be one such
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that for both the bottom seller and top buyer not losing utility than fm,n and gm,n
respectively. So it has to be that h = fm,n = gm,n. All the other sellers now get
utility fm−1,n−1. The same expected utility for all sellers leads to the relationship
am,n(µ1 + λ) + νm,nfm,n = fm−1,n(µ1 + λ) + νm,nfm−1,n−1.
Thereafter, we get the formulas
am,n = fm−1,n +
νm,n
λ+ µ1
(fm−1,n−1 − fm,n)
and
bm,n = gm,n−1 +
νm,n
λ+ µ1
(gm−1,n−1 − gm,n).
The derivations for other types of boundary points are similar.
Theorem 3 in Rosu [74] gives the existence of a rigid, competitive Markovian
equilibrium in the two-side case. We summarise it here: If (m,n) is in the interior
of set Ω, the bottom seller places a limit sell order at am,n, and the top buyer places
a limit buy order at bm,n. If (m,n) ∈ γ, then the strategy is the same as the one
above, except that with the first arrival in a Poisson process with intensity (νm,n)
the bottom seller changes the limit order from am,n to h = fm,n = gm,n, and the
top buyer immediately accepts it via a market buy order; the top buyer would not
accept any higher limit sell order. If (m,n) /∈ Ω andm,n > 0, then the bottom seller
places a limit order at h = fm,n = gm,n and the top buyer immediately accepts it
via a market order. If (m,n) /∈ Ω and n = 0, then the bottom seller places a market
order at P and exists the game.
2.2 Price impact and resilience
We present some of our main contributions in this section, we firstly translate
the definitions of the price impact and the price overshoot in Rosu [74] by notions of
two-side resilience correspondingly. Secondly, for the equilibrium strategies in one-
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side case, we give a rigourous proof of the theorem 2 in Rosu [74] by introducing the
proposition 2.2.2. Thirdly, we provide a rigourous proof for same side resilience in
the Proposition 2.2.3. Finally, we also provide an counterexample of the conjecture
in Rosu [74], which stated that the same side resilience exists without the restriction
on arrival rates µi and µ.
2.2.1 Resilience measurement
Recall that the same side resilience is the decay of the price impact on the
same side of the large market order. The opposite side resilience is the decay of the
price impact on the opposite side of the large order.
When an i−unit market buy order is submitted to the order book of m limit
order sellers, this market order clears the sell orders from the lowest one to the
lowest ith order. The lowest (i+1)th limit sell order immediately becomes the new
best ask order in the order book. This is the immediate price impact incurred by
the large order. Since the agents are fully strategic, they instantly regroup to adjust
to the new state with m− i sellers. The second best ask price changes corresponds
to the transit decay of the first price change.
In Rosu’s model [74], these two price changes take place instantaneously,
and are described by the notions of temporary and permanent impact. However,
as stated in Chapter 1, the permanent price impact is observed in the long term
time. To prevent misunderstanding, in this thesis the permanent price impact is
the second price change and the temporary price impact is the first price change
as discussed above. Without loss of generality, we will define the temporary and
permanent price impact on the ask side of the order book. These definitions could
be extended to the bid side in a similar way.
Definition 2.2.1: Consider the limit order book with only patient sellers and impa-
tient buyers who can submit a market order of size at most k-unit for some k > 1.
In the state of m patient sellers, denote by am(j) the ask price of the jth limit sell
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order starting from the best ask price am(1) for j ≤ m. Denote by i0 := min{k,m}.
The temporary price impact on the ask side caused by a buy market order of size
i ≤ i0 is defined as the diﬀerence
IAm(i) := am(i+ 1)− am(1), (2.2.1)
which is the diﬀerence between the i+ 1￿st oﬀer am(i+ 1) from the bottom and the
best ask price am(1).
The permanent price impact on the ask side caused by a buy market order of
size i ≤ i0 is given by
PAm(i) := am−i(1)− am(1), (2.2.2)
which is the diﬀerence between the best ask price am−i(1) in the state with m − i
sellers and the best ask price am(1) before the market order was submitted.
If use the superscription A for the ask side and B for the bid side, we say
there is the same side resilience if the diﬀerence between same side temporary impact
and permanent impact is positive, i.e. IAm(i) − PAm(i) > 0 and IBm(i) − PBm (i) > 0.
The opposite side resilience is measured by the positivity of the opposite side, or
non-execution side, permanent impact, i.e. PBm (i) > 0 if I
A
m(i) is non-negative and
PAm(i) > 0 if I
B
m(i) is non-negative.
2.2.2 Solution of the recursive system in the one-side case
In this part, we will discuss the properties of the solution of the recursive
system proposed in the one-side order book case. This is an important step in
proving the same side resilience and opposite side resilience. In general, it is diﬃcult
to get an explicit solution of the coupled recursive system in the two-side case.
Consider the limit order book with only patient sellers and impatient buyers who
can submit up to k-unit market orders for some k > 1, placing orders between the
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price range [P , P ]; patient sellers arrive at rate µ > 0 and have waiting cost discount
factor r > 0; impatient buyers who submit i-unit market orders arrive at rate µi > 0
if i ≤ k and µi = 0 if i > k. Let us recall the recursive equations of the sellers’
expected utility fm with the boundary conditions given by
fi = P if i ≤ 0,￿
1 + Σµ
￿
fm = fm+1 +
￿
i≥1
µi
µ fm−i − rµ for 1 ≤ m ≤M − 1,￿
1 + Σν
￿
fM = fM−1 +
￿
i≥1
µi
ν fM−i − rν ,
fM = P ,
(2.2.3)
where Σ =
￿
i≥1 µi and µj = 0 if j > k.
The structure of the solution for the recursive system (2.2.3) is presented in
Proposition 2.2.2.
Proposition 2.2.2: Given the diﬀerence equation
￿
1 +
Σ
µ
￿
fm = fm+1 +
￿
i≥1
µi
µ
fm−i − r
µ
for 1 ≤ m ≤M − 1
with Σ =
￿
i≥1 µi and µj = 0 if j > k. Assume that µ >
￿
i≥1 iµi. The structure
of the solution to this diﬀerence equation is given by
fm = C0 + C1α1(m) + . . .+ Ckαk(m) +
r
µ−￿i≥1 iµim
where α0 = 1 and α1(m), . . . ,αk(m) are the corresponding ansatz solutions of the
diﬀerence equation (2.2.2). αi(m) are functions of m and µ, µ1, ..., µk.
The constants C0, . . . , Ck and M are determined by the boundary conditions
fi = P if i ≤ 0, fM = P and the state M diﬀerence equation￿
1 +
Σ
ν
￿
fM = fM−1 +
￿
i≥1
µi
ν
fM−i − rν . (2.2.4)
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2.2.3 Same side resilience
As proposed in Assumption 1 and Proposition 8 by Rosu [74], the same side
resilience is obtained under the assumption that the market order arrival rate of
i ≥ 2-unit is much smaller than the arrival rate of one-unit order. One possible
reason behind this assumption is due to the large order splitting behaviour in the
market. Traders usually like to use small size order to eliminate the adverse price
change. Thus, it is natural to make this assumption and study the market under it.
Besides, we will test the attempt to relax this assumption in the end of this section.
It is shown there that if the arrival rates of impatient traders satisfy are all the
same, there does not exists the same side resilience in this microstructure model.
Before providing a mathematically rigorous proof of the same side resilience,
we base on and improve the notation in Rosu [74]. For i ≥ 2, denote by
µi = ￿φiµ1 with ￿i ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ φi <∞.
The numbers φi are called the relative arrival rates. The utility function fm and
the ask prices am(i) are now functions of µ, µ1, ￿ and φi>1.
Recall that the same side resilience is measured by the positivity of the
diﬀerence between same side temporary impact and permanent impact, i.e. IAm(i)−
PAm(i) > 0. The presence of the same side resilience
6 is summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.2.3: Consider the limit order book with only patient sellers and
impatient buyers who can submit up to k-unit market orders for some k > 1, placing
orders between the price range [P , P ]; patient sellers arrive at rate µ > 0 and have
waiting cost discount factor r > 0; impatient buyers who submit i-unit market orders
arrive at rate µi > 0 if i ≤ k and µi = 0 if i > k. If the arrival rates of the impatient
6The rational behind the same side resilience eﬀect given by Rosu [74], is that in order to
take advantage of larger incoming market orders, the patient sellers stay higher price in the book.
Once an i-unit market order hits the order book, the rest of patient sellers readjust because of the
(oﬀ-equilibrium) competitive behaviour.
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buyers satisfy the following conditions:
1. µ >
￿
i≥1 iµi, i.e. patient sellers arrive faster than the units demanded by the
impatient buyers,
2. ￿→ 0+, i.e. the arrival rates µi>1 are much smaller than µ1,
the temporary price impact IAm(i) is larger than the permanent price impact P
A
m(i).
A sketch of the proof: step 1, one proves the continuity of the ansatz solutions
(α0,α1, ...,αk) ∈ Rk+1 of the diﬀerence equation 2.2.2 at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0) ∈
Rk+1; step 2, one needs to find the limit lim
￿→0+
fm for any m ≤M ; step 3, one proves
the limit of the consecutive diﬀerence of fm is positive; step 4, one estimates the
asymptotic behaviour of the diﬀerences am−i(1)− fm−i−1 and am(i+ 1)− fm−i−1.
Conjectured in Rosu [74], he speculated that the same side resilience holds
without the assumption on fast decaying arrival rates µi for i ≥ 2. However, by the
following counterexample, it is shown that this conjecture does not hold when the
arrival rates µi are all the same for i ≥ 1.
Proposition 2.2.4: Consider the limit order book with only patient sellers and
impatient buyers who can submit up to k-unit market orders for some k > 1, placing
orders between the price range [P , P ]; patient sellers arrive at rate µ > 0 and have
waiting cost discount factor r > 0; impatient buyers who submit i-unit market orders
arrive at rate µi > 0 if i ≤ k and µi = 0 if i > k.
If the arrival rates µi = µi+1 for i = 1, ..., k− 1, then there does not exist the
same side resilience in this trading game.
2.2.4 Opposite side resilience
Recalling that in the two side order book case, we only consider k = 1, i.e.
only one-unit market orders are considered. The opposite side resilience is measured
by the positivity of the opposite side permanent impact given there are temporary
impact on the same side of the larger order.
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In order to prove the opposite side resilience, Rosu [74] suggests to regard the
limit order book as the collection of the ask side and bid side. The reservation value
for each side is given by the best price on the other side. Without loss of generality
in state (m+ 1, n), the sell side of the book can be considered as a one-side model
with lower bound of price range P = bm+1,n, i.e. the best bid price. When the
best bid price P moves down to P − ∆ for some ∆ > 0, which is caused by an
one-unit market order, one can observe a fall of the ask price am+1,n too in this
model. The Proposition 10 in Rosu [74] gives an approximation of the magnitude
of the opposite side resilience. We review and prove it here again for consistency
reason. From the proof, we should also note that this proposition works when the
order book is not full, i.e. the interior of the state region Ω. This is due to an
approximation expression of am+1,n by fm,n.
Proposition 2.2.5: Suppose the limit order book is in the state with m+ 1 sellers
and n buyers, where (m+1, n) is not on the boundary set γ. Assume that λ = µ, and
λ1 = µ1 satisfying c =
µ
µ1
> 1 and λi = µi = 0 for i > 1. Then if a market sell order
moves the best bid price down by ∆, the best ask price moves down approximately by
∆(1− 1cm ). Therefore, there exists the opposite side resilience in this LOB model.
2.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. The diﬀerence equation (2.2.2) can be rewritten as
(µ+ Σ)fm + r = µfm+1 + µ1fm−1 + . . .+ µkfm−k.
The corresponding homogeneous equation is
µfm+1 − (µ+ Σ)fm + µ1fm−1 + . . .+ µkfm−k = 0.
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The auxiliary equation is given by
Pk+1(x) = µxk+1 − (µ+ Σ)xk + µ1xk−1 + . . .+ µk.
Since all µi are positive for i = 1, ..., k, the roots β0 = 1, ...,βk of the auxiliary
equation Pk+1(x) are all not zero. Considering the possibilities of complex roots
and repeated roots, we denote by αi with i = 0, ..., k the ansatz solutions of the
diﬀerence equation (2.2.2). The general solution of the homogeneous equation can
be expressed as
fm = C0 + C1α1 + . . .+ Ckαk.
Also it is easy to check that r
µ−￿ki=1 iµim is a special solution for the diﬀerence
equation (2.2.2).
Step 1: prove the continuity of (1, a,α2, ...,αk) at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0)
Recall that β0,β1, ...,βk are the roots of the auxiliary polynomial Pk+1(x) and
α0,α1, ...,αk are the corresponding ansatz solutions of the diﬀerence equation (2.2.2).
We want to know the behaviour of αi for i = 1, 2, · · · , k as ￿→ 0+.
We will apply the continuity theorem of the roots of a polynomial given in
Cucker and Corbalan [26].
Theorem 2.3.1: Let Pn(x) = xn+a1xn−1+. . .+an be a monic complex polynomial,
and let ξ1, . . . , ξn be its roots. Given a real number ω > 0, there is a real number δ >
0 such that for every monic polynomial Qn(x) = xn+b1xn−1+. . .+bn, if |bj−aj | < δ
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then there are ζ1, . . . , ζn ∈ C such that Qn(x) =
￿
1≤j≤n(x− ζj) and
|ζj − ξj | < ω for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Lemma 2.3.2: Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.2.2, let (β0, ...,βk) be the
roots of the polynomial Pk+1(x) = µxk+1 − (µ +
￿k
i=1 µi)x
k +
￿k
i=1 µix
k−i. Given
the polynomial Qk+1(x) = µxk+1− (µ+ µ1)xk + µ1xk−1 with roots (b0, ..., bk), if the
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condition (2) of Proposition 2.2.3 is satisfied, namely the arrival rate of more-than-
one units orders µi>1 are much smaller than arrival rate of one-unit order µ1, then
the roots (β0, ...,βk) is continuous at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0), and as ￿ → 0+ the
roots (β0, ...,βk) tends to
￿
1, µ1µ , 0, . . . , 0
￿
which is the roots of polynomial Qk+1.
Moreover, the corresponding ansatz solutions α0(m), ...,αk(m) of the diﬀer-
ence equation (2.2.2) are continuous at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0) and tend to the point￿
1,
￿
µ1
µ
￿m
, 0, . . . , 0
￿
.
Proof. As ￿ → 0+, the coeﬃcients of polynomial Pk+1(x) approaches to the coeﬃ-
cients of polynomial Qk+1(x). One can easily solve the equation Qk+1(x) = 0 and
get the roots as
￿
1, µ1µ , 0, . . . , 0
￿
. By Theorem 2.3.1, we immediately obtain the
continuity of (β0, ...,βk) at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0).
The guessed corresponding solutions αi are power functions of βi or linear
combination of power functions of βi. Thus, the (α0, ...,αk) is continuous at the point
(µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0). And for all m ≤ M , one has lim
￿→0+
α0(m) = 1, lim
￿→0+
α1(m) =
￿
µ1
µ
￿m
and lim
￿→0+
αi(m) = 0 for i > 1.
Step 2: find the limit of fm as ￿→ 0+ for any m ≤M
Lemma 2.3.3: Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.2.2, one has
lim
￿→0+
fm = P + C
￿￿
µ1
µ
￿m
− 1
￿
+
r
µ− µ1m. (2.3.1)
The constant C is given by
C =
r
µ− µ1
µ+ν
µ1+ν￿
µ1
µ
￿M−1 ￿
1− µ1µ
￿ .
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, the boundary conditions associated with diﬀerence
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equation (2.2.2) are
C0 + C1α1(−j) + . . .+ Ckαk(−j) = P + j rµ−￿ iµi (2.3.2)
and
C0 + C1α1(M) + . . .+ Ckαk(M) = P −M rµ−￿ iµi .
As ￿→ 0+, one gets αi(j)→ 0 for i > 1 by Lemma 2.3.2. So the limit αi(−j)→∞
for i > 1 as ￿→ 0+ holds. We find that the limit of the RHS of equation (2.3.2) is
finite as ￿ becomes very small. Then, for i > 1 it has to be lim￿→0+ Ci < ∞ such
that Ci = o(αi(j)). Thus, we get
lim
￿→0+
fm = lim
￿→0+
￿
C0 + C1α1(m) + C2α2(m) + . . .+ Ckαk(m) +
r
µ−￿ iµim
￿
= C0 + C1 lim
￿→0+
α1(m) + lim
￿→0+
C2 lim
￿→0+
α2(m) + . . .+ lim
￿→0+
Ck lim
￿→0+
αk(m) +
r
µ− µ1m
= C0 + C1
￿
µ1
µ
￿m
+
r
µ− µ1m.
Since Ci = o(αi(j)) for i > 1, the asymptotic behaviour of the boundary conditions
implies
lim
￿→0+
f0 = lim
￿→0+
(C0 + C1 + . . .+ Ck) = C0 + C1 = P
and
lim
￿→0+
fM − rµ− µ1M = lim￿→0+C0 + C1α1(M) + . . .+ Ckαk(M) = C0 + C1
￿
µ1
µ
￿M
= P .
We solve the above boundary conditions and get
C1 =
P − P + rµ−µ1M
1−
￿
µ1
µ
￿M <∞ and C0 = P − P
￿
µ1
µ
￿M − rµ−µ1M
1−
￿
µ1
µ
￿M <∞.
Thereafter, the limit of the utility function fm can be rewritten as
fm = P + C
￿￿
µ1
µ
￿m
− 1
￿
+
r
µ− µ1m,
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where the constant C is given by
C =
r
µ− µ1
µ+ν
µ1+ν￿
µ1
µ
￿M−1 ￿
1− µ1µ
￿ .
Step 3: find the consecutive diﬀerence of fm.
Lemma 2.3.4: Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.2.2, one obtains lim
￿→0+
(fm−1−
fm) > 0.
Proof. We estimate the consecutive diﬀerence of fm as follows
lim
￿→0+
(fm−1 − fm) = C
￿
µ1
µ
￿m−1￿
1− µ1
µ
￿
− r
µ− µ1
=
r
µ− µ1
µ+ν
µ1+ν￿
µ1
µ
￿M−1 ￿
1− µ1µ
￿ ￿µ1
µ
￿m−1￿
1− µ1
µ
￿
− r
µ− µ1
=
r
µ− µ1
￿
µ+ ν
µ1 + ν
￿
µ1
µ
￿m−M
− 1
￿
> 0.
The last inequality holds as the assumption of µ > µ1.
Denote by La,b = lim￿→0+(fa − fb) for all 0 < a < b ≤ M . Since fa − fb =
(fa − fa+1) + (fa+1 − fa+2) + . . . + (fb−1 − fb), we then get the general diﬀerence
given by
lim
￿→0+
(fa − fb) = La,a+1 + . . .+ Lb−1,b > 0.
Step 4: estimate the diﬀerences am−i(1)− fm−i−1 and am(i+ 1)− fm−i−1
Recall that the ask prices in equilibrium are given by am(i) =
￿
j≥i µjfm−j￿
j≥i µj
,
and the arrival rates of market order for more than one unit are denoted by µi =
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￿µ1φi with ￿ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ φi <∞.
Lemma 2.3.5: Under the assumption of Proposition 2.2.2, if the arrival rates µi>1
are much smaller than µ1, namely ￿ tends to the zero from right, the diﬀerence
am−i(1)− fm−i−1 is estimated as 0 < am−i(1)− fm−i−1 < o(1).
Proof. According to Lemma 2.3.2 and Lemma 2.3.3, the diﬀerence am−i(1)−fm−i−1
is continuous at the point (µ, µ1, 0, ..., 0). We can then compute the limit of the
diﬀerence am−i(1)− fm−i−1 as follows
lim
￿→0+
(am−i(1)− fm−i−1)
= lim
￿→0+
µ1fm−i−1 + . . .+ ￿φkµ1fm−i−k
µ1 + ￿µ1(φ2 + . . .+ φk)
− µ1fm−i−1 + ￿µ1(φ2 + . . .+ φk)fm−i−1
µ1 + ￿µ1(φ2 + . . .+ φk)
= lim
￿→0+
￿
1 + ￿(φ2 + . . .+ φk)
(φ2(fm−i−2 − fm−i−1) + . . .+ φk(fm−i−k − fm−i−1))
= lim
￿→0+
￿
1 + ￿(φ2 + . . .+ φk)
lim
￿→0+
[φ2(fm−i−2 − fm−i−1) + . . .+ φk(fm−i−k − fm−i−1)]
= 0.
The last equation holds because of Lemma 2.3.4.
Lemma 2.3.6: Under the assumption of Proposition 2.2.2, if the arrival rates µi>1
are much smaller than µ1, one has lim
￿→0+
(am(i+ 1)− fm−i−1) > 0.
Proof. First, we note that for any ￿ > 0, the diﬀerence is positive, i.e.
am(i+ 1)− fm−i−1 = φkfm−k + . . .+ φi+1fm−i−1
φk + . . .+ φi+1
− fm−i−1
=
1
φk + . . .+ φi+1
[φk(fm−k − fm−i−1) + . . .
+ φi+1(fm−i−1 − fm−i−1)] > 0.
Since fm is decreasing with m, for i + 1 ≤ j ≤ k, m − k ≤ m − j ≤ m − i − 1 one
has fm−k ≥ fm−j ≥ fm−i−1. Thus the last inequality holds.
Next, we look at the asymptotic behaviour of the diﬀerence am(i+1)−fm−i−1
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when ￿→ 0+. By Lemma 2.3.4, one gets
lim
￿→0+
(am(i+ 1)− fm−i−1)
= lim
￿→0+
1
φk + . . .+ φi+1
[φk(fm−k − fm−i−1) + . . .+ φi+1(fm−i−1 − fm−i−1)]
=
1
φk + . . .+ φi+1
[φkLm−k,m−i−1 + . . .+ φi+1Lm−i−1,m−i−1] > 0.
Step 5: to prove the same side resilience
Proof of Proposition 2.2.3. There is same side resilience if and only if IAm(i) = am(i+
1)− am(1) > am−i(1)− am(1) = PAm(i), which is equivalent to establish am(i+1) >
am−i(1).
By Lemma 2.3.5, we know lim
￿→0+
(am−i(1) − fm−i−1) = 0. That implies that
for ∀θ > 0, there is δ > 0 such that for all 0 < µi < δ with i > 1, one has
|am−i(1) − fm−i−1| < θ. Furthermore, since the ask price am−i(1) can be regarded
as a weighted average of a decreasing sequence fm−i−k, fm−i−k+1,· · · , fm−i−1, one
getsam−i(1) > fm−i−1, which implies am−i(1) < fm−i−1 + θ.
By Lemma 2.3.6, lim
￿→0+
(am(i+1)− fm−i−1) > 0 implies that there are θ > 0,
for ∀δ > 0, there are some µi with i > 1 satisfying 0 < µi < δ such that am(i+1) >
fm−i−1 + θ.
Therefore, the statement IAm(i) > P
A
m(i) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.4. We prove by showing contradiction. Suppose µi = µi+1
for i = 1, ..., k − 1. Substituting to the ask prices am(i + 1) and am−i(1), we then
get
am(i+ 1) =
fm−k + . . .+ fm−i−1
k − i
and
am−i(1) =
fm−i−k + · · ·+ fm−i−1
k
.
42
We want to see if the diﬀerence am(i+ 1) > am−i(1) is positive. So we compute
k(k − i)(am(i+ 1)− am−i(1))
= kfm−k + ...+ kfm−i−1 − (k − i)fm−i−k − ...− (k − i)fm−k − ...− (k − i)fm−i−1
= i(fm−k + ...+ fm−i−1)− (k − i)[fm−i−k + ...+ fm−k+1]
= i
￿￿
1− k
i
￿
(fm−i−k + ...+ fm−k+1) + fm−k + ...+ fm−i−1
￿
< i
￿
fm−i−k
￿
1− k
i
+ k − i
￿
+
￿
1− k
i
￿
(fm−i−k+1 + ...+ fm−k+1)
￿
.
When i = 1 the RHS of the inequality is negative. This is a contradiction to the
same side resilience.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.5. For any state (m+1, n) in the interior of the state region
Ω, one has the best ask price am+1,n approximately equals fm,n with the dependence
of f on n being omitted.
The temporary price impact of an one-unit market sell order is given by
IBm+1(1) = bm+1(2)− bm+1(1). As the best bid price (or the reservation price for the
ask side traders) changes, the utility of limit order sellers changes by approximately
IBm+1(1)× dfmdP .
The dependence is computed as follows. By Proposition 2.2.2, for k = 1 and
m =M the expected utility function fM is given by fM = P +C(cM −1)+ rµ+µ1M ,
where C = rµ−µ1
µ+ν
µ1+ν
1
cM−1−cM . At the same time by boundary condition fM = P ,
one has
P = P + C(cM − 1) + r
µ+ µ1
M. (2.3.3)
Diﬀerentiating equation (2.3.3) with respect to P , one gets
1 =
dC
dP
(cM − 1).
Then the expected utility function fm depends on reservation value P in the follow-
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ing way:
dfm
dP
=
1− cm
1− cM .
One can then approximate lim
M→∞
dfm
dP = 1 − 1cm . Thus, the approximated
opposite side resilience is given by ∆
￿
1− 1cm
￿
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Chapter 3
The cross-impact LOB model
and definitions of market
irregularities
This chapter is our main contribution, which is the formulation of the cross
impact LOB model. It is an extension of the LOB model of Obizhaeva and Wang
[65]. The main diﬀerence and contribution compared to Obizhaeva and Wang [65]
is that we include the same side resilience and opposite side resilience into the LOB
market impact modelling framework and model a more general time-varying shape
function. The model formulation is provided in Section 3.1.
Two existing LOB market impact models considered in Section 3.2.1 and
Section 3.2.2 correspond to limiting cases of our cross-impact model developed in
Section 3.1. We provide the derivations of these two existing models from our cross-
impact model. Utilising the separation of the same side and opposite side resilience
in our cross-impact model, a non-zero spread in a market impact model is achieved.
In particular, the spread is an endogenous results of the two sides resilience eﬀect
instead of being exogenously given.
Finally, in Section 3.3, three market irregularity notions are provided. Two
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relationships about the absence of the three market irregularities are presented in
Proposition 3.3.4 and Proposition 3.3.5, followed by two examples showing these
hierarchy relationship are not invertible.
3.1 The model formulation
The optimal execution problem is characterised by the following standard
assumptions in the LOB based transient market impact model framework. It is
assumed there is only one large trader whose trading incurs price impact. All other
traders are noise traders, whose trading activities determine the dynamics of the
LOB when the large trader is not active. We do not presume the large trader has
private information about the trading asset. There is some amount Q > 0 (Q < 0)
of one asset to be bought (or sold) within a certain time period [0, T ] with T <∞.
The reason to trade is exogenously given outside of the optimal execution problem.
The large trader wants to minimise the trading costs by splitting the large order
Q into smaller pieces of market orders. We will use the superscription A and B to
denote the ‘ask’ and ‘bid’ side for variables.
Trading strategy
In the rest of this thesis, we focus our eﬀort on the set of deterministic execu-
tion strategies. Although it might be suboptimal in some circumstances according
to Klo¨ck [52] and Lorenz and Almgren [61], the deterministic strategy is a standard
assumption and provides some very delightful insights on optimal execution prob-
lem and market irregularity issues, as shown in most of the market impact model
literature where they focus on deterministic strategy as well. One can regard the
deterministic strategy as sample paths of the stochastic strategy.
Define a trading strategy X to be composed of two non-decreasing processes
XAt and X
B
t , which respectively represents the number of accumulative large buy
and sell orders by large-order trader up to time t ∈ [0, T ]. The trading strategy
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process Xt is defined via XAt and X
B
t as
Xt =
￿ t
0
dXAs −
￿ t
0
dXBs , with X0 = 0.
The admissible trading strategy set is defined by
A(Q) := ￿(XA, XB) : [0, T+]→ R2+ ￿￿ Xi0 = 0, XT+ = Q, Xi is non-decreasing
and bounded variation for i = A,B
￿
,
where Q > 0 (Q < 0) corresponds to a trading program of buying (selling) |Q|
shares of an asset.
In the case that trading takes place at discrete trading times T := {t0, t1, ..., tN}
with 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ... < tN ≤ T , we constrain the admissible strategy set to
AN (Q) :=
￿
(XA, XB) ∈ A(Q) ￿￿ Xit = Xitn+ a.e. on (tn, tn+1] for n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1￿
⊂ A(Q).
Another subset of A(Q) which is important for the absence of market irregularity
is the pure buy (sell) strategy set
AP (Q) :=
￿
(XA, XB) ∈ A(Q) ￿￿ XBt = 0 (XAt = 0) a.e. ∀t ∈ [0, T ]￿
⊂ A(Q).
Both impulse trading and continuous trading are allowed in a trading strategy. For
i = A,B, let us denote by dXit the continuous strategy and by ∆X
i
t := X
i
t+ − Xit
the jumps of Xi at time t. Especially, we will denote the discrete buy (sell) order
at time tn by Θin := ∆X
i
tn . We assume at a single point in time, only buy or sell
order can be submitted, in the sense that ∆XAt ∆X
B
t = 0 and dX
A
t dX
B
t = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Otherwise, only the net position is considered 1.
1If at time t, both buy and sell orders ∆XAt and ∆X
B
t are submitted by one large trader. Only a
buy order of size (∆XAt −∆XBt ) ∆XAt −∆XBt >0, or a sell order of size (∆X
B
t −∆XAt ) ∆XBt −∆XAt >0
would be taken.
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Best bid and ask price
In market impact models, it is a standard assumption that the actual trading
price is decomposed into two parts, namely an unaﬀected price process which de-
scribes the price dynamics when the large trader is not trading and the price impact
caused by the large trader. We denote by (A0t )t∈[0,T ] the unaﬀected best ask price
process and by (B0t )t∈[0,T ] the unaﬀected best bid price process. They are exoge-
nously assumed to be martingales on a given filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P)
satisfying B0t ≤ A0t .
The price impact caused by strategy (XA, XB) on the ask and bid side are
denoted respectively by sA and sB. Therefore, when the large trader trades following
strategy (XA, XB), the best ask price At and the best bid price Bt are defined as
At = A
0
t + s
A
t (X
A
t , X
B
t ),
and
Bt = B
0
t − sBt (XAt , XBt ).
Without loss of generality, we set A00 = A0 and B
0
0 = B0. The dynamics of the price
impact sA and sB will be given in the sequel.
Shape function
The shape function is an abstract description of the dynamics of limit order
volumes at diﬀerent prices. We will adopt the continuous shape function assumption
as in most market impact models. The continuity assumption enables us to keep
mathematical tractability and at the same time it makes good approximation of the
real order book. The discrete tick size of real order book will result in the shape
function being piece-wise constant. By approximation of the piece-wide constant
step function with a smooth function, we can reach any degree of smoothness.
Assume that the ask side (bid side) shape function fA(t, x) (fB(t, x)) is
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strictly positive, deterministic and twice continuous diﬀerentiable. The volume of
limit sell and buy orders at time t between prices a and b is given respectively by￿ b
a f
A(t, x)dx and
￿ b
a f
B(t, x)dx.
Dynamics of price impact and volume impact
We introduce two sides resilience eﬀect into the market impact modelling,
which are the same side resilience and the opposite side resilience introduced in
Section 1.2. We reinterpret them with notions of price impact in the following.
When a market buy order is matched against the limit sell orders on the ask
side, the best ask price decreases. This reflects the price impact on the same side of
the market order. We will denote by DAt the accumulative same side price impact
caused by previous market buy orders up to time t and byDBt the accumulative same
side price impact caused by previous market sell orders up to t. Set by convention
DA0 = 0 and D
B
0 = 0.
Let us now turn to look at the evolution of the same side price impact. More
specifically, one assumes that the same side price impact exponentially decays when
the large trader is inactive. This exponential decay assumption is a natural and
computational eﬃcient one following the line of research of Obizhaeva and Wang
[65] and Alfonsi et al. [5], though empirical studies suggested some other choices,
such as power-law decay in Weber and Rosenow [85], Gatheral [32]. We denote by
ρt the same side resilience rate for t ∈ [0, T ]. It is assumed to be deterministic,
positive and continuous diﬀerentiable. That is to say, given a trading strategy
(XA, XB) ∈ A(Q), the same side price impact DA recovers exponentially at rate ρt
dDAt = −ρtDAt dt+
dXAt
f(t,DAt )
, (3.1.1)
and the same side price impact DB recovers exponentially at rate ρt
dDBt = −ρtDBt dt+
dXBt
f(t,DBt )
, (3.1.2)
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where fA and fB are the strictly positive shape functions of the ask and bid side of
the order book.
In addition, we know that a market buy order incurs price changes not only
on the ask side, but also has an impact on the bid side. This reflects the price
impact on the opposite side of the market order, and is called the cross price impact.
Following the notation rule that superscription A is for variables on the ask side,
and superscription B is for variables on the bid side, we denote by LAt the ask side
cross price impact incurred by all previous market sell orders up to time t, and by
LBt the bid side cross price impact incurred by all previous market buy orders up to
time t. More precisely, they are functions of the form
LAt : = L
A
t (X
B
t )
and
LBt : = L
B
t (X
A
t ),
with LA0 = 0 and L
B
0 = 0.
The creative part of this thesis is that we assume the size of cross price
impact depends on the size of the same side price impact and exponentially decays
by the cross impact resilience rate of β > 0. The dynamics of the cross price impact
LA and LB are given as follows
dLAt = −(β + ρt)LAt dt+ βDBt dt, (3.1.3)
and
dLBt = −(β + ρt)LBt dt+ βDAt dt. (3.1.4)
Combining both the same side price impact and cross price impact into the
best bid and ask price, one obtains the expressions for the price impact sA and sB
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given by
sAt (X
A, XB) = DAt (X
A)− LAt (XB)
and
sBt (X
A, XB) = DBt (X
B)− LBt (XA)
with sA0 = s
B
0 = 0. In the sequel, to distinguish from the same side impact and cross
impact, we will call sA and sB the total price impact.
As suggested in Alfonsi et al. [5] and Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2], there is another
natural way to describe the market order execution and the transient decay in LOB
based market impact model, namely it is assumed a volume impact reversion.
When a market buy order is submitted to the ask side, the existing limit
sell orders are consumed by this market order. This reflects the volume impact on
the same side of the market order. We denote by EAt the accumulative volume of
limit sell orders consumed by all previous market buy orders up to time t and EBt
the accumulative volume of limit buy orders consumed by all previous market sell
orders up to time t. Set by convention that EA0 = 0 and E
B
0 = 0. We call E
A and
EB the same side volume impact.
It is assumed here that the same side volume impact decays exponentially
by the rate of ρt when the large trader is not active. The same side resilience rate
ρt is assumed to be deterministic, positive and continuous diﬀerentiable. Given a
trading strategy (XA, XB) ∈ A(Q), the dynamics of the same side volume impact
EA and EB are given by
dEAt = −ρtEAt dt+ dXAt ,
and
dEBt = −ρtEBt dt+ dXBt .
At the same time, the opposite side volume impact is described by by JAt
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and JBt . We call them the cross volume impact, which reflect the reactions on the
opposite side of the market order in terms of volume of new limit sell and buy order.
Following the same notation rule of the superscription A and B, we denote by JAt
the ask side cross volume impact incurred by all previous market sell orders up to
time t, and by JBt the bid side cross volume impact incurred by all previous market
buy orders up to time t. Given a trading strategy (XA, XB), the dynamics of the
cross volume impact follow the way
dJAt = −(β + ρt)JAt dt+ βEBt dt
and
dJBt = −(β + ρt)JBt dt+ βEAt dt
where β is the cross impact resilience rate and the initial conditions JA0 = 0 and
JB0 = 0.
Combining both the same side volume impact and cross volume impact, one
obtains the expressions for the total volume impact V A and V B
V At (X
A, XB) = EAt (X
A)− JAt (XB)
and
V Bt (X
A, XB) = EBt (X
B)− JBt (XA)
with V A0 = V
B
0 = 0.
Via the shape functions fA and fB, the relationship between total price
impact and total volume impact can be expressed as
V At =
￿ sAt
0
fA(t, x)dx (3.1.5a)
and
V Bt =
￿ 0
−sBt
fB(t, x)dx. (3.1.5b)
An example of trading and resilience in discrete time are illustrated in Figure 3.1
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and Figure 3.2. The strategy used is: buy size x0 at time t0 and wait until time
t1 at which buy another x1 shares. Explanations of each trading activity is given
under the plot.
Cost function
Now we are ready to look at the trading costs given a strategy X ∈ A(Q).
The following two assumptions are helpful to simplify the expressions of the cost
functions.
Assumption 3.1.1: We assume FA(t, x) and FB(t, x) are functions such that
FA(t, 0) = FB(t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
FA(t, x) =
￿ x
0
fA(t, p)dp, FB(t, x) =
￿ 0
−x
fB(t, p)dp,
and
lim
x→∞F
A(t, x) =∞, lim
x→∞F
B(t, x) = −∞.
Denote the first derivative of F i(t, x) on t by ηi(t, x), i.e. ∂F
i
∂t (t, x) = η
i(t, x) for
i = A,B.
Assumption 3.1.2: For each fixed time t ∈ [0, T ] and i = A,B, the function
F i(t, x) is assumed to be invertible on x. Or equivalently, assume there exist func-
tions gi(t, x) such that F i(t, gi(t, x)) = x.
With the functions F i and gi, the relationship between the total price impact
sA, sB and the total volume impact V A, V B can be rewritten as
V it = F
i(t, sit) and s
i
t = g
i(t, V it ). (3.1.6a)
Before we derive the cost function, the following notations are needed. For
∀x ∈ R+, one takes
F˜A(t, x) =
￿ x
0
yfA(t, y)dy, GA(t, x) = F˜A(t, gA(t, x)) (3.1.7)
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(a) From time 0 to t0, the status of the order book without any
large trader activity.
N
um
be
r o
f s
ha
re
s
fA(t0,x)fB(t0,x)
0 B0 A0+A0
0 Price per share
EA0+
(b) At time t0+ a market buy order of size x0 is executed against
the existing limit sell orders on the ask side. The volume con-
sumed is denoted by the shadow area EA0+.
N
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f s
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re
s
fA(t1,x)fB(t1,x)
0 B10 B1 A1A1
0 Price per share
EA1J1
B
(c) Up to time t1, there is no large trade during (t0, t1). Both
sides of the order book are recovering. Reacted to market buy
order x0, the limit buy orders regenerate by volume of JB1 and
the ask side volume impact decreases to EA1
Figure 3.1: LOB dynamics with strategy of buying x0 at time t0 and then waiting
until t1.
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(a) At time t1+, another buy order of size x1 is placed. It con-
sumes a volume of EA1+ limit sell orders. The best ask prices
jumps from A1 to A1+.
N
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fA(t2,x)fB(t2,x)
0 B20 B2 A2
0 A2
A1+ Price per share
E2J2
B
(b) During time (t1, t2), there is no large order trading. Both
sides continue to recover. The bid side volume at time t2 in-
creases by JB2 . The ask side recovers to new best ask price A2.
Figure 3.2: Continued LOB dynamics with strategy of buying x1 at time t1 and
then waiting until t2.
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and
F˜B(t, x) =
￿ 0
−x
yfB(t, y)dy, GB(t, x) = F˜B(t, gB(t, x)). (3.1.8)
Furthermore, one can derive some regularity properties of GA(t, x) and GB(t, x) as
summarised in the following.
Lemma 3.1.3: For i = A,B, suppose F i(t, x) satisfies Assumption 3.1.1 and As-
sumption 3.1.2, the partial derivative on x of function Gi(t, x) is given by ∂G
i
∂x (t, x) =
gi(t, x).
The partial derivatives of gi(t, x) with i = A,B are given as:
∂gi
∂t
(t, x) = −
￿
∂
∂gi
￿
F i(t, gi)− x￿￿−1 ∂
∂t
(F i(t, gi)− x) = −η
i(t, gi(t, x))
f i(t, gi(t, x))
and
∂gi
∂x
(t, x) = −
￿
∂
∂gi
￿
F i(t, gi)− x￿￿−1 ∂
∂x
(F i(t, gi)− x) = 1
f i(t, gi(t, x))
.
Lemma 3.1.4: For i = A,B, assume gi(t, x) is the inverse function of F i(t, x) such
that F i(t, gi(t, x)) = x and F i(t, x) satisfy Assumption 3.1.1 and Assumption 3.1.2.
Then the functions gi(t, x) are strictly increasing with respect to x for all x ∈ R at
some fixed time t.
Since the best price takes the form of the sum of unaﬀected price and price
impact, the expected trading cost Cβ must be equal to the sum of the expected cost
caused by the unaﬀected price and the expected cost caused by price impact. Let
us first look at the expected costs caused by the unaﬀected price martingale. For a
deterministic trading strategy (XA, XB) ∈ A(Q), using integration by parts to the
expected cost function E
￿￿ T
0 A
0
tdX
A
t
￿
, one obtains
E
￿￿ T
0
A0tdX
A
t −B0t dXBt
￿
= E[A0T+XAT+ −A00XA0 ]− E[B0T+XBT+ −B00XB0 ]
= E[A0T+XAT+ −B0T+XBT+] = A00(XAT+ −XBT+) = A00Q
since by definition we have XA0 = X
B
0 = 0, X
A
T+ −XBT+ = Q, A00 = B00 and A0, B0
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are martingales.
Moreover, since only deterministic strategies are considered and the shape
function, two sides resilience rates are all deterministic functions, the trading cost
caused by price impact is actually deterministic. Therefore, in the rest of this thesis,
without loss of generality we can set A0 = B0 ≡ 0 on time interval [0, T ] and denote
by Cβ the deterministic trading cost caused by price impact.
The costs of singular buy and sell trade∆XAt and∆X
B
t are given respectively
by
Cβ(∆XAt ) =
￿ DAt+−LBt
DAt −LBt
xfA(t, x)dx
=
￿ gA(t,EAt +∆XAt −JBt )
gA(t,EAt −JBt )
xfA(t, x)dx
= GA(t, EAt +∆X
A
t − JBt )−GA(t, EAt − JBt )
and
Cβ(∆XBt ) =
￿ −DBt +LAt
−DBt++LAt
xfB(t, x)dx
=
￿ −gB(t,EBt −JAt )
−gB(t,EBt −∆XBt −JAt )
xfB(t, x)dx
=
￿
GB(t, EBt −∆XBt − JAt )−GB(t, EBt − JAt )
￿
.
The trading cost on [0, T ] of a continuous strategy dXA is given by
￿ T
0
Cβ(dXAt ) =
￿ T
0
￿
GA(t, EAt − JAt + dXAt )−GA(t, EAt − JAt )
￿
=
￿ T
0
gA(t, EAt − JAt )dXAt .
The last equation holds because of Lemma 3.1.3. Similarly, we obtain the cost of
continuous strategy dXB
￿ T
0
Cβ(dXBt ) =
￿ T
0
GB(t, EBt − Jbt − dXBt )−GB(t, EBt − Jbt )
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=￿ T
0
gB(t, EBt − JBt )dXBt .
For any deterministic trading strategy X = (XA, XB) ∈ A(Q), the trading cost
function is then defined as
Cβ(X) =
￿ T
0
gA(t, V At )dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, V At +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, V At )
￿
+
￿ T
0
gB(t, V Bt )dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, V Bt −∆XBt )−GB(t, V Bt )
￿
. (3.1.9)
Since both price impact reversion and volume impact reversion models are defined,
it is convenient to write the cost function in terms of price impact sit as well. It is
given by
Cβ(X) =
￿ T
0
sAt dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, FA(t, sAt ) +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, FA(t, sAt ))
￿
+
￿ T
0
sBt dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, FB(t, sBt )−∆XBt )−GB(t, FB(t, sBt ))
￿
.
(3.1.10)
3.2 Two limiting cases as the cross resilience rate β →∞
and β → 0
In this section, we review two existing frameworks of LOB based market
impact models and show that our cross-impact LOB model in Section 3.1 could
reproduce their results by making β →∞ and β → 0 respectively.
3.2.1 Zero-spread LOB model
Zero-spread assumption is widely used in diﬀerent market impact models,
like Almgren and Chriss [9], Alfonsi et al. [5], Gatheral et al. [37], Gatheral [32] and
Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2]. The corresponding microstructure mechanics behind the
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zero-spread assumption is that once a market buy (sell) order is executed, the hole
on the ask (bid)-side can be replenished by the incoming limit buy (sell) orders at
an infinite speed. In terms of resilience, that is to say the opposite side resilience
rate is infinite, i.e. β →∞. The price impact reversion in these zero-spread models
can be reinterpret as a finite same side resilience rate, i.e. ρt <∞ for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Now, we derive the cost function in the zero-spread LOB model by sending
β → ∞. As the cross impact resilience rate β → ∞, one obtains the cross price
impact on ask side LA equals the same side price impact on bid side DB, i.e. LAt =
DBt . Similarly, one gets the relationships L
B
t = D
A
t , J
A
t = E
B
t , and J
B
t = E
A
t .
Denote by sA,∞t , s
B,∞
t the total price impact in zero-spread framework and
V A,∞t , V
B,∞
t the total volume impact. They are expressed as
sA,∞t = D
A
t −DBt = −sB,∞t
and
V A,∞t = E
A
t − EBt = −V B,∞t .
Substituting sA,∞, sB,∞, V A,∞ and V B,∞ into the cost function (3.1.9), we then
obtain
C∞(X) =
￿ T
0
sA,∞t dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, V A,∞t +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, V A,∞t )
￿
+
￿ T
0
sB,∞t dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, V B,∞t −∆XBt )−GB(t, V B,∞t )
￿
. (3.2.1)
We will show how our cost function (3.2.1) coincides the zero-spread cost functions
as given in Alfonsi et al. [5]. The key steps are to show fA(t, x) = fB(t, x) and
then GA(t, x) = GB(t,−x). These can be proved by working on the relationship of
sA,∞t = −sB,∞t and V A,∞t = −V B,∞t . This is because equation
V A,∞t = F
A(t, sA,∞t ) = −V B,∞t = −FB(t, sB,∞t ) = −FB(t,−sA,∞t )
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implies equation FA(t, x) = −FB(t,−x). Rewriting FA and FB via shape functions
fA and fB, one has
￿ x
0
fA(t, p)dp = −
￿ 0
x
fB(t, p)dp =
￿ x
0
fB(t, p)dp.
Since both fA and fB are defined on the whole real line, the equality fA = fB holds
and also the equation F˜A(t, x) = F˜B(t, x) holds. Furthermore, the relationship
sA,∞t = g
A(t, V A,∞t ) = −sB,∞t = gB(t,−V A,∞t )
implies gA(t, x) = gB(t,−x).
Recall the notation for i = A,B one has Gi(t, x) := F˜ i(t, gi(t, x)). The
equation gA(t, x) = gB(t,−x) implies the equation
GA(t, x) = F˜A(t, gA(t, x)) = F˜A(t, gB(t,−x))
= F˜B(t, gB(t,−x)) = GB(t,−x)
=: G(t, x).
We can define a function F (t, x) in a similar way as in cross-impact LOB model
case. Set the shape function f(t, x) := fA(t, y).
Assumption 3.2.1: Define function F (t, x) by F (t, x) :=
￿ x
0 f(t, y)dy, and assume
that F (t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
x→−∞F (t, x) = −∞
and
lim
x→∞F (t, x) =∞.
Its first derivative on t is denoted by η(t, x), i.e. ∂F∂t (t, x) = η(t, x).
Assumption 3.2.2: For each fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], the function F (t, x) is assumed
to be invertible on x. Or equivalently, assume there is a function g(t, x) such that
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F (t, g(t, x)) = x.
Remark 3.2.3 (Special cases of F and g): 1) Zero-spread time independent shape
function as in Alfonsi and Schied [3]: f(t, x) := f(x). The anti-derivative function
is F (t, x) := F (x) =
￿ x
0 f(y)dy and it inverse function is g(t, x) := F
−1(x).
2) Zero-spread time-varying separable shape function as in Alfonsi and Acevdeo
[2]: f(t, x) := q(t)h(x). The corresponding F and g are F (t, x) = q(t)F (x) where
F (x) =
￿ x
0 f(y)dy and g(t, x) = F
−1
￿
x
q(t)
￿
.
The admissible set of trading strategies under the zero-spread LOB model is
defined as
A∞(Q) :=
￿
Xt : [0, T+]→ R
￿￿￿￿ Xt = ￿ t
0
dXAt −
￿ t
0
dXBt
∀(XAt , XBt ) ∈ A(Q), X0 = 0, and XT+ = Q
￿
.
The zero-spread discrete admissible strategy set can be defined as
A∞N (Q) :=
￿
Xt ∈ A∞(Q)
￿￿ Xt = Xtn+ on (tn, tn+1] for n = 0, 1, ..., N￿.
Denote by ξt := ∆Xt and short by ξn := ξtn . The zero-spread cost function (3.2.1)
of strategy X ∈ A∞(Q) can be rewritten as
C∞(X) =
￿ T
0
(DAt −DBt )dXt +
￿
t∈[0,T ]
￿
G(t, EAt − EBt +∆Xt)−G(t, EAt − EBt )
￿
.
(3.2.2)
3.2.2 One-side LOB model
We call the LOB model proposed in Fruth et al. [31] by the one-side LOB
model. By ‘one-side’, we mean there is no opposite side resilience modelled, namely
β = 0. In the following, we remind the readers briefly the model of Fruth et al. [31].
Readers might have noticed that in Fruth et al. [31], at the very beginning
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both bid and ask sides of the order book were modelled. More specifically translated
into our notation, the equations (1) and (2) in Fruth et al. [31] implies that for any
t ∈ [0, T ] the best ask and best bid prices are
At = A
0
t + s
A
t
and
Bt = B
0
t − sBt ,
where
sAt = γX
A
t +D
A
t − γ
￿ t
0
￿
1− e−
￿ t
s ρudu
￿
dXBs
and
sBt = γX
B
t +D
B
t − γ
￿ t
0
￿
1− e−
￿ t
s ρudu
￿
dXAs ,
for the permanent impact factor γ. The price impact sAt , s
B
t are determined by
both buy and sell trades via the permanent impact factor γ. However later in their
Proposition 3.3, they claim only temporary impact should be considered. So they
set the permanent impact factor γ = 0 for the rest of the analysis. By doing this,
their LOB model only includes the same side resilience eﬀect. Thus, in this thesis we
call it one-side LOB model. However we should note that, when it is restricted that
only buy (sell) order can be traded, there is no diﬀerence between the cross-impact
LOB model and one-side LOB model.
Now let us derive the cost function in the one-side LOB model. As the cross
impact resilience rate β = 0, one gets the cross price impact LAt = 0, L
B
t = 0 and the
cross volume impact JAt = 0, J
B
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Denote the total price impact
in one-side LOB model by sA,0t , s
B,0
t , which are given by s
A,0
t = D
A
t , s
B,0
t = D
B
t .
Simply substituting sA,0t and s
B,0
t into cost function formula (3.1.10), we
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obtain the cost function of the one-side LOB model as
C0(X) =
￿ T
0
DAt dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, EAt +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, EAt )
￿
+
￿ T
0
DBt dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, EBt −∆XBt )−GB(t, EBt )
￿
. (3.2.3)
This expression coincides with the cost function in Fruth et al. [31].
3.3 Market irregularity definitions
In this section, we introduce three widely studied market irregularity notions
in market impact model and some hierarchy relationships between them. More
studies on the presence and absence conditions of these market irregularities will be
presented in Chapter 5.
Note that as stated in Section 3.1, the eﬀect of the unaﬀected price on the
trading costs is not considered. We will recapitulate the original definition in terms
of our notions. We drop the superscription ∞, β and 0 of the cost function unless
stated otherwise, so that these definitions are not model dependent.
Definition 3.3.1: A market impact model does not admit price manipulation (PMS)
strategy if
inf
X∈A(0)
C(X) ≥ 0,
where A(0) is the set of the round trip strategies which means the total amount to
trade is zero, i.e. XT+ = 0.
The notion of price manipulation strategy is first proposed in Huberman
and Stanzl [48]. According to Gatheral and Schied [35], an optimal solution of the
optimal execution problem does not exist if it is profitable to exploit some PMS
strategy to a given strategy.
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Definition 3.3.2: A market impact model has positive liquidation costs (PLC) if
for ∀Q ∈ R, and every corresponding order execution strategy
inf
X∈A(Q)
C(X) ≥ 0,
where A(Q) is the admissible set of trading strategies that to get a total amount of
Q shares.
Note that for round trips, PLC and absence of PMS are equivalent. However,
PLC is defined on a bigger set of execution strategies.
Positive liquidation cost is first defined in Klo¨ck et al. [53]. In its original
paper, the condition is presented as infX∈A(Q) C(X)+A0Q ≥ A0Q over allX ∈ A(Q)
given A0 = B0. This PLC condition rules out the situation that on average the
trader can make a profit beyond the face value A0Q of a position out of the price
impact incurred by his own trades.
Definition 3.3.3: A market model does not admit transaction-triggered price ma-
nipulation (TTPM) strategy if for any Q ∈ R,
inf
X∈A(Q)
C(X) = inf
X∈AP (Q)
C(X),
where AP (Q) is the set of the pure trading strategies.
The TTPM strategy is first found in Alfonsi et al. [6]. It describes the
situation in which the execution costs of a a buy (resp. sell) program can be reduced
by intermediate sell (resp. buy) orders. For those models which admit TTPM
strategy, optimal execution strategies may oscillate strongly between buy and sell
orders, which implies the instability of the market impact models.
As preparation for the study of absence and presence condition of market
irregularity in Chapter 5, we start with some hierarchy relationships between these
three market irregularity definitions followed by some examples showing these rela-
tionships are not invertible.
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Proposition 3.3.4: In cross-impact LOB model with cost function (3.1.9), the
absence of the transaction-triggered price manipulation implies the model has positive
liquidation cost. Moreover, the existence of positive liquidation cost implies the
absence of price manipulation strategies.
We note that in the proof of the hierarchy relationship of market irregularity,
a specific LOB model is required. Suppose given a general LOB model, the hierarchy
relationship turns to be the one given in Proposition 3.3.5.
Proposition 3.3.5: The absence of the transaction-triggered price manipulation
implies the absence of price manipulation strategy.
In the following, we will present some examples and show the above hierarchy
relationships are not invertible.
Example 3.3.6 (No PMS but not PLC): By this example we will demonstrate a
constant time-varying zero-spread LOB model that excludes the PMS but does not
have the PLC under some circumstances.
Assume the shape function is of the form f(t, p) = q(t)f(x) where we set
f(x) = 1 and q(t) = 1− bt+ at2. Let trading times be T = {0, 1, 2}. For the trading
strategy (x, y,Q− x− y), we have the trading cost
C∞ = x
2
2q(0)
+
y
2
￿
y
2
+ 2e−ρ
x
q(0)
￿
+
Q− x− y
2
￿
Q− x− y
q(2)
+ 2e−2ρ
x
q(0)
+ 2e−ρ
y
q(1)
￿
.
Using the software Mathematica, one obtains C∞ ≥ 0 for Q = 0 under some specific
combinations of the coeﬃcients a, b, ρ. One example is taking a = 21.5 and b =
−19.5, ρ = log(2).
However, with the same coeﬃcients a, b, ρ and for any Q ￿= 0, one obtains
inf C∞ → −∞, which implies the violation of the definition of positive liquidation
cost.
Example 3.3.7 (PLC but TTPM): We will present an example of a zero-spread
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LOB model which has PLC but admits the TTPM. Consider a purchase program to
buy 50 shares of some stock. Suppose that the resilience rate is ρ = 1, cross impact
resilience rate is β → ∞ and trading times T = {t0 = 0, t1 = 0.05, t2 = 0.1}, the
shape function is of the form f(t, x) = q(t) where q(t) = 4 + cos(2πt). We fix the
first trading size to be ξ0 = 20.
As we change the size of the second trade ξ1 and the final trade ξ2 accordingly
such that a total size of Q = 50 is bought in the end, the change of the trading cost of
strategy {ξ0, ξ1, ξ2} is shown in Figure 3.3. As we can observe, the optimal strategy
ξ1 is negative in some cases (shown by the negative part of ξ1). In particularly,
the minimum of the trading cost is obtained when ξ1 = −5 and accordingly ξ2 =
50 − ξ1 − ξ2 = 35. As a result, this model admits the TTPM. But this model has
PLC by Proposition 5.3.2 in Chapter 5.
3.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1.3. Using the integration by parts formula xF (x) =
￿ x
0 ydF (y)+￿ x
0 F (y)dy, for each fixed time t ∈ [0, T ] we could write
GA(t, x) =
￿ gA(t,x)
0
ydFA(t, y)
= gA(t, x)FA(t, gA(t, x))−
￿ gA(t,x)
0
FA(t, y)dy
=
￿ gA(t,x)
0
￿
x− FA(t, y)￿dy
=
￿ gA(t,x)
0
￿ x
FA(t,y)
dzdy
=
￿ x
0
￿ gA(t,z)
0
dydz
and
GB(t, x) =
￿ 0
−gB(t,x)
ydFB(t, y)
= gB(t, x)FB(t, gB(t, x))−
￿ 0
−gB(t,x)
FB(t, y)dy
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Figure 3.3: The change of the liquidation cost against the trade size ξ1 at time t1.
The vertical line is ξ1 = 0.
67
=￿ 0
−gB(t,x)
(x− FB(t, y))dy
=
￿ 0
−gB(t,x)
￿ x
FB(t,y)
dzdy
=
￿ x
0
￿ 0
−gB(t,z)
dydz.
The last step in equations of GA and GB are both true because of the fact that the
symmetric diﬀerence of the sets
￿
(z, y)
￿￿ z ∈ [FA(t, y), x] and ∈ [0, gA(t, x)]￿,￿
(z, y)
￿￿ z ∈ [0, x] and y ∈ [0, gA(t, z)]￿,￿
(z, y)
￿￿ z ∈ [FB(t, y), x] and y ∈ [−gB(t, x), 0]￿
and ￿
(z, y)
￿￿ z ∈ [0, x] and y ∈ [−gB(t, z), 0]￿
are both at most a countable union of line segments. Thus the two-dimensional
Lebesgue measure is zero. Therefore, Gi(t, x) =
￿ x
0 g
i(t, z)dz and ∂G
i
∂x (t, x) = g
i(t, x).
Proof of Lemma 3.1.4. Ask side: Suppose x2 < x1 ≤ ∞. For some fixed time
t ∈ [0, T ], choose y1, y2 such that FA(t, y1) − x1 = 0 and FA(t, y2) − x2 = 0.
Thus we get FA(t, y1) > FA(t, y2) since FA(t, x) is non-decreasing on x by Assump-
tion 3.1.1. The inequality FA(t, y1) > FA(t, y2) can be rewritten as
￿ y1
0 f
A(t, x)dx >￿ y2
0 f
A(t, x)dx. The positivity of the shape function fA(t, x) implies y1 > y2, i.e.
gA(t, x1) > gA(t, x2).
Bid side: For x2 < x1 ≤ ∞. Choose y1, y2 such that FB(t, y1) − x1 = 0
and FB(t, y2)− x2 = 0. Thus we have FB(t, y1) > FB(t, y2), i.e.
￿ 0
−y1 f
B(t, x)dx >￿ 0
−y2 f
B(t, x)dx. By the positivity of the shape function, we obtain y1 > y2, i.e.
gB(t, x1) > gB(t, x2).
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. Part One: We prove the proposition under the price
impact reversion and volume impact reversion respectively. Without loss of general-
ity, we will consider a pure buy strategy (XA, 0) ∈ AP (Q). Recall the cost function
of a cross-impact LOB model for pure strategy
Cβ(XAt , 0) =
￿ T
0
sAdXAt +
￿
t∈[0,T ]
￿
GA(t, V At +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, V At )
￿ ≥ 0.
Case of price impact reversion: The total price impacts caused by strat-
egy (XA, 0) are sAt > 0 and s
B
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This is because the cross price
impact LA(XB) of a pure buy strategy is zero, namely sAt = D
A
t for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Considering the initial condition DA0 = 0, the dynamics (3.1.1) and and X
A is non-
decreasing, one gets sAt > 0. Via the relationship equation (3.1.6), the corresponding
volume impact are given by V At = F
A(t, sAt ) > 0 and V
B
t = 0.
By Lemma 3.1.3 and Lemma 3.1.4, we know GA(t, x) is non-decreasing on x
for some fixed t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, for ∆XAt > 0 and V At > 0, GA(t, V At +∆XAt )−
GA(t, V At ) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. In addition, since dXAt is a positive measure on [0, T ],
one obtains the first term in cost function is positive, i.e.
￿ T
0 s
A
t dX
A
t ≥ 0.
The trading cost of arbitrary pure buy strategy (XA, 0) is then positive. So
for any pure strategy one obtains infX∈AP (Q) Cβ(X) ≥ 0.
The absence of TTPM implies that infX∈A(Q) Cβ(X) = infX∈AP (Q) Cβ(X) ≥
0. Therefore, the absence of TTPM implies the positive liquidation costs.
Case of volume impact reversion: The total volume impacts are V At =￿ t
0 e
−ρ(t−r)dXAr > 0 and V Bt = 0 since XA is an increasing process. By the relation-
ship equation (3.1.6), the corresponding price impact are given by sAt = g
A(t, V At ) >
0 and sBt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] since gA(t, x) is increasing on x.
Therefore, for∆XAt > 0 and V
A
t > 0, one hasG
A(t, V At +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, V At ) ≥
0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. Furthermore, dXAt is a positive measure on [0, T ], which implies￿ T
0 s
A
t dX
A
t ≥ 0.
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As a result, the trading cost of an arbitrary pure buy strategy is positive,
namely Cβ(XAt , 0) ≥ 0. So for any pure strategy we have infX∈AP (Q) Cβ(X) ≥ 0.
In particular, by absence of the TTPM strategy in cross-impact model, one ob-
tains infX∈A(Q) Cβ(X) = infX∈AP (Q) Cβ(X) ≥ 0. Therefore, the absence of TTPM
strategy implies the positive liquidation costs.
Part Two: For a round trip i.e. Q = 0, the model admits positive liquidation cost
implies
inf
X∈A(0)
Cβ(X) ≥ 0,
which is just the definition of absence of price manipulation strategy.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.5. In this proof, we drop the superscription β, ∞ and 0 of
the cost functions. By doing this, we show that the following arguments hold under
all three models.
If we could prove that the existence of price manipulation strategy leads to
transaction-triggered price manipulation, then the assertion holds.
On one hand, the existence of PM strategies implies that there is at least a
round trip X ∈ A(0) such that C(X) < 0, namely infX∈A(0) C(X) < 0.
On the other hand, the absence of TTPM strategies implies that for Q = 0
one has infX∈A(0) C(X) = infX∈AP (0) C(X). While for a round trip, the pure strategy
could only take the form of Xt ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. As a result, the cost of a trading
strategy X ∈ AP (0) is always zero.
If the TTPM strategies are excluded, one has infX∈A(0) C(X) = infX∈AP (0) C(X) =
0. This is a contradiction to the existence of PMS which states infX∈A(0) C(X) < 0.
Thus the TTPM strategy can not be excluded. Then the assertion holds.
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Chapter 4
Application I: Optimal market
order trading strategy
As a natural application of the cross impact LOB model, in Section 4.1 we
will solve the optimal execution problem in a more general context. The complex-
ity brought by modelling the two sides resilience ρ,β and a general time-dependent
shape function f(t, x) makes it hard to prove the existence of optimal strategy.
Exploiting the Proposition 4.1.2 and Corollary 4.1.3, we can transfer the problem
of existence of optimal solution of the cross-impact LOB model to the problem of
existence of optimal strategy in zero-spread LOB model. Proposition 4.1.2 and
Corollary 4.1.3 respectively states that for any strategy in the admissible set A(Q),
the zero-spread cost C∞ is a lower bound of the cross-impact cost Cβ , and further-
more the minimum cost of the zero-spread LOB model is a lower bound of the
minimum cost of the cross-impact LOB model.
We closely follow the line oﬀered in Alfonsi and Schied [3] and Alfonsi and
Acevdeo [2], where the price impact reversion and volume impact reversion are
both considered. Firstly, we use Euler-Lagrange formalism to find the discrete-time
optimal trading strategy. Then, by taking each trading interval [ti, ti+1) to be very
small approaching zero, one obtains a candidate continuous-time optimal strategy.
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Then the verification of optimality is done by direct calculation. Therefore, in the
sequel we will discuss the optimal execution strategy under four cases of zero-spread
LOB model, namely reversion of the volume impact process in discrete time (Et
Dis) and continuous time (Et Cts), reversion of the price impact process in discrete
(Dt Dis) and continuous time (Dt Cts) setting.
We also obtain suﬃcient conditions for absence of TTPM under all four
cases, which are summarised in Table 4.1. An overview of the contributions in this
chapter is: Our results generalise the results in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2] in terms of
optimal strategy (Proposition 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 4.1.10, and 4.1.11) and absence condition
of transaction-triggered price manipulation (Corollary 4.1.7 and 4.1.12). For the
zero-spread LOB model in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2], the suﬃcient conditions on
absence of TTPM is independent on shape function. While, in our case with more
general shape function, the condition in Corollary 4.1.7 is more restrictive than that
in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2].
Section 4.2 is devoted to constant time varying shape function of cross impact
LOB model. There, we will present some numerical examples of our cross-impact
LOB optimal execution strategies. It is further assumed that the shape function
is of the form f(t, x) = q(t). Comparative analysis on the shape function, same
side resilience rate ρ and cross-impact resilience rate β are conducted. Figure 4.4
suggests that the bigger the cross impact resilience rate, the more volatile the optimal
strategy alternating between buy and sell. As shown in Figure 4.6, the bigger the
same side resilience rate, the more pure buy (sell) orders are used and the smaller
size for each child order.
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4.1 Construction of optimal trading strategy
Let us summarise the optimal execution problem that we consider in this
chapter. The cross-impact cost function Cβ(XA, XB) is defined as
Cβ(XA, XB) =
￿ T
0
(DAt − LAt )dXAt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, EAt − JAt +∆XAt )
−GA(t, EAt − JAt )
￿
+
￿ T
0
(DBt − LBt )dXBt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, EBt − JBt
−∆XBt )−G(t, EBt − JBt )
￿
, (4.1.1)
where DA, DB are the same side price impact, LAt , L
B
t are the cross price impact,
EAt , E
B
t are the same side volume impact, and J
A
t , J
B
t are the cross volume impact.
They are related by formula (3.1.6) in Chapter 3. Recall the following functions
too. gA(t, x) and gB(t, x) are inverse functions of FA(t, x) and FB(t, x) such that
gA(t, FA(t, x)) = x and gB(t, FB(t, x)) = x. FA(t, x) and FB(t, x) are functions
satisfying
∂F i
∂t
(t, x) = ηi(t, x),
FA(t, x) =
￿ x
0
fA(t, y)dy
and
FB(t, x) =
￿ 0
−x
fB(t, y)dy.
where fA(t, x) is ask side shape function and fB(t, x) is bid side shape function.
The auxiliary function GA(t, x) and GB(t, x) are defined as
F˜A(t, x) =
￿ x
0
yfA(t, y)dy, GA(t, x) = F˜A(t, gA(t, x)),
and
F˜B(t, x) =
￿ 0
−x
yfB(t, y)dy, GB(t, x) = F˜B(t, gB(t, x)).
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The admissible set is given by
A(Q) =
￿
(XA, XB) ∈ R2+
￿￿￿￿ XA0 = XB0 = 0, ￿ T+
0
dXAs −
￿ T+
0
dXBs = Q,
XAt ≥ XAs , XBt ≥ XBs for any t ≥ s,
and XA, XB are bounded variation.
￿
. (4.1.2)
The admissible set A(Q) is closed, convex but not bounded. In this case, we make
use of the notion of a coercive function.
Definition 4.1.1: A function f(x) : Rn → R is said to be coercive if for every
sequence {xν} ⊂ Rn for which ￿xν￿ → ∞ it must be the case that f(xν) → +∞
as well. That is, for any constant M > 0 there is a constant R(M) > 0 such that
￿f(xν)￿ > M whenever ￿xν￿ > R(M).
It turns out that Proposition 4.1.2 and Corollary 4.1.3 enable us to simplify
the task of proving the existence of optimal solution in cross-impact LOB model.
Proposition 4.1.2: Given the cost functional C∞ for zero-spread LOB model, Cβ
with 0 < β < ∞ for cross-impact LOB model and C0 for one-side LOB model, for
any strategy X ∈ A(Q) these cost functions satisfy the following relationship
C∞(X) ≤ Cβ(X) ≤ C0(X).
Moreover, for all pure strategies X ∈ AP (Q), the three cost functionals coincide i.e.
C∞(X) = Cβ(X) = C0(X).
The optimal execution problem under the zero-spread LOB model is formu-
lated as follows. Minimise the zero-spread cost functional
C∞ =
￿ T
0
(DAt −DBt )dXt +
￿
t∈[0,T ]
[G(t, EAt − EBt +∆Xt)−G(t, EAt − EBt )]
(4.1.3)
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over the admissible set
A∞(Q) :=
￿
Xt : [0, T+]→ R
￿￿￿￿ X0 = 0, XT+ = Q and Xt = ￿ t
0
dXAs −
￿ t
0
dXBs
for any (XAt , X
B
t ) ∈ A(Q)
￿
.
From the analysis of section 3.2.1, we know the function G(t, x) is defined by
G(t, x) = GA(t, x) and F (t, x) =
￿ x
0 f(t, y)dy, η(t, x) =
∂F
∂t (t, x) and g(t, x) the
inverse function of F (t, x) satisfying g(t, F (t, x)) = x.
Corollary 4.1.3: If there is an optimal solution X∗,β for the optimal execution
problem (4.1.1) and an optimal solution X∗,∞ for problem (4.1.3), one obtains the
following relationship
C∞(X∗,∞) ≤ Cβ(X∗,β) over A(Q).
As a result, we can restrict our attention to the existence of optimal solution
in zero-spread LOB model. In the discrete time case, we will demonstrate the
existence by proving the coerciveness of the cost functionals and then we construct
a semi closed-form optimal execution strategy. By taking the time step of trading
strategies to zero, we get a candidate solution. In this way, we can transfer the
results from discrete to continuous time.
Before stepping into the detailed discussion, we will make a simplification
assumption that the same side and opposite resilience rate are constant, i.e. ρt = ρ
for all t ∈ [0, T ] in this chapter. All results can be extended to the deterministic
resilience rate case in the same way. Besides, in the rest of this section only, we will
drop the superscription and denote by C = C∞.
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4.1.1 Model of volume impact reversion in discrete time
Denote by an = e−ρ(tn−tn−1) for 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The dynamics of the volume
impact process in discrete time are summarised by equations
E0 = 0, En =
n−1￿
i=0
ξie
−ρ(tn−ti) for n = 1, . . . , N
and
E0+ = ξ0, En+ =
n−1￿
i=0
ξie
−ρ(tn−ti) + ξn for n = 1, . . . , N,
where ξi is the trade size at each trading time ti ∈ T .
We rewrite the zero-spread cost function (4.1.3) in discrete time setting by
C(ξ) =
N￿
n=0
[G(tn, En + ξn)−G(tn, En)]
=
N−1￿
n=0
[G(tn, En + ξtn)−G(tn+1, En+1)] +G(tN , EN + ξN )
=
N−1￿
n=0
[G(tn, En + ξn)−G(tn+1, an+1(En + ξn))] +G(tN , EN + ξN ). (4.1.4)
In order to construct a discrete time optimal strategy in Proposition 4.1.5, we need
the following Assumption 4.1.4 and auxiliary function:
hi+1(x) =
g(ti, x)− ai+1g(ti+1, ai+1x)
1− ai+1 , for x ∈ R and 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. (4.1.5)
Assumption 4.1.4: For ∀t ∈ [0, T ], the shape function f(t, x) satisfies the condi-
tions x∂f∂x (t, x) ≤ 0 and η(t, x) ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.1.5: Under Assumption 4.1.4, the auxiliary function (4.1.5) is bi-
jective and we denote by h−1i its inverse function. Construct a trading strategy ξ
∗
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as follows
ξ∗0 = h
−1
1 (ν),
ξ∗i = h
−1
i+1(ν)− aih−1i (ν), 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
ξ∗N = F (tN , ν)− aNh−1N (ν),
(4.1.6)
where ν is the unique solution of the following equation
Q =
N￿
i=1
ξti = (1− a1)h−11 (ν) + . . .+ (1− aN )h−1N (ν) + F (tN , ν).
Strategy (4.1.6) is the unique minimiser for the cost functional (4.1.4) over A∞N (Q).
Moreover, this zero-spread LOB model does not admit PMS. The first and the last
trades have the same sign as Q. The intermediate strategies ξ∗i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 has
the same sign as Q, if the following condition
ai + ai+1 ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 (4.1.7)
is satisfied.
In other words, Assumption 4.1.4 and condition (4.1.7) are the suﬃcient
conditions for absence of TTPM. The condition (4.1.7) does not depend on the
shape function f(t, x), but only on the resilience rate ρ. With this condition, we
can tell that the bigger the resilience rate ρ, the less profitable to use the TTPM
strategies in this discrete time volume impact reversion model.
The condition (4.1.7) for absence of TTPM strategy is more restrictive than
the condition (33) in Theorem 2.3 of Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2], where the shape
function takes the form f(t, x) = q(t)f(x). In that case, condition (4.1.7) is satisfied.
This is proved in Lemma 4.3.4.
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4.1.2 Model of volume impact resilience in continuous time
For continuous time case, we utilise the optimal execution strategy obtained
in discrete time set-up, and provide a verification argument that the corresponding
continuous analogy strategy is an optimal solution. We propose a continuous time
auxiliary function
ht(x) = g(t, x) + x
∂g
∂x
(t, x)− 1
ρ
∂g
∂t
(t, x), (4.1.8)
We assume the shape function f(t, x) to be such that the auxiliary function (4.1.8)
is bijective on R and has positive first derivative on x is positive, namely ∂ht∂x (x) > 0.
Later in Corollary 4.1.7 we will show that the auxiliary function ht(x) is bijective
and strictly increasing on R if Assumption 4.1.4 and condition (4.1.10) are satisfied.
Proposition 4.1.6: Assume a continuous diﬀerentiable shape function f(t, x) such
that the auxiliary function (4.1.8) is bijective and ∂ht∂x (x) > 0 on R. Denote by
h−1t (x) the inverse function of ht(x). Construct a trading trading strategy X∗ in the
following way: Trade at time t = 0 a singular order of size ξ∗0 ; then continuously
trade with rate ξ∗t on time interval (0, T ); finally at time T submit a singular order
of ξ∗T . The trade sizes are determined by
ξ∗0 = ζ0,
ξ∗t =
dζt
dt
+ ρζt
and
ξ∗T = F (T, ν)− aNζT ,
where we set ζt := h
−1
t (ν) and ν ∈ R uniquely solves the equation
Q =
￿ T
0
ρh−1t (ν)dt+ F (T, ν). (4.1.9)
Then the cost function 4.1.3 is non-negative and has a minimiser X∗ over A∞(Q).
Moreover, the initial trade ξ∗0 and the last trade ξ∗T have the same sign as Q which
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is positive if it is a buy program and is negative if it is a sell program.
Now let us discuss the sign of the trades given by the optimal strategy. A
suﬃcient condition of absence of TTPM is summarised in Corollary 4.1.7.
Corollary 4.1.7: Under Assumption 4.1.4, the auxiliary function ht(x) is contin-
uous diﬀerentiable in x, bijective on R and strictly increasing if
∂
∂x
￿
η
f
￿
(t, x) > 0. (4.1.10)
Thus, the results of Proposition 4.1.6 hold. Moreover, if
￿
2ρζt
∂f
∂t
+ 2
∂f
∂t
η + ρfη + 2ρ2ζtf − f ∂η
∂t
￿
(t, g(t, ζt)) ≥ 0 (4.1.11)
also holds where ζt takes values as that in Proposition 4.1.6, ξ∗t has the same sign
as Q for any 0 < t < T , which excludes TTPM.
We should note that the condition (4.1.11) is not a time continuous analog
of the absence condition (4.1.7) in discrete time case and is not a sharp condition as
we can see from the proofs. Our results from Corollary 4.1.7 is more restrictive than
the condition (22) in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2] in a way that our results is depend
on the shape function. In particular, in Lemma 4.3.6 we provide a proof that our
condition (4.1.11) implies the condition (22). Furthermore, it turns out that as long
as the shape function takes the form of f(t, x) = q(t)f(x), the condition (22) in
Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2] holds under arbitrary function f(x).
4.1.3 Model of price impact reversion in discrete time
Recall that for 1 ≤ n ≤ N , we set an = e−ρ(tn−tn−1). The dynamics of the
price impact process Dt in discrete time are given by
D0 = 0, Dn = ang(tn−1, F (tn−1, Dn−1) + ξn−1) for 1 < i ≤ N
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and
D0+ = g(0, ξ0), Dn+ = g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn) for 1 < i ≤ N,
where g(t, x) is the inverse function of F (t, x) =
￿ x
0 f(t, y)dy such that g(t, F (t, x)) =
x.
We translate the cost function (4.1.3) with price impact resilience as
C(ξ) =
N￿
n=0
[G(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn)−G(tn, F (tn, Dn))]
= G(tN , F (tN , DN ) + ξN ) +
N−1￿
n=0
[G(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn)−G(tn+1, F (tn+1, Dn+1))]
= F˜ (tN , g(tN , F (tN , DN ) + ξN ))
+
N−1￿
n=0
￿
F˜ (tn, g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn))− F˜ (tn+1, an+1g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn))
￿
,
(4.1.12)
where F˜ is defined by F˜ (t, x) =
￿ x
0 yf(t, x)dy. Similarly in order to solve the optimal
execution problem in this model, we will need Assumption 4.1.8 and construct an
auxiliary function
pi+1(x) = x
1
ai+1
− ai+1f(ti+1, x) ∂g∂x
￿
ti, F
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿￿
1− ai+1f(ti+1, x) ∂g∂x
￿
ti, F
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿￿ . (4.1.13)
Assumption 4.1.8: For each fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and all x ∈ R, the shape function
f(t, x) needs to satisfy:
1. x∂f∂x (t, x) ≥ 0;
2. ∂η∂t (t, x) ≤ 0 and x
￿
f ∂
2f
∂t∂x − ∂f∂t ∂f∂x
￿
≥ 0;
3. x→ x∂xf(t,x)f(t,x) is non-decreasing on R− and non-increasing on R+.
Remark 4.1.9: By analysing the Assumption 4.1.8 item 1 and 3, it is observed that
the set of functions satisfying this assumption should be of the form f(t, x) = λ(t),
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or equivalently ∂xf(t, x) = 0 for all x ∈ R. This is due to the fact that function
x∂xf(t,x)f(t,x) = 0 at x = 0.
This observation is also reflected by the Assumption 2.2 in Alfonsi and Acevdeo
[2] and by Corollary 2.6 in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2]. Assumption 2.2 is a restriction
of our Assumption 4.1.8 with the shape function of the form f(t, x) = f(x)λ(t).
The functions that satisfy that assumption are constant functions on R. The suﬃ-
cient conditions of absence of TTPM in Corollary 2.6 for general separable shape
functions coincides with those for constant shape functions, which is trivial from the
Assumption 2.2.
Nevertheless, when finding optimal solution(s) for discrete time price impact
reversion, one should not restrict on the set of constant shape functions. Our proof
in the discrete time relies on Lagrange multiplies which requires to show first that
the cost function has a minimum. In addition, the candidates of optimal strategy in
continuous time are obtained from the discrete time optimal solutions shown in the
following Proposition 4.1.10.
When stating the continuous time optimal strategy, we slightly relax Assump-
tion 4.1.8 since the proof of the continuous time case relies on a verification argu-
ment. In Example 4.1.13 we will show the existence of optimal solutions of time-
varying non-constant shape function LOB models and conditions to exclude the PMS
and TTPM.
Proposition 4.1.10: Under Assumption 4.1.8, the auxiliary function (4.1.13) is
bijective and we denote by p−1i its inverse function. Construct a trading strategy ξ
∗
as follows
ξ∗0 = F
￿
t0,
p−11 (ν)
a1
￿
,
ξ∗i = F
￿
ti,
p−1i+1(ν)
ai+1
￿
− F ￿ti, p−1i (ν)￿ , 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 (4.1.14)
and
ξ∗N = F (tN , ν)− F
￿
tN , p
−1
N (ν)
￿
,
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where ν is the unique solution of the following equation
Q =
N￿
i=1
￿
F
￿
ti−1,
p−1i (ν)
ai
￿
− F ￿ti, p−1i (ν)￿￿+ F (tN , ν).
Strategy (4.1.14) is the unique minimiser for the cost function (4.1.12) over A∞N (Q).
The cost functional C(ξ) is non-negative and the first and the last trades have the
same sign as Q.
Not like in the case of discrete time volume resilience model, it is diﬃcult
to find a more restrict condition than sgn(v)F
￿
ti,
p−1i+1(ν)
ai+1
￿
− F ￿ti, p−1i (ν)￿ ≥ 0 to
make the trades ξ∗i have the same sign as Q.
4.1.4 Model of price impact reversion in continuous time
We propose the continuous auxiliary function
pt(x) = x
2ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x)
ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x) . (4.1.15)
Now we are ready to show that no PMS exists and that there is a unique
optimal execution strategy if the auxiliary functions for t ∈ [0, T ] are bijective on R
with a positive first derivative on x.
Proposition 4.1.11: Assume the shape function f(t, x) ∈ C2([0, T ] × R,R+) sat-
isfies the condition
ρf(t, x) + ρx
∂f
∂x
(t, x)− ∂η
∂x
(t, x) > 0, (4.1.16)
and is such that the auxiliary function (4.1.15) is bijective on R with positive first
derivative ∂xpt(x) > 0. Denote by p
−1
t (x) the inverse function of pt(x). Construct
a trading strategy X∗ in the following way: Trade at time t = 0 a singular order of
size ξ∗0 ; then continuously trade with rate ξ∗t in time (0, T ); finally at time T submit
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a singular order of ξ∗T . The trade sizes are determined by
ξ∗0 = F (t0, ζ0),
ξ∗t = f(t, ζt)
￿
dζt
dt
+ ρζt
￿
and
ξ∗T = F (tN , ν)− F (tN , ζT ),
where we set ζt := p
−1
t (ν) and ν ∈ R uniquely solve the equation
Q = F (T, ν) +
￿ T
0
￿
ρp−1t (ν)f(t, p
−1
t (ν))− η(t, p−1t (ν))
￿
dt. (4.1.17)
Then the strategy X∗ is the minimiser of the cost function (4.1.3) and PMS does
not exist. The initial trade ξ∗0 has the same sign as Q.
In the following Corollary 4.1.12, we show that if the Assumption 4.1.8 holds,
the increasing, bijection condition of the auxiliary function pt is automatically sat-
isfied.
Corollary 4.1.12: Let f be twice continuous diﬀerentiable. Under Assumption 4.1.8,
if the condition ρf(t, x) + ρx∂f∂x (t, x)− ∂η∂x(t, x) > 0 holds, the function pt is C1, bi-
jective and strictly increasing. Thus, the results of Proposition 4.1.11 hold and the
last trade ξ∗T has the same sign as Q. Besides, if
ρx∂t
￿
∂xf
f
(t, x)
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
(t, x)
￿
+
￿
ρ− ∂tf
f
(t, x)
￿￿
2ρ− ∂tf
f
(t, x)
￿
> 0
(4.1.18)
also holds, ξ∗t has the same sign as Q for any 0 < t < T , which rules out TTPM.
As stated in Remark 4.1.9, due to Assumption 4.1.8, the results of Corol-
lary 4.1.12 coincides with the condition (30) in Corollary 2.6 of Alfonsi and Acevdeo
[2] for absence of PMS and TTPM. From the proof of this corollary, we should note
that the condition (4.1.18) is not sharp. In the following, we study the absence
of PMS and existence of optimal solution for a LOB model with a non-separable
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time-varying shape function.
Example 4.1.13: Consider a shape function of the form
f(t, x) = tx2 + a, for some positive constant a > 0.
In this case, ∂f∂t (t, x) = x
2 and ∂f∂x (t, x) = 2tx. The auxiliary function pt(x) and its
derivative on x are then respectively given by
pt(x) = x
(4ρt− 1)x2 + 2aρ
(3ρt− 1)x2 + aρ
and
∂xpt(x) =
1
(3ρt− 1)x2 + aρ
￿
x4(4ρt− 1)(3ρt− 1) + aρx2(6ρt− 1) + 2a2ρ2￿ .
Thus, pt(x) is bijective and strictly increasing if and only if
3ρt− 1 ≥ 0.
We can apply the results of Proposition 4.1.11 in this case. The LOB model with
this non-separable, time-varying shape function admits a unique optimal execution
strategy, which can be numerically computed.
4.2 Numerical examples of discrete optimal trading strat-
egy in cross-impact LOB model
In this section, we are going to look at some numerical examples of optimal
trading strategies in discrete time cross-impact LOB model. We will further assume
that the shape function takes the form fA(t, x) = fB(t, x) = q(t) where the depth
function q(t) is assumed to be deterministic, twice continuous diﬀerentiable and
strictly positive.
Substituting the shape function q(t) into the cross impact cost function (4.1.1),
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one gets
Cβ(XA, XB) =
￿ T
0
(DAt − LAt )dXAt +
￿ T
0
(DBt − LBt )dXBt +
￿
t≤T
￿
(∆XAt )
2
2q(t)
+
(∆XBt )
2
2q(t)
￿
.
(4.2.1)
In particular, before specifying the dynamics of price impact and volume impact, we
substitute the constant shape function into equation (3.1.6) and obtain the relation
equation between the price impact sA, sB and volume impact V A, V B, which is
given by
sit =
V it
q(t)
, for i = A,B.
By considering a shape function qˆ(t) = q(T − t) and trading times tˆN−i = T −
ti, It turns out that the price impact reversion model in constant shape model is
mathematically the same as the volume impact reversion model. Without loss of
generality, we will only derive the optimal problem under the assumption of price
impact reversion in the rest of this section.
Let us introduce the following notations:
ΘA = (θA0 , θ
A
1 , . . . , θ
A
N ) ∈ RN+1,
ΘB = (θB0 , θ
B
1 , . . . , θ
B
N ) ∈ RN+1,
ai,j : =
e−ρ(tj−ti)
q(ti)
,
a˜i,j : =
e−(ρ+β)(tj−ti)
q(ti)
,
A : = ai,j {i<j}
A˜ : = a˜i,j {i<j},
A¯ : = ai,j {i<j} +
ai,j
2 {i=j}
,
B =
1
2
(A¯T + A¯),
D = A− A˜,
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z : = (ΘA,ΘB),
and
M : =
 B −D
−D B
 .
The cost function of a discrete trading strategy (ΘA,ΘB) can be expressed as
Cβ(ΘA,ΘB) = ￿ΘA, A¯ΘA￿ − ￿ΘB, AΘA￿+ ￿ΘB, A˜ΘA￿+ ￿ΘB, A¯ΘB￿
− ￿ΘA, AΘB￿+ ￿ΘA, A˜ΘB￿
= ￿ΘA, BΘA￿ − ￿ΘB, DΘA￿+ ￿ΘB, BΘB￿ − ￿ΘA, DΘB￿
= ￿z,Mz￿,
where ￿·, ·￿ : RN+1 × RN+1 → R is an inner product.
By introducing a skew-symmetric matrix M¯ =
 0 D−DT2
D−DT
2 0
, the cost
function can be further simplified to be
Cβ(ΘA,ΘB) = ￿z,Mz￿ = ￿z, (M + M¯)z￿ = 1
2
￿z, (M +MT )z￿ = 1
2
￿z,Hz￿, (4.2.2)
where H :=M +MT is a symmetric matrix. Thus the optimal problem in constant
shape cross-impact LOB model now is to minimise the cost functional
￿z,Hz￿,
subject to z ≥ 0 and ￿e, z￿ = Q, where eT = (1, ..., 1,−1, ...,−1).
The object of Figure 4.1 is to study the changes of the minimal costs of a
cross-impact LOB model against the cross impact resilience rate β. The star line
describes the minimal costs under the cross-impact LOB model. The horizontal line
is the minimal costs of a zero-spread LOB model with the same parameters, except
that it is independent on the cross impact resilience rate. One observes that as
β increases from 0 to 50, the cross-impact minimum cost approaches to the zero-
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spread minimum cost from above. This is agreeable with the definitions of the cost
functions in these two models and the Proposition 4.1.2 that lim
β→∞
C∗,β = C∗,∞ over
X ∈ A(Q).
Figure 4.2 are two bar graphs illustrating respectively the optimal strategies
under a cross-impact LOB model with volume impact revision and with price impact
revision. They are plotted against a regular time grid ti = t0 + iτ with τ =
T
N . The
bars above the horizontal line ξ = 0 stands for buy orders, while the bars under
this line for sell orders. The common features of these two plots are: the optimal
strategy for both models are not pure strategies; the first and last order are two
lumps which are much bigger than the intermediate orders; there are some time in
the trading interval when it is better not to trade. Another interesting observation
is that the optimal strategies are showing symmetry in the sense that Xsi = X
V
N−i
if we denote by Xs and XV the optimal strategies under price impact reversion and
volume impact reversion model respectively.
Next, we will have a look at how diﬀerent shape functions aﬀect the optimal
trading strategy under the cross-impact LOB framework. Keep other parameters
constant, four examples of shape functions are tested, e.g. reverting depth q(t) =
2+ cos(2πt), increasing depth q(t) = 1+ 2t, constant depth q(t) = 5 and decreasing
depth q(t) = 20.5+t . Figure 4.3 consist of four plots showing optimal strategies under
diﬀerent shape functions, which are represented by dashed lines. Plot (a), (c) and
(d) show lump orders at the beginning and end of trade time. In plot (b) under
increasing depth though, only the end order is relatively much bigger than other
orders. Focusing on plot (b), (c) and (d), there exists a positive correlation between
the order book depth and optimal order sizes. Specifically, when the depth function
q(t) is increasing (decreasing, or constant), the intermediate optimal trading sizes
are increasing (decreasing, or constant). Compared to the rest of the plots, plot
(a)’s optimal strategies show oscillation between buy and sell orders.
Inspired by the observation in Figure 4.3, the existence of the transaction-
triggered price manipulations depends on the shape function of the order book.
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Figure 4.1: The change of the minimal cost C∗ of a cross impact LOB model against
the cross impact resilience rate β, with Q = 50 shares, T = 1, N = 20, ρ = 2 and
q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt). The horizontal line is the minimum cost of a zero-spread LOB
model with the same parameters, which is independent on β.
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(a) The optimal execution strategies with the volume impact resilience.
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(b) The optimal execution strategies with the price impact resilience.
Figure 4.2: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with the volume and price impact resilience, with T = 1, N = 50, ρ = 2, β = 10
and q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt). The dashed line is the plot of the depth function q(t).
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(a) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt)
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Time
O
rd
er
 s
ize
(b) q(t) = 1 + 2t
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(c) q(t) = 5
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(d) q(t) = 20.5+t
Figure 4.3: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with four diﬀerent depth function q(t) (plotted in dashed lines). For each
sub-figure, the corresponding depth functions is indicated in its sub-caption. Other
parameters are identical for each of the four plots, i.e. T = 1, N = 20, ρ = 2 and
β = 5.
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Especially when taking the cross impact resilience rate β = 5, the optimal strategy
is not pure strategy under reverting depth function, meanwhile there are pure buy
optimal strategies for increasing, constant and decreasing depth function. There-
after, in the following Figure 4.4, we fixed the depth function as q(t) = 2+ cos(2πt)
and compute the optimal trading orders by setting the cross impact resilience rate
β to be 1, 10, 100 and tends to ∞ respectively. It is shown that when β = 1, the
TTPM can be excluded (by showing pure optimal strategy). As the cross impact
resilience rate taking bigger values, more sell orders are used in this purchase pro-
gram, namely more volatile between buy and sell orders. However, this feature is
not true for the model with depth q(t) = 20.5+t while keeping other parameter the
same. In Figure 4.5, there does not exist TTPM strategy for all four values of β.
Finally, we want to study the eﬀect of the same side resilience rate ρ on the
optimal strategies. We can achieve this by controlling three parameters at the same
time, namely the same side resilience rate ρ, the cross impact resilience rate β and
the depth q(t). In Figure 4.6 on the same row of plots, from the left column to the
right column, only ρ is increased from 2 to 20. As the same side resilience rate ρ
increases, the optimal strategies are less volatile. This is reflected in three aspects:
the lump order becomes smaller, as shown in all subplots; the intermediate orders
are more evenly distributed, as shown from plot (a) to (b) and from plot (g) to (h);
there are less opposite side orders, as shown from plot (c), (e) to plot (d), (f).
4.3 Proofs
Lemma 4.3.1: Given the admissible set A(Q) is defined by equation 4.1.2, A(Q)
is a convex set.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.1. For any (XA1 , X
B
1 ), (X
A
2 , X
B
2 ) ∈ A(Q) and ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), we
check the following three conditions. For i = A,B,
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(d) β →∞, i.e. the zero-spread optimal strategy
Figure 4.4: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with four values of cross impact resilience rate β. For each sub-figure, the
corresponding β is indicated in its sub-caption. Other parameters are identical for
each of the four plots, i.e. T = 1, N = 20, ρ = 2 and q(t) = 2+ cos(2πt) (plotted in
dashed lines).
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(a) β = 1
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(b) β = 10
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(c) β = 100
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(d) β →∞, i.e. the zero-spread optimal strategy
Figure 4.5: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with four values of cross impact resilience rate β. For each sub-figure, the
corresponding β is indicated in its sub-caption. Other parameters are identical for
each of the four plots, i.e. T = 1, N = 20, ρ = 2 and q(t) = 20.5+t (plotted in dashed
lines).
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(a) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 2, β = 1
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(b) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 20, β = 1
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(c) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 2, β = 10
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(d) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 20, β = 10
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(e) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 2, β →∞
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(f) q(t) = 2 + cos(2πt), ρ = 20, β →∞
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(g) q(t) = 2t+ 1, ρ = 2, β = 10
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(h) q(t) = 2t+ 1, ρ = 20, β = 10
Figure 4.6: Optimal execution strategy to buy 50 shares on a regular time grid, with
T = 1, N = 50. The dashed lines are the plot of shape functions.
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1)
λXi1(0) + (1− λ)Xi2(0) = 0,
λX1(T+) + (1− λ)X2(T+) = λQ+ (1− λ)Q = Q.
2) For any s < t, we have Xi1(s) ≤ Xi1(t) and Xi2(s) ≤ Xi2(t). Therefore the non-
decreasing property holds, i.e.
λXi1(s) + (1− λ)Xi2(s) ≤ λXi1(t) + (1− λ)Xi2(t).
3) The total variation of λXi1(s) + (1− λ)Xi2(s) is also finite and bounded.
Proof of Proposition 4.1.2. Recall that the cost functions of cross-impact, zero-spread
and one-side LOB models are respectively given by
Cβ(X) =
￿ T
0
(DAt − LAt )dXAt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, EAt − JAt +∆XAt )−GA(t, EAt − JAt )
￿
+
￿ T
0
(DBt − LBt )dXBt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, EBt − JBt −∆XBt )−G(t, EBt − JBt )
￿
,
(4.3.1)
C∞(X) =
￿ T
0
(DAt −DBt )dXAt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, EAt − EBt +∆XAt )−GA(t, EAt − EBt )
￿
+
￿ T
0
(DBt −DAt )dXBt +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, EBt − EAt −∆XBt )−G(t, EBt − EAt )
￿
(4.3.2)
and
C0(X) =
￿ T
0
DAt dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GA(t, EAt +∆X
A
t )−GA(t, EAt )
￿
+
￿ T
0
DBt dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
GB(t, EBt −∆XBt )−G(t, EBt )
￿
. (4.3.3)
For all pure strategies X ∈ AP (Q), the three cost functionals are the same since
only either ask side or bid side is involved. The equality part of this proposition is
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easy to get.
Next, we prove the inequality C∞(X) < Cβ(X) < C0(X) for ∀X ∈ A(Q)\AP (Q)
in two steps.
Step 1: prove C∞ < Cβ .
In the case of modelling price impact reversion, given the shape function fA
and fB, the cross impact resilience rate 0 < β < ∞, the same side resilience rate
0 < ρt < ∞, let us recall the dynamics of same side price impact and cross price
impact respectively,
dDAt = −ρtDAt dt+
dXAt
f(t,DAt )
,
dDBt = −ρtDBt dt+
dXBt
f(t,DBt )
,
dLAt = −(β + ρt)LAt dt+ βDBt dt,
dLBt = −(β + ρt)LBt dt+ βDAt dt.
To simplify the illustration, we introduce the processes D˜A and D˜B satisfying
the equations
dD˜At = −(ρt + β)D˜At dt+
dXAt
f(t,DAt )
,
dD˜Bt = −(ρt + β)D˜Bt dt+
dXBt
f(t,DBt )
.
Thereafter, the cross price impact processes LA and LB can be expressed by formulas
LAt = D
B
t − D˜Bt ,
LBt = D
A
t − D˜At .
Since the admissible strategies XAt , X
B
t are non-decreasing and D˜
A, D˜B
follow exponential decay, one gets the relationships between the cross price impact
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and same side price impact
LAt < D
B
t
and
LBt < D
A
t .
Thereafter, the ask side price impact sAt = D
A
t − LAt and the bid side price impact
sBt = D
B
t − LBt satisfy
DAt −DBt < sAt (4.3.4a)
and
DBt −DAt < sBt . (4.3.4b)
Via the relationship equation (3.1.6), we can express the ask side volume impact
V At = E
A
t − JAt and the bid side volume impact V Bt = EBt − JBt as
V At = F
A(t, sAt ), V
B
t = F
B(t, sBt ).
Since F i(t, x) are increasing on x for i = A,B, equation (4.3.4) implies that
EAt − EBt = FA(t,DAt −DBt ) < V At
and
EBt − EAt = FB(t,DBt −DAt ) < V Bt .
In the case of modelling volume impact reversion, given the same side re-
silience rate ρt and cross impact resilience rate β <∞, for all t ∈ [0, T ], the dynam-
ics of same side volume impact process and cross volume impact process are given
by
dEAt = −ρtEAt dt+ dXAt ,
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dEBt = −ρtEBt dt+ dXBt ,
dJAt = −(β + ρt)JAt dt+ βEBt dt,
dJBt = −(β + ρt)JBt dt+ βEAt dt.
Similarly, we introduce two processes E˜A andE˜B evolving as follows
dE˜At = −(ρt + β)E˜At dt+ dXAt ,
dE˜Bt = −(ρt + β)E˜Bt dt+ dXBt .
Thereafter, the cross price impact processes JA and JB can be expressed by formulas
JAt = E
B
t − E˜Bt ,
JBt = E
A
t − E˜At .
Since the admissible strategies XAt , X
B
t are non-decreasing and E˜
A, E˜B
follow exponential decay, one gets the relationships between the cross price impact
and same side price impact
JAt < E
B
t
and
JBt < E
A
t .
Thereafter, the ask side volume impact V At = E
A
t − JAt and the bid side volume
impact V Bt = E
B
t − JBt satisfy
EAt − EBt < V At (4.3.5a)
and
EBt − EAt < V Bt . (4.3.5b)
Via the relationship equation (3.1.6), we can express the ask side price impact
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sAt = D
A
t − LAt and the bid side price impact sBt = DBt − LBt as
V At = g
A(t, sAt )
and
V Bt = g
B(t, sBt ).
Since gi(t, x) are increasing on x for i = A,B by Lemma 3.1.4, equation (4.3.5a)
implies that
DAt −DBt = gA(t, EAt − EBt ) < sAt
and
DBt −DAt = gB(t, EBt − EAt ) < sBt .
In both cases, since Gi(t, x) is convex in x by Lemma 3.1.3 and Lemma 3.1.4,
one obtains
GA(t, EAt − EBt +∆XAt )−GA(t, EAt − EBt )
∆XAt
<
GA(t, EAt − JAt +∆XAt )−GA(t, EAt − JAt )
∆XAt
and
GB(t, EBt − EAt −∆XBt )−GB(t, EBt − EAt )
∆XBt
<
GB(t, EBt − JBt −∆XBt )−GB(t, EBt − JBt )
∆XBt
.
From these two inequalities, one obtains C∞ < Cβ .
Step 2: prove Cβ < C0.
Simply since the cross volume impact is positive, i.e. J it ≥ 0 for i = A,B,
the convexity of Gi on x implies the following inequalities
GA(t, EAt − JAt +∆XAt )−GA(t, EAt − JAt )
∆XAt
<
GA(t, EAt +∆X
A
t )−G(t, EAt )
∆XAt
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and
GB(t, EBt − JBt −∆XBt )−GB(t, EBt − JBt )
∆XBt
<
GB(t, EBt −∆XBt )−G(t, EBt )
∆XBt
.
In addition, since the cross price impact is positive, i.e. Lit ≥ 0 for i = A,B, the
inequality Cβ < C0 holds.
Proof of Corollary 4.1.3. Since X∗,∞ is a minimiser of C∞, one has
C∞(X∗,∞) ≤ C∞(X∗,β).
At the same time, for strategy X∗,β Proposition 4.1.2 implies that
C∞(X∗,β) ≤ Cβ(X∗,β).
Therefore, we obtain C∞(X∗,∞) ≤ Cβ(X∗,β) over A(Q).
Lemma 4.3.2: Given the volume impact dynamics
En =
n−1￿
i=0
ξie
−ρ(tn−ti)
and the discrete time cost functional (4.1.4), we have ∂C∂ξN = g(tN , EN + ξN ) and for
i = 0, . . . , N − 1,
∂C
∂ξi
− e−ρ(ti+1−ti) ∂C
∂ξi+1
= g(ti, Ei + ξi)− e−ρ(ti+1−ti)g(ti+1, Ei+1). (4.3.6)
Proof. We have ∂En∂ξi = 0 if i ≥ n, and ∂En∂ξi = e−ρ(tn−ti) if i < n. Thus, we get
∂C
∂ξi
= g(ti, Ei + ξi) +
N￿
n=i+1
e−ρ(tn−ti)(g(tn, En + ξn)− g(tn, En))
= g(ti, Ei + ξi)− e−ρ(ti+1−ti)g(ti+1, Ei+1) + e−ρ(ti+1−ti)
￿
g(ti+1, Ei+1 + ξi+1)
+
N￿
n=i+2
e−ρ(tn−ti+1)(g(tn, En + ξn)− g(tn, En))
￿
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= g(ti, Ei + ξi)− e−ρ(ti+1−ti)g(ti+1, Ei+1) + e−ρ(ti+1−ti) ∂C
∂ξi+1
.
Lemma 4.3.3: Under Assumption 4.1.4, one obtains:
1. for i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the auxiliary function hi+1(x) by equation 4.1.5 is an
increasing bijection on R;
2. if condition (4.1.7) holds, we have sgn(x)h−1i+1(x) ≥ sgn(x)aih−1i (x) for i ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1};
3. sgn(x)F (tN , x) ≥ sgn(x)aNh−1N (x).
Proof of Lemma 4.3.3. We will prove each point of this lemma in sequence.
• point 1:
Since the resilience rate ρ is positive, we have 0 < ai < 1. By Assump-
tion 4.1.4, xη(t, x) ≥ 0 implies f(ti, x) < f(ti+1, x) on R and x∂f∂x ≤ 0 implies f is
non-decreasing on R− and non-increasing on R+. By Lemma 3.1.4 we know g(t, x)
is increasing on x, i.e. g(ti, ai+1x) < g(ti, x) on R+ and g(ti, ai+1x) > g(ti, x) on
R−.
Thus we compute ∂hi+1∂x (x) and obtain
∂hi+1
∂x
(x) =
∂xg(ti, x)− a2i+1∂xg(ti+1, ai+1x)
1− ai+1
=
1
1− ai+1
￿
1
f(ti, g(ti, x))
− a2i+1
1
f(ti+1, g(ti+1, ai+1x))
￿
≥ 1− a
2
i+1
1− ai+1
1
f(ti, g(ti, x))
> 0.
• point 2:
We set gˆ(t, x) = ∂xg(t, x) = 1/f(t, g(t, x)). By Assumption 4.1.4 and Lemma 3.1.4,
we know gˆ is positive, non-increasing on R− and non-decreasing on R+. Take ν ≥ 0
and y = h−1i+1(ν). We note that y ≥ 0 because hi+1(0) = 0 and hi+1 is increasing by
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the first point of this lemma. Thus, we have
ν =
g(ti, y)− ai+1g(ti+1, ai+1y)
1− ai+1
= g(ti+1, ai+1y) +
g(ti, y)
1− ai+1
≤ g(ti, y) + 1
1− ai+1
￿ y
0
gˆ(ti, r)dr
≤ g(ti, y) + 1
1− ai+1 ygˆ(ti, y)
=: Ri+1(y).
Hence we obtain that Ri+1 is increasing on R+ and then y ≥ R−1i+1(ν). Take z =
aih
−1
i (ν). We have
ν =
g
￿
ti−1, zai
￿
− aig(ti, z)
1− ai
= g(ti, z) +
g
￿
ti−1, zai
￿
− g(ti, z)
1− ai
≥ g(ti, z) + 1
1− ai
￿ z
ai
z
gˆ(ti, r)dr
≥ g(ti, z) +
1
ai
− 1
1− ai zgˆ(ti, z)
=: R¯i(z).
Therefore, if
1
ai
− 1
1− ai ≥
1
1− ai+1 (4.3.7)
or equivalently the condition (4.1.7) holds, we get that Ri+1(x) ≤ R¯i(x) for all x ≥ 0.
That is to say one gets R−1i+1(x) ≥ R¯−1i (x) and therefore
y ≥ R−1i+1(ν) ≥ R¯−1i (ν) ≥ z.
The same arguments for ν ≤ 0 give y ≤ R−1i+1(ν) ≤ R¯−1i (ν) ≤ z.
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• point 3:
Using the above notations, we have sgn(x)R¯N (x) ≥ sgn(x)g(tN , x), and
therefore we get
sgn(ν)F (tN , ν) ≥ sgn(ν)R¯−1N (ν) ≥ sgn(ν)z = sgn(ν)aNh−1N (ν).
Proof of Proposition 4.1.5. We rewrite the cost function (4.1.4) as follows
C(ξ) = G
￿
tN ,
N￿
i=0
ξtie
−ρ(tN−ti)
￿
+
N−1￿
n=0
￿
G
￿
tn,
n￿
i=0
ξtie
−ρ(tn−ti)
￿
−G
￿
tn+1, e
−ρ(tn+1−tn)
n￿
i=0
ξtie
−ρ(tn−ti)
￿￿
.
Define the linear map T1 : RN+1 → RN+1 by (T1ξ)n =
￿n
i=0 ξtie
−ρ(tn−ti). Further
rewrite the cost function
C(ξ) = G(tN , (T1ξ)N ) +
N−1￿
n=0
[G(tn, (T1ξ)n)−G(tn+1, an+1(T1ξ)n)].
Note that T1 is a linear bijection. Thus one obtains |T1ξ| → +∞ as |ξ| → +∞.
Moreover, one can get the following inequality
￿ an+1x
0
g(tn+1, y)dy ≤ an+1
￿ x
0
g(tn+1, y)dy ≤ an+1
￿ x
0
g(tn, y)dy.
The first ≤ sign holds since G(t, x) is convex on x and ∂G∂x (t, x) = g(t, x). The
second ≤ sign holds because of η(t, x) ≥ 0 and ∂g∂t (t, x) = − η(t,x)f(t,x) on R+. Equiv-
alently, that is G(tn+1, an+1x) ≤ an+1G(tn, x). We then have G(tn, (T1ξ)n) −
G(tn+1, an+1(T1ξ)n) ≥ G(tn, (T1ξ)n)(1− an+1). Since the function G is convex on x
and G(t, 0) = 0, we have G(t, x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R and lim
x→∞G(t, x) =∞. Therefore
C(ξ) ≥ 0 and C(ξ)→ +∞ as |ξ|→ +∞ since g is increasing and lim
x→+∞F (t, x) = +∞.
To find the candidate optimal solution, we consider the Lagrangian L defined
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as
L(X, ν) = C(X)− ν(
N￿
i=0
ξi −Q).
By setting ∂L∂ξi = 0, we get the relationships
ν(1− ai+1) = g(ti, Eti + ξti)− e−ρ(ti+1−ti)g(ti+1, Eti+1) for i = 0, ..., N and
ν = g(tN , EtN + ξtN ).
Thus the Lagrange multiplier ν satisfies,
ν = hi+1(Eti + ξti), for i = 0, . . . , N − 1, and ν = g(tN , EtN + ξtN ). (4.3.8)
By Lemma 4.3.3, we know the auxiliary function hi(x) is bijective and invertible. Let
us denote it by h−1i (x). Thereafter, we have Eti + ξ
∗
ti = h
−1
i+1(ν) and then Eti+1 =
ai+1h
−1
i+1(ν) (the dynamics of volume impact process En = e
−ρ(tn−tn−1)(En−1 +
ξn−1)). We then summarise the candidate optimal strategy as
ξ∗0 = (h1)
−1 (ν),
ξ∗i = (hi+1)
−1 (ν)− ai (hi)−1 (ν), 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
and
ξ∗N = F (tN , ν)− aN (hN )−1 (ν),
where ν solves the equation
Q =
N￿
i=1
ξ∗ti = (1− a1)h−11 (ν) + . . .+ (1− aN )h−1N (ν) + F (tN , ν).
By Lemma 4.3.3 the right side is an increasing bijection on R, and we deduce that
there is only one ν ∈ R which satisfies the above equation. This gives the uniqueness
of the minimiser.
Moreover, the functions g(t, x) and hi(x) vanish at x = 0 and ν has the same
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sign as Q, which implies that ξ∗0 and ξ∗N have the same sign as Q by Lemma 4.3.3.
Besides, by Lemma 4.3.3 if (4.1.7) holds, the trades ξ∗i have also the same sign as
Q.
Lemma 4.3.4: Given xη(t, x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ R, ∀t ≥ 0 the condition ai + ai+1 ≤ 1
implies that
1
a˜i
1− a˜i
1− ai ≥
1− a˜i+1
1− ai+1 ,
where a˜i = ai
q(ti−1)
q(ti)
, and f(t, x) = q(t)f(x), η(t) = q
￿(t)
q(t) .
Proof. Assume a separable shape function f(t, x) = q(t)f(x). By Assumption 3.2.1
of ∂F∂t (t, x) = η(t, x), we compute correspondingly η(t, x) = q(t)η(t)F (x) where
F (x) :=
￿ x
0 f(y)dy. Since q(t) and F (x) ≥ 0, we have
xη(t, x) ≥ 0 ⇔ η(t) ≥ 0 ⇔ q(ti) ≥ q(ti−1)
and then
0 < a˜i = ai
q(ti−1)
q(ti)
≤ ai < 1.
In addition, we note that inequality ai + ai+1 ≤ 1 is the same as the inequality
1
ai
−1
1−ai ≥ 11−ai+1 . One then has
1
ai
− 1
1− ai ≥
1
1− ai+1 ⇒
1− ai
1− ai+1 ≤
1
ai
(1− ai) ≤ 1
ai
(1− a˜i).
Now look at the following inequalities
a˜i
1− ai
1− ai+1 ≤ ai
1− ai
1− ai+1 ≤ 1− a˜i ≤
(1− a˜i)
1− a˜i+1 .
As a result, we get
a˜i
1− ai
1− ai+1 ≤
1− a˜i
1− a˜i+1 ⇔
1
a˜i
1− a˜i
1− ai ≥
1− a˜i+1
1− ai+1 .
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Lemma 4.3.5: Given a time continuous function
ht(x) = g(t, x) + x
∂g
∂x
(t, x)− 1
ρ
∂g
∂t
(t, x)
and a time discrete function
hi(x) =
g(ti, x)− ai+1g(ti+1, ai1x)
1− ai+1 ,
where ti ∈ {t0, t1, ..., tN} satisfying ti+1− ti = ti− ti−1 and tN = T , and set τ := TN ,
we have lim
τ→0hi(x) = ht(x).
Proof. On time grid {t0, t1, ..., tN} , we set ai ≡ e−ρτ := a. We do the following
calculation
ht(x) = lim
τ→0
g(t, x)− ag(t+ τ, ax)
1− a = limτ→0
∂τ [g(t, x)− ag(t+ τ, ax)]
∂τ (1− a)
= lim
τ→0
ρe−ρτg(t+ τ, ax)− e−ρτ
￿
∂g
∂t (t+ τ, ax) +
∂g
∂x(t+ τ, ax)
∂
∂τ (e
−ρτx)
￿
ρe−ρτ
= g(t, x) + x
∂g
∂x
(t, x)− 1
ρ
∂g
∂t
(t, x).
Proof of Proposition 4.1.6. Since ht(x) is bijective, denote its inverse function by
h−1t . For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , set
C(t, T, Et, Xt) = [G(t, ζt)−G(t, Et)] +
￿ T
t
g(u, ζu)ξudu+ [G(T, F (T, ν))−G(T, ζT )]
where we set ζu = h−1u (ν), ξu =
dζu
du + ρζu and ν ∈ R solves the equation
−Et +
￿ T
t
ρh−1u (ν)du+ F (T, ν) = Q−Xt. (4.3.9)
We should note that the function ν → ￿ Tt ρh−1u (ν)du + F (T, ν) is bijective and
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increasing since ht(x) and F (t, x) are both increasing and bijective on x. So ν
uniquely solves the equation (4.3.9).
Remind that the volume impact function Et is the solution of dEt = dXt −
ρEtdt. Set
Ct =
￿ t
0
g(s, Es)dXs +
￿
0≤s<t
[G(s, Es +∆Xs)−G(s, Es)] + C(t, T, Et, Xt)
with CT = C(X) and C0 = C(0, T, 0, Q).
• Step 1: show C(0, T, 0, Q) ≥ 0.
Given the boundary value C(T, T,ET , XT ) = G(T,ET+(Q−XT ))−G(T,ET ),
let us substitute ξu into C(t, T, Et, Xt) and then apply integration by parts. We get
C(t, T, Et, Xt)
=[G(t, ζt)−G(t, Et)] + [G(T, F (T, ν))−G(T, ζT )]
+
￿ T
t
g(u, ζu)dζu + ρ
￿ T
t
g(u, ζu)ζudu
=[G(t, ζt)−G(t, Et)] + [G(T, F (T, ν))−G(T, ζT )] + ρ
￿ T
t
g(u, ζu)ζudu
+
￿ T
t
￿
dG(u, ζu)− ∂G
∂u
(u, ζu)du
￿
=−G(t, Et) +G(T, F (T, ν)) +
￿ T
t
￿
ρg(u, ζu)ζu − ∂G
∂u
(u, ζu)
￿
du.
Since G(0, E0) = G(0, 0) = 0 and G(t, x) ≥ 0, it is suﬃcient to check that the
function ζ → ρζg(t, ζ)− ∂G∂t (t, ζ) is non-negative.
Since f(t, x) is continuous diﬀerentiable, we can do the following calculation
∂G
∂t
(t, x) =
∂g
∂t
(t, x)g(t, x)f(t, g(t, x)) +
￿ g(t,x)
0
y
∂f
∂t
(t, y)dy.
By definition we know g(t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus the function ζ → ρζg(t, ζ)−
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∂G
∂t (t, ζ) vanishes at zero and its derivative is given by
∂
∂ζ
￿
ρζg(t, ζ)− ∂G
∂t
(t, ζ)
￿
= ρg(t, ζ) + ρζ
∂g
∂x
(t, ζ)− ∂
2G
∂t∂x
(t, ζ)
= ρg(t, ζ) + ρζ
∂g
∂x
(t, ζ)− ∂g
∂t
(t, ζ) = ρht(ζ),
which has the same sigh as ζ.
• Step 2: show dCt ≥ 0, and that dCt = 0 holds only for X∗.
First, we consider the case of a jump ∆Xt > 0. The corresponding change
of Ct is given by
∆Ct = G(t, Et +∆Xt)−G(t, Et) + C(t+, T, Et+, Xt+)− C(t, T, Et, Xt).
Since Et+ − Et = ∆Xt, the solution νt of equation (4.3.9) also solves −Et+ +￿ T
t ρh
−1
u (νt)du+ F (T, νt) = Q−Xt+ and then ∆Ct = 0. Denote by
V (t, T, Et, Xt, ν) =−G(t, Et) +G(T, F (T, ν))
+
￿ T
t
ρg
￿
u, h−1u (ν)
￿
du−
￿ T
t
∂G
∂t
￿
u, h−1u (ν)
￿
du
and we compute
∂V
∂ν
(t, T, Et, Xt, ν)
=
∂G
∂x
(T, F (T, ν))
∂F
∂x
(T, ν)−
￿ T
t
∂2G
∂t∂x
￿
u, h−1u (ν)
￿
∂x
￿
h−1u
￿
(ν)du
+
￿ T
t
ρ
￿
∂x
￿
h−1u
￿
(ν)g
￿
u, h−1u (ν)
￿
+ h−1u (ν)
∂g
∂x
￿
u, h−1u (ν)
￿
∂x(h
−1
u )(ν)
￿
du
= ρν∂x(h
−1
u )(ν) + νf(T, ν).
Since d(Et−Xt) =
￿￿ T
t ρ∂x(h
−1
u )(νt)du+ f(T, νt)
￿
dνt−ρh−1t (νt)dt, we could rewrite
∂νV (t, T, Et, Xt, ν) = ρν(h
−1
t (ν)Et)dt. The diﬀerential of Ct is
dCt = g(t, Et)dXt +
dC
dt
(t, T, Et, Xt)
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= g(t, Et)dXt − ∂G
∂t
(t, Et)dt− ∂G
∂x
(t, Et)dEt − ρg(t, ζt)ζtdt
+
∂G
∂t
(t, ζt)dt+
∂V
∂ν
(t, T, Et, Xt, νt)dνt
= −∂G
∂t
(t, Et)dt+ ρg(t, Et)dt− ρg(t, ζt)ζtdt
+
∂G
∂t
(t, ζt)dt+ ρht(ζt)(ζt − Et)dt
:= θt(ζ).
The function θt(ζ) := −∂G∂t (t, Et)+ρg(t, Et)dt−ρg(t, ζ)ζ+ ∂G∂t (t, ζ)+ρht(ζ)(ζ−Et)
vanishes at ζ = Et and its derivative ∂xθt(ζ) = −ρg(t, ζ) − ρζ ∂g∂x(t, ζ) + ∂g∂t (t, ζ) +
∂xht(ζ)ρ(ζ − Et) + ρh(ζ) = ρ∂xht(ζ)(ζ − Et) is positive for ζ ￿= Et. This implies
that C(X) ≥ 0 for X ∈ A∞(Q) and dCt = 0 only holds for X∗.
If X is another optimal strategy, we necessarily have ζt = Et, dt − a.e..
Diﬀerentiating Xt −Q−Et +
￿ T
t ρh
−1
u (νt)du+ F (T, νt) = 0 on νt, one obtains that￿￿ T
t ρ∂xh
−1
u (νt)du+ f(T, νt)
￿
dνt = 0, which implies dνt = 0 since ∂xh−1u (x) > 0 and
f > 0. Thus we get that νt = ν where ν is the solution of (4.1.9). Thereafter, we
get ∆X0 = E0+ = (h0)−1(ν) = ∆X∗0 and then X = X∗, which gives the uniqueness
of the optimal strategy.
We observe that ν has the same sign as Q and thus ξ∗0 = ζ0 = h
−1
0 (ν)
has the same sign as Q. Remind that ∂g∂t = − η(t,g)f(t,g) and ∂g∂x = 1f(t,g) which are
both positive by assumption. Thus we have sgn(x)ht(x) ≥ sgn(x)g(t, x) which
implies that aNsgn(x)h
−1
t (x) ≤ sgn(x)h−1t (x) ≤ sgn(x)F (t, x). Thus the last trade
ξ∗T = F (t, ν)− aNh−1N (ν) has the same sign as Q.
Proof of Corollary 4.1.7. ζt has the same sign as Q, and g(t, ζt) has the same sign
as Q since g(t, 0) = 0 and g is increasing on R. It is suﬃcient to check that ξ∗t ≥ 0.
Since −x∂xf(t, x) ≥ 0 by Assumption 4.1.4 and ∂∂x
￿
η
f
￿
> 0, dropping the
arguments for g = g(t, x) we get
∂ht
∂x
(x) = 2
∂g
∂x
− x 1
(f(t, g))2
∂f
∂x
(t, g)
∂g
∂x
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+
1
ρ
∂η
∂x(t, g)
∂g
∂xf(t, g)− η(t, g)∂f∂x (t, g) ∂g∂x
(f(t, g))2
=
￿
2
f
− x∂xf
f3
+
∂xηf − η∂xf
ρf3
￿
(t, g)
> 0.
We also have dζtdt = − 1∂xht(ζt) dhtdt (ζt). Thus the strategy
ξ∗t =
1
∂xht(ζt)
￿
−dht
dt
(ζt) + ρζt∂xht(ζt)
￿
=
1
∂xht(ζt)
￿
η(t, g)
f(t, g)
+
ζt
f(t, g)2
￿
∂f
∂t
(t, g)− ∂f
∂x
(t, g)
η(t, g)
f(t, g)
￿
− 1
ρf(t, g)
￿
∂tη(t, g)
− ∂tf(t, g)η(t, g)
f(t, g)
￿
+
η(t, g)
ρf(t, g)2
￿
∂f
∂t
(t, g)− ∂f
∂x
(t, g)
η(t, g)
f(t, g)
￿
+ ρζt∂xht(ζt)
￿
=
1
∂xht(ζt)
￿
− ζt
∂f
∂x (t, g)
f(t, g)3
(ρζt + η(t, g))2
ρζt
+
2∂f∂t (t, g)
f(t, g)2
ρζt + η(t, g)
ρ
+
1
f(t, g)
ρη(t, g) + 2ρ2ζt − ∂η∂t (t, g)
ρ
￿
.
is non-negative if condition (4.1.11) holds since ∂xht > 0 and −ζt ∂f∂x (t, g(t, ζt)) > 0.
Lemma 4.3.6: Under Assumption 4.1.4, condition (4.1.11) implies
d
dt
￿
ρ
2ρ+ ηt
￿
+ ρ
￿
ρ+ ηt
2ρ+ ηt
￿
≥ 0,
where f(t, x) = q(t)f(x), ηt =
q￿(t)
q(t) .
Proof. In the case of separable shape function f(t, x) = q(t)f(x), we have
F (t, x) = q(t)F (x) with F (x) =
￿ x
0
f(y)dy,
η(t, x) = q(t)ηtF (x),
∂f
∂t
(t, x) = q(t)ηtf(x),
∂η
∂t
(t, x) =
￿
η￿t + η
2
t
￿
q(t)F (x)
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and
g(t, x) = F−1
￿
x
q(t)
￿
.
Recall also the notation in Alfonsi and Acevdeo [2] that ζ¯t := h
−1
V,t(ν) where ν is the
unique solution of
￿ T
0 q(t)ρh
−1
V,t(ν)dt + q(T )F (ν) = Q and the auxiliary function is
given by h−1V,t(x) = F
−1(x) + ρ+ηtρ
x
f(F−1(x)) .
Next, we will show ht(q(t)x) = hV,t(x), or equivalently ζt = q(t)ζ¯t. Substi-
tuting xq(t) = y into ht(x), we get
ht(q(t)y) = g(t, x) + x
1
f(t, g(t, x))
+
1
ρ
η(t, g(t, x))
f(t, g(t, x))
= F−1(y) + q(t)y
1
q(t)f(F−1(y))
+
1
ρ
q(t)ηtF (F−1(y))
q(t)f(F−1(y))
= hV,t(y).
Now we can conclude that
￿
2ρζt
∂f
∂t
+ 2
∂f
∂t
η + ρfη + 2ρ2ζtf − f ∂η
∂t
￿
(t, g(t, ζt))
= 2ρq2(t)ζ¯tηtf(ζ¯t) + 2q
2(t)η2t ζ¯tf(ζ¯) + 2ρ
2q(t)ζ¯tf(ζ¯t)
+ ρq2(t)ηtζ¯tf(ζ¯t)− q2(t)ζ¯t(η￿t + η2t )f(ζ¯t)
= ζ¯tf(ζ¯t)q
2(t)(2ρηt + η
2
t + 2ρ
2 + ρηt − η￿t)
= ζ¯tf(ζ¯t)q
2(t)
￿
(ρ+ ηt)(2ρ+ ηt)− η￿t
￿ ≥ 0
⇔ d
dt
￿
ρ
2ρ+ ηt
￿
+ ρ
￿
ρ+ ηt
2ρ+ ηt
￿
≥ 0.
Lemma 4.3.7: Given the cost function (4.1.12), for i = 0, ..., N − 1, we have
∂C
∂ξi
= g(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi)
+
￿
∂C
∂ξi+1
−Di+1
￿
f(ti+1, Di+1)ai+1
∂g
∂x
(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi).
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Proof. The derivative ∂Dn∂ξi is given by
∂Dn
∂ξi
=
0, if i ≥ nan ∂g∂x(tn−1, F (tn−1, Dn−1) + ξn−1), if i = n− 1 .
If 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, we can calculate that
∂Dn
∂ξi
= an
∂g
∂x
(tn−1, F (tn−1, Dn−1) + ξn−1)f(tn−1, Dn−1)
∂Dn−1
∂ξi
= ai+1f(ti+1, Di+1)
∂g
∂x
(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi)
∂Dn
∂ξi+1
.
Thereafter, we have
∂C
∂ξi
= g(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi) +
N￿
n=i+1
[g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn)−Dn] f(tn, Dn)∂Dn
∂ξi
= g(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi)
+ [g(ti+1, F (ti+1, Di+1) + ξi+1)−Di+1] f(ti+1, Di+1)ai+1 ∂g
∂x
(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi)
+
￿
∂C
∂ξi+1
− g(ti+1, F (ti+1, Di+1) + ξi+1)
￿
ai+1f(ti+1, Di+1)
∂g
∂x
(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi)
= g(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi) +
￿
∂C
∂ξi+1
−Di+1
￿
f(ti+1, Di+1)ai+1
∂g
∂x
(ti, F (ti, Di) + ξi).
Lemma 4.3.8: Under Assumption 4.1.8, we have that:
1. the function x→ xf(t, x) is increasing on R, or equivalently F˜ (t, x) = ￿ x0 yf(t, y)dy
is convex on x;
2. f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
− ai+1f(ti+1, x) > 0 for i = 0, . . . , N − 1;
3. The auxiliary function
pi+1(x) = x
a−1i+1 − ai+1 f(ti+1,x)f￿ti, xai+1 ￿
1− ai+1 f(ti+1,x)
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
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is well-defined, bijective and increasing and satisfies sgn(x)pi(x) ≥ |x|.
Proof. • point 1: Since f(t, x) > 0 for ∀x ∈ R and ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and x∂xf(t, x) ≥ 0 by
Assumption 4.1.8, one gets
∂
∂x
xf(t, x) = f(t, x) + x∂xf(t, x) > 0.
• point 2: Since ∂η∂x(t, x) ≤ 0 by Assumption 4.1.8, we have
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
≥ f
￿
ti+1,
x
ai+1
￿
.
Also, the assumption that x∂f∂x (t, x) ≥ 0 and ai+1 < 1 for i = 0, ..., N − 1 implies
f
￿
ti+1,
x
ai+1
￿
≥ f(ti+1, x) > ai+1f(ti+1, x).
As a result, we get
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
> ai+1f(ti+1, x).
• point 3: Denote by H := f(ti+1,x)
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿ and we know ai+1H ≤ 1 by the second point
of this lemma. Rewrite the auxiliary function (4.1.13) and we get
pi+1(x) = x
￿
1 +
a−1i+1 − 1
1− ai+1H
￿
.
Since ai+1 < 1, it is easy to check that pi is well-defined and satisfies sgn(x)pi(x) ≥
|x|. Then we compute the derivative of pi(x) as
∂xpi(x) =
￿
1 +
a−1i+1 − 1
1− ai+1H
￿
+ x
1− ai+1
ai+1
ai+1
(1− ai+1H)2∂xH
=
ai+1
(1− ai+1H)2
￿
(1− ai+1H)(1− a2i+1H) + x(1− ai+1)ai+1∂xH
￿
.
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The derivative ∂xH is given by
∂xH = ∂x
 f(ti+1, x)
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
 = ∂xf(ti+1, x)f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
− 1ai+1 f(ti+1, x)∂xf
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿2 .
Thereafter, it is suﬃcient to check that x∂xH ≥ 0, or equivalently
x
∂xf(ti+1, x)
f(ti+1, x)
≥ x
ai+1
∂xf
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿ .
Since ai+1 < 1, one has
x
∂xf(ti+1, x)
f(ti+1, x)
≥ x
ai+1
∂xf(ti+1, x/ai+1)
f(ti+1, x/ai+1)
.
Moreover, since x
￿
∂2f
∂x∂t − ∂f∂t ∂f∂x
￿
≥ 0 by assumption, we have x∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
≥ 0. Thus,
one could derive that
x
ai+1
∂xf
￿
ti+1,
x
ai+1
￿
f
￿
ti+1,
x
ai+1
￿ ≥ x
ai+1
∂xf
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿
f
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿ .
Proof of Proposition 4.1.10. Since F˜ (t, x) is convex on x and F˜ (t, 0) = 0, we have
F˜ (tn+1, an+1g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn)) ≤ an+1F˜ (tn+1, g(tn, F (tn, Dn) + ξn)) for all x ∈ R
Moreover, we have F˜ (tn, x) ≥ F˜ (tn+1, x) by the second condition 2) in Assump-
tion 4.1.8. Thus, the cost function (4.1.12) satisfies
C(ξ) ≥ F˜ (tn, g(tN , F (tN , DN ) + ξN )) +
N−1￿
n=0
F˜ (tn, g(tn, F (tn, Dn)) + ξn)(1− an+1).
Set T2(ξ) = (ξ0, F (t1, D1) + ξ1, . . . , F (tN , DN ) + ξN ). Since lim
x→∞F (t, x) = ∞, one
has that |T2(ξ)| → ∞ as |ξ| → ∞, which immediately implies that C(ξ) → ∞ as
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|ξ|→∞.
We denote by ν a Lagrange multiplier such that
ν = pi+1(Di+1), for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 and ν = g(tN , F (tN , DN ) + ξN ).
By Lemma 4.3.8, we know that pi is invertible and we denote by p
−1
i its inverse
function. We then get
ξ∗0 = F
￿
t0,
p−11 (ν)
a1
￿
,
ξ∗i = F
￿
ti,
p−1i+1(ν)
ai+1
￿
− F ￿ti, p−1i (ν)￿ , for i = 1, . . . , N − 1
and
ξ∗N = F (tN , ν)− F
￿
tN , p
−1
N (ν)
￿
.
Besides, ν solves the equation
F (tN , ν) +
N￿
i=1
￿
F
￿
ti−1,
p−1i (ν)
ai
￿
− F ￿ti, p−1i (ν)￿￿ = Q. (4.3.10)
Since F and pi is increasing and bijective in x and the function y → F
￿
ti−1, yai
￿
−
F (ti, y) is increasing (its derivative is positive by Lemma 4.3.8), ν is the unique
solution to equation (4.3.10), and has the same sign as Q. Thus ξ∗ is the unique
optimal solution. Moreover, the initial and last trade have the same sign as Q since
sgn(x)pi(x) ≥ |x|.
Lemma 4.3.9: Given a time continuous function
pt(x) = x
2ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x)
ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x)
and a time discrete function
pi+1(x) = x
1
ai+1
− ai+1f(ti+1, x) ∂g∂x
￿
ti, F
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿￿
1− ai+1f(ti+1, x) ∂g∂x
￿
ti, F
￿
ti,
x
ai+1
￿￿ ,
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where ti ∈ {t0, t1, ..., tN} satisfying ti+1− ti = ti− ti−1 and tN = T , and set τ := TN ,
we have lim
τ→ pi(x) = pt(x).
Proof. In a regular time grid {t0, t1, ..., tN} such that ti+1−ti = ti−ti−1 and tN = T ,
set τ := TN and a ≡ e−ρτ . We do the following calculation
pt(x) = x lim
τ→0
a−1 − af(t+ τ, x) ∂g∂x
￿
t, F
￿
t, xa
￿￿
1− af(t+ τ, x) ∂g∂x
￿
t, F
￿
t, xa
￿￿
= x lim
τ→0
a−1 − af(t+τ,x)
f(t,xa)
1− af(t+τ,x)
f(t,xa )
= x lim
τ→0
f(t, eρτx)eρτ − f(t+ τ, x)e−ρτ
f(t, eρτx)− f(t+ τ, x)e−ρτ
= x lim
τ→0
ρeρτf(t, eρτx) + eρτ∂xf(t, eρτx)ρeρτx+ ρe−ρτf(t+ τ, x)− ∂tf(t+ τ, x)e−ρτ
∂xf(t, eρτx)ρeρτx+ ρe−ρτf(t+ τ, x)− ∂tf(t+ τ, x)e−ρτ
= x
2ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x)
ρf(t, x)− ∂tf(t, x) + ρx∂xf(t, x) .
Proof of Proposition 4.1.11. Since pt(s) is bijective, we can denote by p−1(x) its
inverse function. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we introduce
C(t, T,Dt, Xt) = [F˜ (t, ζt)− F˜ (t,Dt)] +
￿ T
t
ζuξudu+ [F˜ (T, ν)− F˜ (T, ζT )],
(4.3.11)
where ζu = p−1u (ν), ξu = f(u, ζu)
￿
dζu
du + ρζu
￿
and ν ∈ R, solving the equation
−Et +
￿ T
t
￿
ρp−1u (ν)f
￿
u, p−1u (ν)
￿− η ￿u, p−1u (ν)￿￿ du+ F (T, ν) = Q−Xt. (4.3.12)
We should note that the function x→ ρxf(t, x)− η(t, x) is increasing and bijective,
since its derivative is equal to ρf(t, x) + ρx∂f∂x (t, x) − ∂η∂x(t, x) and is positive by
assumption. Thus ν uniquely solves equation (4.3.12).
Recall that the price impact function Dt and volume impact function Et
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satisfy Et = F (t,Dt) and dDt = −ρDtdt. So we can solve Et satisfying
dEt = dXt +
∂F
∂t
(t,Dt)dt+
∂F
∂x
(t,Dt)dDt
= dXt + [η(t,Dt)− ρDtf(t,Dt)] dt
= dXt + η(t, g(t, Et))dt− ρg(t, Et)f(t, g(t, Et))dt.
We set
Ct =
￿ t
0
DsdXs +
￿
0≤s<t
[G(s, Es +∆Xs)−G(s, Es)] + C(t, T,Dt, Xt)
with CT = C(X) and C0 = C(0, T, 0, Q).
• Step 1: show C(0, T, 0, Q) ≥ 0.
Given that C(T, T,DT , XT ) = G(T,Q−XT +ET )−G(T,ET ), let us substi-
tute ξu into C(t, T,Dt, Xt) and then apply integration by parts. We get
C(t, T,Dt, Xt) = F˜ (T, ν)− F˜ (t,Dt) +
￿ T
t
￿
ρζ2uf(u, ζu)−
∂F˜
∂t
(u, ζu)
￿
du. (4.3.13)
Since F˜ (0, D0) = F˜ (0, 0) = 0 and F˜ (t, x) ≥ 0, it is suﬃcient to show that the
function ζ → ρf(t, ζ)ζ2 − ∂F˜∂t (t, ζ) is non-negative.
It is obvious that this function vanishes at ζ = 0. Its derivative is equal to
2ζρf(t, ζ) + ρζ2 ∂f∂x (t, ζ)− ζ ∂η∂x(t, ζ) and has the same sign as ζ by assumption.
• Step 2: show dCt ≥ 0, and that dCt = 0 holds only for X∗.
We first consider the case of a jump ∆Xt > 0. The corresponding change of
Ct is given by
∆Ct = [G(t, Et +∆Xt)−G(t, Et)] + C(t, T,Dt+, Xt+)− C(t, T,Dt, Xt).
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Since Et+ − Et = ∆Xt, the solution νt of equation (4.3.12) also solves
−Et+ +
￿ T
t
￿
ρp−1u (νt)f
￿
u, p−1u (νt)
￿− η ￿u, p−1u (νt)￿￿ du+ F (T, νt) = Q−Xt+.
Thus ∆Ct = 0 since F˜ (t,Dt) = G(t, Et). Denote by
V (t, T,Dt, Xt, v) = F˜ (T, v)− F˜ (t,Dt)
+
￿ T
t
￿
ρ
￿
p−1u (v)
￿2
f
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿− ∂F˜
∂t
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿￿
du
and we compute
∂V
∂v
(t, T,Dt, Xt, v)
= ∂xF˜ (T, v) +
￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)
￿
2ρp−1u (v)f
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿￿
du
+
￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)
￿
ρ
￿
p−1u (v)
￿2
∂xf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿− ∂x∂tF˜ ￿u, p−1u (v)￿￿ du
= vf(T, v) +
￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)p−1u (v)
￿
2ρf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿￿
du
+
￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)p−1u (v)
￿
ρp−1u (v)∂xf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿− ∂tf ￿u, p−1u (v)￿￿ du
= v
￿
f(T, v) +
￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)
￿
ρf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿￿
du
￿
+ v
￿￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)
￿
ρp−1u (v)∂xf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿− ∂tf ￿u, p−1u (v)￿￿ du￿ .
Since d(Et −Xt) = [η(t,Dt)− ρDtf(t,Dt)]dt, we get from equation (4.3.12) that￿￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(v)
￿
ρf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿
+ ρp−1u (v)∂xf
￿
u, p−1u (v)
￿− ∂xη ￿u, p−1u (v)￿￿ du￿ dvt
+
￿￿ T
t
∂xF (T, v)du
￿
dvt −
￿
ρp−1t (v)f
￿
t, p−1t (v)
￿− η ￿t, p−1t (v)￿￿ dt
= [η(t,Dt)− ρDtf(t,Dt)]dt. (4.3.14)
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Thereafter, we can rewrite ∂vV (t, T,Dt, Xt, v) as
∂C˜
∂v
(t, T,Dt, Xt, v)dvt = vt[η(t,Dt)− η(t, ζt) + ρζtf(t, ζt)− ρDtf(t,Dt)].
Since dDt = −ρtDtdt+ dXtf(t,Dt) , the diﬀerential of Ct is given by
dCt = DtdXt − ∂F˜
∂t
(t,Dt)dt+ ρD
2
t f(t,Dt)dt−DtdXt − ρζ2t f(t, ζt)dt
+
∂F˜
∂t
(t, ζt)dt+
∂C˜
∂v
(t, T,Dt, Xt, v)dvt
=
∂F˜
∂t
(t, ζt)dt− ∂F˜
∂t
(t,Dt)dt+ ρD
2
t f(t,Dt)dt− ρζ2t f(t, ζt)dt
+ pt(ζt)[η(t,Dt)− η(t, ζt) + ρζtf(t, ζt)− ρDtf(t,Dt)]dt
=: ψt(ζt)dt.
We have ψt(Dt) = 0 and can compute its derivative as
∂xψt(ζ) = ∂xpt(ζ)[η(t,Dt)− η(t, ζ) + ρζf(t, ζ)− ρDtf(t,Dt)].
Since ∂xpt(ζ) > 0, it is suﬃcient to look at the term αt(x) := η(t,Dt) − η(t, x) +
ρxf(t, x)−ρDtf(t,Dt). We then compute its derivative ∂xαt(x) given by ρx∂xf(t, x)+
ρf(t, x)−∂xη(t, x). The function αt(x) is positive on ζ > Dt, and negative on ζ < Dt
since ∂xαt(x) is positive by assumption. Thus, Dt is the unique minimiser of ψt:
ψt(Dt) = 0 and ψt(ζ) > 0 for ζ ￿= Dt.
If X is an optimal strategy, we necessarily have ζt = Dt dt − a.e.. From
equation (4.3.14), one obtains that
￿ ￿ T
t
∂x
￿
p−1u
￿
(ν)
￿
ρf
￿
u, p−1u (ν)
￿
+ ρup
−1
u (ν)∂xf
￿
u, p−1u (ν)
￿
− ∂xη
￿
u, p−1u (ν)
￿ ￿
du
￿
dνt = 0,
which implies dνt = 0 since ∂xp−1u (x) > 0 and ∂xαt(x) > 0. Thus we get that νt = ν
where ν is the solution of (4.3.12). Thereafter, we get ∆X0 = F (t0, ζ0) = ∆X∗0 and
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then X = X∗, which gives the uniqueness of the optimal strategy.
Since ν has the same sign as Q, pt(x) is bijective and F (t, x) is increasing
along R, one obtains that ξ∗0 = F (t0, ζ0) has the same sign as Q.
Proof of Corollary 4.1.12. Set ∆ := ρ
￿
1 + x∂xf(t,x)f(t,x)
￿
− ∂tf(t,x)f(t,x) . First, dropping the
arguments for f(t, x), we can rewrite the auxiliary function pt(x) as
pt(x) = x
2ρf − ∂tf + ρx∂xf
ρf − ∂tf + ρx∂xf
= x
￿
ρ
ρ+ x∂xff − ∂tff
+ 1
￿
= x
￿ ρ
∆
+ 1
￿
.
We then compute its derivative
∂pt
∂x
(x) =
￿
1 +
ρ
∆
￿
− xρ
∆2
∂∆
∂x
=
1
∆2
(∆2 + ρ∆− xρ∂∆
∂x
)
=
1
∆2
￿
∆2 + ρ∆− ρ2x∂x
￿
x∂xf
f
￿
+ ρx∂x
￿
∂tf
f
￿￿
.
By Assumption 4.1.16, we have x∂x
￿
x∂xf
f
￿
≤ 0, x ∂∂x
￿
∂tf
f
￿
≥ 0 and also we assume
∆ > 0, which implies ∂xpt(x) > 0. Since ∆ > 0 and pt(0) = 0, we also have pt is
bijective and sgn(x)pt(x) ≥ |x|. We then could deduce that sgn(x)p−1t (x) ≤ |x|,
which implies that the last trade ξ∗T has the same sign as Q since F (t, x) is increasing
in x.
We also know dζtdt = − 1∂xpt(ζt)
dpt
dt (ζt) and the first derivative
d
dt
pt(x) = − xρ
∆2
∂∆
∂t
= − xρ
∆2
￿
ρx∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿￿
.
Thus the strategy
ξ∗t = f (t, ζt)
￿
dζt
dt
+ ρζt
￿
= f(t, ζt)
￿
1
∂xpt(ζt)
ζtρ
∆2
￿
ρζt∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿￿
+ ρζt
￿
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=
ρζtf(t, ζt)
∂xpt(ζt)∆2
￿
ρζt∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿
+ ∂xpt(ζt)∆
2
￿
=
ρζtf(t, ζt)
∂xpt(ζt)∆2
￿
ρζt∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿
+∆2 + ρ∆− ρ2ζt∂x
￿
x∂xf
f
￿
+ ρζt∂x
￿
∂tf
f
￿￿
≥ ρζtf(t, ζt)
∂xpt(ζt)∆2
￿
ρζt∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿
+∆2 + ρ∆
￿
≥ ρζtf(t, ζt)
∂xpt(ζt)∆2
￿
ρζt∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿
+
￿
ρ− ∂tf
f
￿￿
2ρ− ∂tf
f
￿￿
≥ 0.
The first inequality holds by the last two items of Assumption 4.1.8 and the second
inequality does by the first item of Assumption 4.1.8. Moreover, the last inequality
holds if condition (4.1.18) holds.
Lemma 4.3.10: Under Assumption 4.1.8, if ρ
￿
1 + x∂xf(t,x)f(t,x)
￿
− ∂tf(t,x)f(t,x) ≥ 0 condi-
tion (4.1.18) implies
d
dt
￿
ρ− ηt
2ρ− ηt
￿
+ ρ
￿
ρ− ηt
2ρ− ηt
￿
≥ 0
where f(t, x) = q(t)f(x) and ηt =
q￿(t)
q(t) .
Proof. In the case of separable shape function f(t, x) = q(t)f(x), we have
F (t, x) = q(t)F (x) with F (x) =
￿ x
0
f(y)dy,
η(t, x) = q(t)ηtF (x),
∂f
∂t
(t, x) = q(t)ηtf(x),
∂η
∂t
(t, x) =
￿
η￿t + η
2
t
￿
q(t)F (x)
and
g(t, x) = F−1
￿
x
q(t)
￿
.
Now we can conclude that
ρx∂t
￿
∂xf
f
￿
− ∂t
￿
∂tf
f
￿
+
￿
ρ− ∂tf
f
￿￿
2ρ− ∂tf
f
￿
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= − η￿t + (ρ− ηt)(2ρ− ηt) ≥ 0
⇔ d
dt
￿
ρ− ηt
2ρ− ηt
￿
+ ρ
￿
ρ− ηt
2ρ− ηt
￿
≥ 0.
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Chapter 5
Application II: Absence and
presence of market irregularity
conditions
Another application of our cross impact LOB model is to study the market
impact model regularities when one cannot get closed-form optimal solutions of the
execution problem. Our goal is to understand whether and how the dynamics of
the LOB, specifically the depth and resilience of the order book, will create market
irregularities. In particularly, we will research how the cross impact resilience factor
β aﬀects the market irregularity absence and presence conditions.
Some theoretical studies of market manipulations in market impact models,
such as Huberman and Stanzl [48], Alfonsi et al. [6], Gatheral [32] and Klo¨ck [52],
address the market irregularity problem merely on models without spread. Fruth
et al. [31] argues that in models without spread it might appear that there are price
manipulations while in practice the spread precludes these price manipulations. At
first sight, this statement is quite trivial since traders would not make profits from
a round-trip if there is a cost to cross the spread. However, as we can see in the
sequel, our cross impact model possesses non-zero spread too but it is possible that
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all three market irregularities exist.
All of these inspire us to think of the inclusion of two sides resilience into the
analysis of market irregularity issues and think of the profitability depending on two
sides resilience of the order book. Indeed, the cross impact LOB model provides us
new insights about the market irregularity. Our Proposition 5.1.1, Proposition 5.1.2,
Proposition 5.2.1, Proposition 5.3.1 and Proposition 5.3.2 show that the market
irregularity conditions in models without spread is weaker than that in the cross-
impact LOB model and the conditions in cross-impact model is weaker than that in
one-side LOB model. All the results about this weaker relationship between zero-
spread and cross-impact are due to the argument we made in Proposition 4.1.2 that
for an arbitrary strategy X ∈ A(Q), the costs under zero-spread model is always
less than or equal to the costs under the cross-impact model.
Moreover, we provide necessary conditions for absence of PMS, TTPM and
existence of PLC under the cross-impact LOB model. Particularly, the necessary
condition (5.3.2) becomes suﬃcient for zero-spread models.
In this chapter, we assume a constant time-varying shape function of the
form fA(t, x) = fB(t, x) = q(t) unless specifically stated. The depth function q(t) :
[0, T ] → (0,∞) is deterministic and twice continuous diﬀerentiable. For simplicity,
the same side resilience rate ρ and cross impact resilience rate β are assumed to
be constant. In this constant shape function setting-up, as discussed in section 4.2,
we will focus on the models with price impact resilience. We remind the reader the
main notations here.
Given a constant shape function q(t), the same side price impact DAt , D
B
t
and cross price impact LAt , L
B
t take the following forms:
DAt (X
A
t ) =
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
dXAs ,
DBt (X
B
t ) =
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
dXBs ,
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LBt (X
A
t ) =
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
￿
1− e−β(t−s)
￿
dXAs
and
LAt (X
B
t ) =
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
￿
1− e−β(t−s)
￿
dXBs .
The cost function of the cross impact LOB model is
Cβ =
￿ T
0
(DAt − LAt )dXAt +
￿ T
0
(DBt − LBt )dXBt +
￿
t≤T
￿
(∆XAt )
2
2q(t)
+
(∆XBt )
2
2q(t)
￿
.
(5.0.1)
The cost function of the one-side LOB model is
C0 =
￿ T
0
DAt dX
A
t +
￿ T
0
DBt dX
B
t +
￿
t≤T
￿
(∆XAt )
2
2q(t)
+
(∆XBt )
2
2q(t)
￿
. (5.0.2)
The cost function of the zero-spread LOB model is
C∞ =
￿ T
0
DtdXt +
￿
t≤T
∆X2t
2q(t)
, (5.0.3)
where
Dt :=
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
dXAs −
￿
[0,t)
e−ρ(t−s)
q(s)
dXBs
and
Xt :=
￿
[0,t)
dXAs −
￿
[0,t)
dXBs .
The structure of this chapter is: section 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 present conditions for
the absence and presence of three irregularities TTPM, PMS and PLC respectively.
We will review the definition of each market irregularity first, and then look at how
each of them is aﬀected by our cross-impact resilience rate β. It is followed by
absence and presence conditions of each irregularity. The section 5.4 show some
examples of price impact dynamics generated by three diﬀerent LOB models which
admits PMS.
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5.1 Absence of transaction-triggered price manipula-
tion strategies (TTPM)
Recall that a market impact model does not admit transaction-triggered price
manipulation (TTPM) if for any Q ∈ R, there is
inf
X∈A(Q)
C(X) = inf
X∈AP (Q)
C(X),
where AP (Q) is the admissible set of the pure strategy. By the hierarchy Propo-
sition 3.3.4, we know that once the transaction-triggered price manipulation is ex-
cluded, the standard price manipulation strategy is impossible and the liquidation
cost is positive. So we will first have a look at the transaction triggered price ma-
nipulation.
5.1.1 Absence of TTPM strategies on cross-impact resilience β
From the numerical example Figure 4.6 in section 4.2, we observe that if there
is TTPM in zero-spread model (corresponds to the left column in the figure), TTPM
is also likely to exist when β < ∞ is big but less possible to exist when β is small;
when the zero-spread model excludes TTPM (corresponds to the right column), no
matter what value β < ∞ is, TTPM does not present. So we conjecture that: the
smaller the cross impact resilience rate β, the less profitable to apply transaction-
triggered price manipulation strategies.
We start by proving that the one-side LOB model which corresponds to a
β = 0 does not admit the TTPM.
Proposition 5.1.1: Consider a cross-impact LOB model (3.1.10) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), if the cross impact resilience rate β = 0,
the model excludes transaction-triggered price manipulation.
As the cross impact resilience rate becomes bigger, i.e. β > 0, we get the
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following property about TTPM between models of zero-spread (corresponds to
β = ∞ ) and cross-impact. Note that the Proposition 5.1.2 works for any shape
function f(t, x) which is twice continuous diﬀerentiable, deterministic and strictly
positive.
Proposition 5.1.2: Consider a cross-impact LOB model (3.1.10) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), if there is no transaction-triggered price
manipulation in the LOB model with β =∞, then the cross-impact LOB model with
0 < β <∞ does not admit transaction-triggered price manipulation.
The economics interpretation of this cross-impact resilience rate dependent
absence condition of TTPM is that: The key step for the success of the market ma-
nipulation in the real financial market is to make the market believe the misleading
trading and then to create extra supply on the opposite side of the order book. If
the opposite side is not responding (i.e. β = 0), it is not beneficial to trade on both
sides of the order book. As the cross impact resilience rate β becomes smaller, the
ability to create extra liquidity via manipulations drops.
Predoiu et al. [71] and Fruth et al. [31] are two which obtain the same results
as our Proposition 5.1.1 without solving the optimal execution problem. We extend
their results about the absence of TTPM. Although not explicitly stated out in their
wor, Predoiu et al. [71] and Fruth et al. [31] can be regarded as our β = 0 one-side
LOB model. Predoiu et al. [71] works with a time-independent shape function.
Fruth et al. [31] studies a constant shape function with stochastic depth and they
believe that it is the non-zero spread that precludes the TTPM. In particular, our
cross impact time varying LOB model possessing a non-zero spread, admits the
TTPM under some circumstances. This implies that the non-zero spread is not the
reason to exclude the TTPM, but the way of modelling the two sides resilience of
the order book.
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5.1.2 A suﬃcient condition for absence of TTPM
The cost function of pure strategy under the zero-spread, cross-impact and
one-side LOB model is the same by Proposition 4.1.2. Without loss of generality,
given a pure buy strategy XP ∈ AP (Q), the cost function of pure strategy is given
by
CP (XP ) =
￿ T
0
DAt dX
A
t +
￿
t≤T
(∆XAt )
2
2q(t)
. (5.1.1)
For an arbitrary strategy X ∈ A(Q), the cross-impact cost function is
Cβ(XA, XB) =
￿ T
0
(DAt − LAt +
∆XAt
2q(t)
)dXAt +
￿ T
0
(DBt − LBt +
∆XBt
2q(t)
)dXBt
=
￿￿ T
0
(DAt − LBt )dXAt + (DBt − LAt )dXBt
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
=E1
+
￿￿ T
0
∆XAt
2q(t)
dXAt +
￿ T
0
∆XBt
2q(t)
dXBt
￿
.￿ ￿￿ ￿
=E2
Since XBt is an increasing process in the sense that ∆X
B
t ≥ 0 and dXBt ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ], we have
E2 ≥
￿ T
0
∆XAt
2q(t)
dXAt =
￿
t≤T
(∆XAt )
2
2q(t)
. (5.1.2)
In addition, we can rewrite E1 as
E1 =
￿ T
0
DAt dX
A
t +
￿ T
0
DBt dX
B
t￿ ￿￿ ￿
=E3
−
￿ T
0
LAt dX
A
t￿ ￿￿ ￿
=E4
−
￿ T
0
LBt dX
B
t￿ ￿￿ ￿
=E5
. (5.1.3)
By definition of TTPM, if for any X ∈ A(Q) there are XP ∈ AP (Q) such that
Cβ(X) ≥ CP (XP ), the cross-impact LOB model does not admit TTPM. It is suf-
ficient to say that if E3 − E4 − E5 ≥ 0, there is no TTPM. Note however that
E3 − E4 − E5 ≥ 0 is not a sharp condition. In particular, when E4− E5− E6 < 0
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there might not admit TTPM if for any strategy (XA, XB) one has
￿ T
0
∆XBt
2q(t)
dXBt + E3 − E4 − E5 > 0.
In the following, we illustrate an example of increasing depth function under the
cross-impact LOB model and show how one could check the absence of TTPM by
using the condition E3 − E4 − E5 ≥ 0.
Example 5.1.3: Suppose that the depth function is q(t) = eαt with α ≥ 0. Consider
a strategy where shares are accumulated continuously at the positive constant rate
v1 on time interval [0, τ ] and then liquidated continuously at the positive constant
rate v2 during the rest of time (τ, T ] such that at the end of trading, Q shares are
purchased. The time τ is one such that v1τ − v2(T − τ) = Q. So one gets
τ =
Tv2 +Q
v1 + v2
.
Now we calculate E3, E4 and E5 as follows:
E3 =
￿ T
τ
v2
￿ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)
eαs
dXBs dt = v
2
2
￿ T
τ
￿ t
τ
e−ρtes(ρ−α)dsdt
=
v22
ρ− α
￿ T
τ
e−ρt(et(ρ−α) − eτ(ρ−α))dt
=
v22
ρ− α
￿
e−ατ − e−αT
α
+
eτ(ρ−α)
ρ
￿
e−Tρ − e−τρ￿￿
=
v22
ρ− α [l(α)− e
τ(ρ−α)l(ρ)]
> 0,
E4 =
￿ τ
0
v1
￿ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)
eαs
(1− e−β(t−s))dXBs dt
= 0,
and
E5 =
￿ T
τ
v2
￿ t
0
e−ρ(t−s)−αs(1− eβ(t−s))dXAs dt
= v2
￿ T
τ
v2
￿ τ
0
e−ρ(t−s)−αs(1− eβ(t−s))v1dsdt
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= v1v2
￿ T
τ
e−ρt
￿ τ
0
e(ρ−α)s(1− e−β(t−s))dsdt
=
v1v2
ρ(ρ− α)
￿
e−τρ − e−Tρ￿ ￿eτ(ρ−α) − 1￿
− v1v2
(ρ+ β)(ρ+ β − α)
￿
e−τ(ρ+β) − e−T (ρ+β)
￿￿
eτ(ρ+β−α) − 1
￿
= v1v2l(ρ)m(ρ− α)− v1v2m(ρ+ β − α)l(ρ+ β)
> 0,
where functions l(·) and m(·) in the last equation are defined as
l(x) :=
e−τx − e−Tx
x
and
m(x) :=
eτx − 1
x
.
Thereafter, we obtain
E3 − E4 − E5 = E3 − E5
=
v2
ρ− α
￿
v2l(α)− v2eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ)− v1eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ) + v1l(ρ)
￿
+ v1v2l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α) := H + v1v2l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α).
Before checking the condition E3−E5 ≥ 0, we derive some properties about functions
l and m. The function m(x) > 0 for all τ > 0 and x ∈ R. l(x) is positive and non-
increasing on R since its derivative is
∂l
∂x
=
1
x2
[e−Tx(Tx+ 1)− e−τx(τx+ 1)] = 1
x2
[h(T )− h(τ)],
where h(t) = e−tx(tx+ 1) and ∂h∂t = −tx2e−tx < 0, ∀t > 0.
• Case 1: v1 ≤ v2.
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Since 1ρ−α [l(α)− eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ)] > 0, we have
H =
v2
ρ− α
￿
v2l(α)− v2eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ)
￿
− v2
ρ− α
￿
v1e
τ(ρ−α)l(ρ)− v1l(ρ)
￿
≥ v2v1
ρ− α
￿
l(α)− 2eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ) + l(ρ)
￿
=
v2v1
l(ρ)
l(α)
l(ρ) + 1− 2eτ(ρ−α)
ρ− α
> 0,
if v2v1l(ρ)
l(α)
l(ρ)+1−2eτ(ρ−α)
ρ−α > 0. This implies E3−E5 > 0 since m(x) and l(x) are positive
∀τ ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R.
If H < 0 and ρ− α < ρ+ β − α < 0, we then have E3 − E5 > 0 since
E3 − E5 = H + v1v2l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α)
=
v2
ρ− α
￿
v2
￿
l(α)− l(ρ)eτ(ρ−α)
￿￿
− v1v2l(ρ)m(ρ− α)
+ v1v2l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α)
≥ v2
ρ− α
￿
v1
￿
l(α)− l(ρ)eτ(ρ−α)
￿￿
− v1v2l(ρ)m(ρ− α)
+ v1v2l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α)
≥ v1v2
￿
l(ρ)
￿
1− eτ(ρ−α)￿+ l(ρ+ β) ￿eτ(ρ+β−α) − 1￿￿
ρ+ β − α
× v1v2
￿
l(α)− l(ρ)eτ(ρ−α)￿
ρ+ β − α
=
v1v2
ρ+ β − α
￿
l(α) + l(ρ) + l(ρ+ β)
￿
eτ(ρ+β−α) − 1
￿
− 2l(ρ)eτ(ρ−α)
￿
> 0.
• Case 2: v1 > v2. There is no easier condition found to exclude the TTPM other
than asking for
v2
ρ− α
￿
v2l(α)− v2eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ)
￿
− v2
ρ− α
￿
v1e
τ(ρ−α)l(ρ)− v1l(ρ)
￿
> 0
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or
v2
ρ− α
￿
v2l(α)− v2eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ)− v1eτ(ρ−α)l(ρ) + v1l(ρ)
￿
+ l(ρ+ β)m(ρ+ β − α) ≥ 0.
5.1.3 Absence of TTPM strategies with time-independent shape
function
In this section only, we do not assume a constant shape function. A time-
independent shape function takes the form of f(t, x) = f(x).
Some zero-spread LOB models (i.e. β =∞), such as Alfonsi et al. [6], Alfonsi
et al. [5] and Alfonsi et al. [4], work under assumption of time-independent shape
function. Their results are that the time independent shape limit order book model
with zero spread precludes the TTPM.
Here we extend their results to the cross impact modelling where the opposite
side resilience rate β is finite. We then claim that the TTPM is impossible under the
cross-impact LOB model in case of time-independent shape function. Suppose there
is a minimiser strategy X∗,∞ for zero-spread LOB cost function and a minimiser
strategy X∗,β for cross-impact LOB cost function, Proposition 5.1.2 implies that if
X∗,∞ is a pure strategy, then the optimal strategy under cross impact model X∗,β
is also a pure strategy. That is to say, the TTPM is absent under all three LOB
modes when the shape function is time-independent.
5.1.4 Absence of TTPM strategies on trading frequency
An interesting property of the optimal strategy under the assumption of time
independent shape function is that the optimal strategy consists in a sequence of
market orders that consume exactly that amount of shares by which the LOB has
recovered since the proceeding market order due to the resilience eﬀect. If this is
true for time-varying shape function as well, the TTPM can be excluded by checking
the resilience of the order book. We then find this relationship does not hold if the
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shape function is time-dependent. We will show one example that Eti+−Eti+1 ￿= ξi+1
under the zero-spread LOB model.
Recall that the shape function is given by f(t, x) = q(t). Given the trading
interval [0, T ], the discrete time trading times are ti := t0+ iτ for i = 0, ..., N where
τ = TN . Let us denote by ai = e
−ρ(ti−ti−1) and aˆi = ai q(ti)q(ti−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Note
that ti and aˆi are functions of N .
In zero-spread LOB model framework, the optimal execution problem admits
a unique optimal strategy ξ∗ ∈ A(Q) which is explicitly given by

ξ∗0 =
Q
K q(t0)
1−aˆ1
1−a1aˆ1 ,
ξ∗i =
Q
K q(ti)
￿
ai
1−aiaˆi (aˆi − 1) +
1−aˆi+1
1−ai+1aˆi+1
￿
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
ξ∗N =
Q
K q(tN )
1−aN
1−aN aˆN ,
(5.1.4)
where
K =
q(tN )(1− 2aN ) + q(tN−1)
αN (1− aN aˆN ) +
N−2￿
i=0
q(ti)
(1− aˆi+1)2
(1− ai+1aˆi+1) .
We find that the optimal strategy is not perfectly using the resilient amount of the
order book during each small trading interval. The resilience amount over time
interval (ti, ti+1) is
Eti+ − Eti+1 =
Q
K
1− aˆi+1
1− ai+1aˆi+1 (q(ti)− ai+1q(ti+1)).
The optimal trading size during this same interval is
ξ∗i+1 = q(ti+1)
1− aˆi+2
1− ai+2aˆi+2 − q(ti+1)ai+1
1− aˆi+1
1− ai+1aˆi+1 ￿= Eti+ − Eti+1 .
Furthermore, one need to note that the length of each small trading interval
still has an aﬀect on the presence of transaction-triggered price manipulation. We
will have a look at two examples under the framework of zero-spread LOB model
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Figure 5.1: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with N = 20 (plots in left column) and N = 80 (plots in right column). For
each sub-figure, fix T = 1, ρ = 2 and β →∞. Both plots in the first row illustrate
the strategies with q(t) = 4+cos(2πt) (plotted in dashed lines) and both plots in the
second row illustrate the strategies with q(t) = 4 + 20.5+t (plotted in dashed lines).
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Figure 5.2: The optimal execution strategies for buying 50 shares on a regular time
grid with T = 1 (plots in left column) and T = 5 (plots in right column). For each
sub-figure, fix N = 20, ρ = 2 and β →∞. Both plots in the first row illustrate the
strategies with q(t) = 4 + cos(2πt) (plotted in dashed lines) and both plots in the
second row illustrate the strategies with q(t) = 4 + 20.5+t (plotted in dashed lines).
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with time-varying, constant shape function. In Figure 5.1 we change each trading
times by fixing the trading time interval T and changing the trading frequency from
20 to 80. The lump orders at the beginning and the end of T have no change, but the
intermediate orders becomes smaller as N increases. In Figure 5.2 we fix the trading
frequency N = 20 and change the trading time interval T from 1 to 5. Focusing
on the upper row plots, when T is increasing, the optimal strategy becomes a pure
strategy. For the models excluding the TTPM (lower row plots), the sizes of the
first and last order become smaller and the child orders are more evenly distributed.
5.2 Absence and presence of price manipulation strate-
gies (PMS)
Recall that a market impact model dose not admit price manipulation strat-
egy (PMS) if infX∈A(0) C(X) ≥ 0 where A(0) is the set of the round-trip strategies
which are to buy the total amount of zero shares. From the analysis of TTPM ab-
sence section 5.1 and irregularity hierarchy relationship Proposition 3.3.4, all three
market irregularities can be excluded under the one-side LOB model. Thus we only
study the cross-impact and zero-spread models in this section for price manipulation
strategy and the next section for positive liquidation cost.
5.2.1 Absence of PM strategy on β
Proposition 4.1.2 shows that given a trading strategy, the cost under the
zero-spread model is a lower bound of the cost under cross-impact model, and the
cost under the one-side model is an upper bound of the cross-impact cost. In terms
of the price manipulation, this proposition implies that the profitable round trips
under the cross-impact model also make non-negative costs under the zero-spread
model. Note that this PMS property holds even for a general shape function.
Proposition 5.2.1: Consider Cβ the cross-impact cost function (3.1.10) and C∞
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the zero-spread cost function (3.2.2), if there is round trip strategy X ∈ A(0) such
that Cβ(X) < 0, we have C∞(X) < 0.
In other words, if PMS is impossible in zero-spread LOB model, then there
is no PMS in cross-impact LOB model. However, in general, the converse does not
hold. We will present in Example 5.2.2 the possibility of C∞ < 0 ≤ Cβ .
Example 5.2.2: Consider a round trip X = (∆XAti ,∆X
B
tj ) = (m,m) with ti < tj <
T . The cross impact cost function of this strategy is given by
Cβ(X) =
￿
m2
2q(ti)
+
m2
2q(tj)
￿
− m
2e−ρ(tj−ti)
q(ti)
￿
1− e−β(tj−ti)
￿
= m2
￿￿
1
2q(ti)
+
1
2q(tj)
￿
− a
q(ti)
(1− c)
￿
=
m2
2q(ti)
(b+ 1− 2a+ 2ac),
where a = e−ρ(tj−ti), b = q(ti)q(tj) and c = e
−β(tj−ti).
Applying the same strategy X = (m,m) to the zero-spread cost function (5.0.3),
one obtains the zero-spread cost function
C∞(X) = m2
￿￿
1
2q(ti)
+
1
2q(tj)
￿
− a
q(ti)
￿
=
m2
2q(ti)
(b+ 1− 2a).
If ρ, β and α are such that β ≤ 1tj−ti ln 2a−(b+1−2a) and b + 1 − 2a < 0, one obtains
m2
2q(ti)
(b + 1 − 2a) < 0 ≤ m22q(ti)(b + 1 − 2a + 2ac). An economics interpretation of
the condition β ≤ 1tj−ti ln 2a−(b+1−2a) is that: As the cross-impact factor β becomes
smaller, from ∞ to less than 1tj−ti ln 2a−(b+1−2a) , the opposite side resilience becomes
slower. This results in smaller opposite side price recovery, and then the profits of
the round trip is smaller, e.g. after a buy order, one might sell at a lower price if
the opposite side resilience is smaller.
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5.2.2 Conditions for absence of PM strategies
In this section, we will first present two necessary conditions for absence of
PMS under the cross-impact model.
Proposition 5.2.3: Consider a cross-impact LOB model (3.1.10) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), if the cross-impact LOB model does not
admit the price manipulation strategy, then for any s < t the depth function satisfies
q(s)
q(t)
≥ 2e−ρ(t−s) − 1− 2e−(ρ+β)(t−s). (5.2.1)
Corollary 5.2.4: Consider a cross-impact LOB model (3.1.10) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), if the price manipulation strategy is ex-
cluded in the cross-impact LOB model, then the cross-impact resilience rate satisfies
β(t− s) ≤ ln 2 for any s < t.
An extreme example of this Corollary 5.2.4 is that if β = 0, we are then in
the one-side LOB world, and we know PMS is not possible.
Next, let us consider the corresponding results for zero-spread model. By
sending the cross impact resilience rate β to∞, one obtains the necessary condition
for LOB model with zero spread, which is given by
q(s)
q(t)
≥ 2e−ρ(t−s) − 1. (5.2.2)
In general, condition (5.2.1) and condition (5.2.2) are not suﬃcient. We will present
in the following example that for a depth function q(t) satisfying condition (5.2.2),
the zero-spread LOB model still admits price manipulation strategy.
Example 5.2.5: Let us consider a three-trade round trip strategy under zero spread
LOB model (i.e. the cross-impact resilience rate β = ∞). Trading times are T =
{t0, t1, t2} and total trading size is Q = 0.
Given a depth function q(t) = (1+t)2 and a same side resilience rate ρ = 0.4,
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one has
q(ti)
q(tj)
=
￿
1 + ti
1 + tj
￿2
= 1− 2(tj − ti)
1 + tj
+
￿
tj − ti
1 + tj
￿2
> 1− 2(tj − ti)
1 + tj
and
1− (tj − ti)
1 + tj
≥ 1 + tj
1 + tj
> 1 ≥ e−ρ(tj−ti).
Thus, given 1− (tj−ti)1+tj > e−ρ(tj−ti), we obtain that
1− 2(tj − ti)
1 + tj
≥ 2e−ρ(tj−ti) − 1,
which implies that condition (5.2.1) is satisfied. Now, let us look at the cost function
of round trip (x0, x1,−x0 − x1), which is in the form of
C∞(x0, x1,−x0 − x1) = −(x0 + x1)
￿
1
9
(−x0 − x1) + 0.4493x0 + 0.1676x1
￿
+ x0(0.4493(−x0 − x1) + x0 + 0.6703x1)
+ x1(0.1676(−x0 − x1) + 0.6703x0 + x1/4).
Then we solve the inequality C∞(x0, x1,−x0 − x1) < 0 and the solutions are
x0 < 0 and −6.34906x0 − 5.66648|x0| < x1 < −6.34906x0 + 5.66648|x0|
or
x0 > 0 and −6.34906x0 − 5.66648|x0| < x1 < −6.34906x0 + 5.66648|x0|.
5.3 Conditions for the positive liquidation cost (PLC)
Recall first that a market impact model has positive liquidation costs (PLC)
if for ∀Q ∈ R, there is
inf
X∈A(Q)
C(X) ≥ 0.
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First, we try to derive a discrete-time necessary and suﬃcient condition for PLC.
Recall the cross-impact cost function (4.2.2) with constant shape function
Cβ(ΘA,ΘB) =
1
2
￿z,Hz￿, (5.3.1)
where
ΘA ∈ AN (Q), Θ∈AN (Q),
ai,j :=
e−ρ(tj−ti)
q(ti)
, a˜i,j :=
e−(ρ+β)(tj−ti)
q(ti)
,
A := ai,j {i<j}, A˜ := a˜i,j {i<j}, A¯ := ai,j {i<j} +
ai,j
2 {i=j}
,
B =
1
2
(A¯T + A¯), D = A− A˜,
and
z := (ΘA,ΘB), M :=
 B −D
−D B
 , H =M +MT .
In this case, we have positive liquidation cost if and only if the depth function q(t)
is such that the matrix H is co-positive. A discussion of criteria for co-positive
matrices can be found in Va¨liaho [84] and Hiriart-Urruty and Seeger [46] and the
references therein.
In general, this co-positivity matrix condition for PLC is not very practical
since it is not easy to check the co-positivity. We then derive a necessary condition
for PLC under cross-impact LOB model.
Proposition 5.3.1: Consider a cross-impact LOB model (3.1.10) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), if the cross impact LOB model has posi-
tive expected liquidation cost, then for any s < t the depth function satisfies
q(s)
q(t)
≥ e−2ρ(t−s)(1− e−β(t−s))2. (5.3.2)
Next, we will derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for PLC under zero-
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spread LOB model. Note that this condition (5.3.3) is a suﬃcient condition for PLC
under cross-impact model by Proposition 4.1.2. When the cross-impact resilience
rate β →∞, one obtains the cost function of the zero-spread LOB model
C∞(ξ) = 1
2
￿ξ,Λξ￿,
where ξ ∈ A∞N (Q) and Λi,j = e
−ρ|tj−ti|
q(ti∧tj) for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N with (m∧n) taking minimum
between m and n.
Proposition 5.3.2: Consider a zero-spread LOB model (3.2.2) with a constant
time-varying shape function f(t, x) = q(t), the zero spread LOB model has positive
liquidation costs if and only if q(t) satisfies
q(s) ≥ q(t)e−2ρ(t−s), (5.3.3)
for any s < t.
5.4 Examples of models admitting PM strategies
In this section, we will show examples of price impact dynamics A − A0
and B − B0 generated by three LOB models which admit PMS. The three LOB
models are: the zero-spread increasing depth LOB model, the zero-spread reverting
depth LOB model and the cross-impact increasing LOB model. The objective is to
understand that how a price manipulation strategy works under diﬀerent trading
times, depth function q(t) and cross resilience rate β.
The base assumptions for all three examples are: a round trip strategy with
two discrete trades is considered, i.e. the buy strategy isXA = (0, ..., 0,∆XAt1 , 0, ..., 0)
and the sell strategy is XB = (0, ..., 0,∆XBt2 , 0, ..., 0) with t1 < t2 and ∆X
A
t1 =
∆XBt2 := m. Take trading time interval T = 1. Thereafter, the cost function of such
a round trip can be expressed as a function of trading time t1, t2, the depth function
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q(t) and the cross-impact resilience rate β
C(t1, t2,β, q(t)) =
m2
￿
q(t1)
q(t2)
+ 1 + 2e−(ρ+β)(t2−t1) − 2eρ(t2−t1)
￿
2q(t1)
. (5.4.1)
Example 5.4.1 (Zero-spread and increasing depth LOB model): Consider an ex-
ponential depth function q(t) = q(0)eαt. First, we investigate that how the costs
change against trading time t1 and t2. When t1 is fixed, like in Figure 5.3 where
we set t1 = 0.2, we see that placing the sell order at diﬀerent t2 might lead to nega-
tive costs, which means this particular LOB model admits PMS. In other words, in
order to create negative costs the trader should submit the sell order between time
(0.2, 0.7).
Next, we look at how the ask side and bid side price impact dynamics behave.
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 illustrate two price impact dynamic examples when trading
times are t1 = 0.2, t2 = 0.4 and t1 = 0.2, t2 = 0.8 respectively.
The price impact dynamics can be described as: before first buy order at t1,
there is no price impact incurred on both sides. At time t1 a buy order of size m
pushes the best ask price up and makes a hole in the order book. This is reflected
by the vertical line at time t1 in plots of A− A0. The bid side refills the hole at an
infinite speed (i.e. β →∞), which is illustrated by the vertical line at t1 in plots of
B−B0. During time (t1, t2), price impact decays on both sides. At time t2, another
sell order further drags back the best bid price and makes a hole in the order book.
This is reflected by the vertical line at t2 in plots of B −B0. The infinite resilience
of the ask side refills the hole at once, which is illustrated by the vertical line at t2
in plots of A−A0.
Because of the infinite cross impact resilience, the ask side dynamic and the
bid side dynamic are the same. The position of two midpoints on the two vertical
lines in each plot shows whether the cost of this round trip with trading time t1, t2
is negative or non-negative. In Figure 5.4, midpoint + is lower than the midpoint
￿ implies the average buy price is lower than the average sell price. Thus, the total
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Figure 5.3: The change of the cost function against t2 when t1 = 0.2, q(t) = q(0)eαt
with q(0) = 2, α = 3, ρ = 1, β →∞ and m = 50/3.
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cost of t1 = 0.2, t2 = 0.4 strategy is negative. While in Figure 5.5, midpoint + is
higher than the midpoint ￿ implies the total cost of t1 = 0.2, t2 = 0.8 strategy is
positive.
Example 5.4.2 (Zero-spread and reverting depth LOB model): Consider a re-
verting depth function q(t) = 2 − cos(2πt). Similarly, Figure 5.12 shows how
the cost (5.4.1) changes with respect to t2 for fixed time t1 = 0.2. We also ob-
serve the price manipulation opportunities where the cost function is below zero for
t2 ∈ (0.2, 0.46).
The interpretation of price impact dynamics in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 is
the same as in Example 5.4.1. The way to detect PMS is the same as in Exam-
ple 5.4.1 too. The diﬀerence between this LOB model and the one in Example 5.4.1
is the depth function. At the same time t2 = 0.8, the diﬀerent depths q(t2) generate
two diﬀerent price impact dynamics as shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.7.
Example 5.4.3 (Cross-impact increasing depth LOB model): In this example, it
is assumed that the depth function takes the form q(t) = q(0)eαt. Figure 5.8 illus-
trates how the cross-impact cost are aﬀected by the trading time t2 when t1 is fixed
and by the cross-impact resilience rate β. As the cross impact resilience rate β be-
comes smaller, the negative cost time interval becomes smaller and the profits −Cβ
is smaller. This observation coincides with Corollary 5.2.4 and Proposition 5.2.1
about the relationship between irregularity and cross-impact resilience rate.
Three cases of price impact dynamics are presented in Figure 5.9, Figure 5.10
and Figure 5.11 respectively. The two trading times are fixed to be t1 = 0.2 and
t2 = 0.5. Compared with the price impact dynamics in Example 5.4.1, for the bid
side price impact, after the first trade at time t1 there is no instantaneously refill
in the sense that it is not a vertical line at t1. The transient opposite resilience is
reflected in the ask side price dynamics at time t2 as well.
Compare the price impact dynamics in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. They are
distinguished by diﬀerent cross impact resilience rate β. Without loss of generality,
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Figure 5.4: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with t1 = 0.2 and t2 = 0.4.
For each plot, ρ = 1, β → ∞, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 2 and α = 3, m = 50/3.
The point + is the midpoint of the vertical line at time t1. The point ￿ is the
midpoint of the vertical line at time t2.
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Figure 5.5: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with t1 = 0.2 and t2 = 0.8.
For each plot, ρ = 1, β → ∞, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 2 and α = 3, m = 50/3.
The point + is the midpoint of the vertical line at time t1. The point ￿ is the
midpoint of the vertical line at time t2.
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Figure 5.6: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with t1 = 0.2 and t2 = 0.3.
For each plot, ρ = 1, β → ∞, q(t) = 2 − cos(2πt), m = 50/3. The point + is the
midpoint of the vertical line at time t1. The point ￿ is the midpoint of the vertical
line at time t2.
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Figure 5.7: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with t1 = 0.2 and t2 = 0.8.
For each plot, ρ = 1, β → ∞, q(t) = 2 − cos(2πt), m = 50/3. The point + is the
midpoint of the vertical line at time t1. The point ￿ is the midpoint of the vertical
line at time t2.
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Figure 5.8: The change of the cost function against t2 with β → ∞ (left) and
β = 15 (right) when t1 = 0.2. For each plots, ρ = 1, m = 50/3, q(t) = q(0)eαt with
q(0) = 10 and α = 3.
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Figure 5.9: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with ρ = 1 and β = 15.
For each plot, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 10 and α = 3, m = 50/3, t1 = 0.2 and
t2 = 0.5.
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Figure 5.10: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with ρ = 1 and β = 60.
For each plot, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 10 and α = 3, m = 50/3, t1 = 0.2 and
t2 = 0.5.
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Figure 5.11: The ask side price impact (left) and the bid side price impact (right)
dynamics on time interval [0, 1] with ρ = 5 and β = 15.
For each plot, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 10 and α = 3, m = 50/3, t1 = 0.2 and
t2 = 0.5.
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Figure 5.12: The change of the cost function against t2 when t1 = 0.2, ρ = 1,
β →∞, q(t) = 2− cos(2πt) and m = 50/3.
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we look at the bid side price impact plot. As β become larger, the opposite side
refills the hole faster. This is reflected in the plot by the shorter time that it takes
to reach the maximum bid side price impact, whose economics interpretation is the
minimum bid-ask spread after the trade at t1. The same analysis applies to ask side
price impact during time (t2, 1].
Compare the price impact dynamics in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.11. There are
diﬀerent same side resilience rate ρ in these two figures. Without loss of generality,
let us focus on the price impact dynamics on time interval (t1, t2). After a buy
market order at t1, the ask side (i.e. same side of buy market order) decays faster
if the ρ is bigger. Correspondingly, on the same time interval (t1, t2) at the bid
side, the cross price impact incurred by the buy order at t1 is smaller than that in
Figure 5.9.
Recall that one can see the profitability of round trip strategies by investigating
the levels of average buy and sell prices. In order to compare the average buy and
sell prices, we do the phase portrait of the coupled system of best ask and best bid in
Figure 5.13. The trade at time t1 corresponds to the jump from 0 to 0.92 along the
A − A0 axis. The sell order at time t2 is the B − B0 jump from 0.69 to 0.3 in the
opposite direction of B − B0 axis. The point + is the projection of the midpoint of
A − A0 jump onto the line x = y. The point ￿ is the projection of the midpoint of
B − B0 jump onto the line x = y. Similar to the analysis in Example 5.4.1, if the
point ￿ is higher than the point +, it implies the strategy is a PMS.
5.5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1.1. Without loss of generality, we consider a purchase pro-
gram. Given β = 0 in the sense that the one-side LOB model is considered, the cost
function (5.0.2) can be rewritten as
C0(XA, XB) =
￿ T
0
￿
DAt +
∆XAt
2q(t)
￿
dXAt +
￿ T
0
￿
DBt +
∆XBt
2q(t)
￿
dXBt .
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Figure 5.13: The phase portrait of the coupled system of ask side price impact
against bid side price impact. ρ = 1, β = 15, q(t) = q(0)eαt with q(0) = 10 and
α = 3, m = 50/3, t1 = 0.2 and t2 = 0.5.
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Since DBt ≥ 0 and XBt is an increasing process along time, one obtains
C0(XA, XB) ≥
￿ T
0
￿
DAt +
∆XAt
2q(t)
￿
dXAt . (5.5.1)
The right hand side of inequality (5.5.1) is the cost function of a pure buy strategy
(XAt , 0) to buy a total amount of X
A
T+ > Q since Q = X
A
T+−XBT+. If we replace the
pure buy strategy XAt by min{XAt , Q} for all t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain a feasible pure buy
strategy in AP (Q) whose total cost is less than or equal to
￿ T
0
￿
DAt +
∆XAt
2q(t)
￿
dXAt .
Therefore, the transaction-triggered price manipulation is excluded.
Proof of Proposition 5.1.2. Given that there is no TTPM under the zero-spread
LOB model, by the definition of transaction-triggered price manipulation, one has
the following relationship
inf
X∈A(Q)
C∞(X) = inf
X∈AP (Q)
C∞(X).
Next, let us consider the minimum costs C∗,∞ := infX∈A(Q) C∞(X) and C∗,β :=
infX∈A(Q) Cβ(X). By Corollary 4.1.3, we have
C∗,∞ ≤ C∗,β .
Furthermore, Proposition 4.1.2 states that pure strategies X ∈ AP (Q) give out the
same cost functions for all three LOB models. That is to say
inf
X∈AP (Q)
C∞(X) = inf
X∈AP (Q)
Cβ(X).
These three equations above imply that
inf
X∈AP (Q)
Cβ(X) ≤ inf
X∈A(Q)
Cβ(X).
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At the same time, since AP (Q) ⊂ A(Q), we have
inf
X∈A(Q)
Cβ(X) ≤ inf
X∈AP (Q)
Cβ(X).
Therefore, we have the equality infX∈A(Q) Cβ(X) = infX∈AP (Q) Cβ(X).
Proof of Proposition 5.2.3. Consider a round trip trading strategy: buy first XA =
(0, . . . , 0, xti , 0, . . . , 0), and then sell X
B = (0, . . . , 0, xtj , 0, . . . , 0) with ti < tj and
xti = xtj > 0. We can compute the same side and opposite side price impact
dynamics and then obtain the cross-impact cost function
Cβ(XA, XB) = xtixtj
q(ti)
eρ(tj−ti)
￿
e−β(tj−ti) − 1
￿
+
￿
x2ti
2q(ti)
+
x2tj
2q(tj)
￿
=
m2
2q(ti)
(b+ 1− 2a(1− c)),
where we set xti = m > 0 and a = e
−ρ(tj−ti), b = q(ti)q(tj) and c = e
−β(tj−ti).
Suppose that condition (5.2.1) does not hold i.e. b < 2a(1− c)− 1, the cross
impact cost is then negative Cβ(XA, XB) < 0. Therefore, for any trading strategy
X ∈ A(Q) there is
inf
X∈A(0)
Cβ(X) ≤ Cβ(XA, XB) < 0.
This is a contradiction to the definition of absence of price manipulation strategy.
Proof of Corollary 5.2.4. Adapting the notations from the Proof of Proposition 5.2.3,
we have a = e−ρ(tj−ti), b = q(ti)q(tj) and c = e
−β(tj−ti). Then condition (5.2.1)
can be rewritten as b ≥ 2a − 1 − 2ac. If c ≥ 12 , and since a < 1, one obtains
b− 2a+ 1 + 2ac ≥ b+ 1− a > 0. Therefore the assertion holds.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.1. Let us consider a buy program totally to buy Q > 0
shares. Consider a trading strategy: sell following XB = (0, . . . , 0, xti , 0, . . . , 0),
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and then buy XA = (0, . . . , 0, xtj , 0, ..., 0) with ti < tj . Here we set xti = m > 0,
xtj = m+Q, a = e
−ρ(tj−ti), b = q(ti)q(tj) , c = e
−β(tj−ti) and
L(m) = m2(b+ 1− 2a(1− c)) + 2mQ(b− a(1− c)) + bQ2.
Then we compute the both sides price impact dynamics and then obtain the cross-
impact cost function
Cβ(XA, XB) = xtixtj
q(ti)
e−ρ(tj−ti)
￿
e−β(tj−ti) − 1
￿
+
￿
x2ti
2q(ti)
+
x2tj
2q(tj)
￿
=
2m(Q+m)a(c− 1) +m2
2q(ti)
+
(Q+m)2
2q(tj)
=
1
2q(ti)
[m2(b+ 1− 2a(1− c)) + 2mQ(b− a(1− c)) + bQ2]
=
1
2q(ti)
L(m).
Look at the quadratic equation L(m) = 0. If the condition (5.3.2) does not hold in
the sense that ∆ := (b− a(1− c))2 − b(b+ 1− 2a(1− c)) = a2(1− c)2 − b > 0, then
the quadratic equation L(m) = 0 has two distinct solutions, which are given by
m1 = Q
ω1 −
√
∆
mω2
and
m2 = Q
ω1 +
√
∆
mω2
,
where ω1 = a(1− c)− b and ω2 = b+ 1− 2a(1− c).
• Case 1: if ω2 > 0.
Since a < 1 and c < 1, one has 0 < 1 − c < 1 and then a(1 − c) < 1. The
∆ > 0 implies b < a2(1 − c)2 < a(1 − c) which implies ω1 > 0. If ω2 > 0, we have
ω1 >
√
∆ since
ω21 −∆2 = (a(1− c)− b)2 − a2(1− c)2 + b = b(b− 2a(1− c) + 1) > 0.
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Then the two solutions satisfies 0 < m1 < m2. For any m ∈ (m1,m2), by property
of quadratic equation we have Cβ(m) = L(m)2q(ti) < 0. Thereafter, for any trading
strategy X ∈ A(Q) there is
inf
X∈A(Q)
Cβ(X) < inf
m∈(m1,m2)
Cβ(m) < 0.
In other words, by constructing a purchase trade strategy by selling quantity m ∈
(m1,m2) first and then buying back Q+m, one could get negative liquidation cost.
• Case 2: ω2 < 0.
ω2 < 0 implies the necessary condition (5.2.1) for absence of PMS is violated.
By the hierarchy Proposition 3.3.4, the cross-impact LOB model does not admit
PLC.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.2. The proof will be conducted in two steps. On one hand,
let us prove that q(s) ≥ q(t)e−2ρ(t−s) is the suﬃcient condition for the zero spread
LOB model having positive liquidation costs.
The condition q(s) ≥ q(t)e−2ρ(t−s) implies that for discrete times {t0, t1, ..., tN}
one has q(ti−1) ≥ q(ti)e−ρ(ti−ti−1), or equivalently aia˜i < 1 for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where ai = e−ρ(ti−ti−1) and a˜i = ai q(ti)q(ti−1) . Then, we can define vectors v0 and vi to
be
v0 =
e0￿
q(t0)
and
vi = a˜ivi−1 +
ei￿
q(ti)
￿
1− aia˜i,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N and e0, . . . , eN are the canonical basis of RN+1. Note that vi for
1 ≤ i ≤ N are linearly independent. We have the matrix Λij = ￿vi, vj￿ as their
Gram matrix. Thus Λ is positive definite and then the zero-spread cost function
C∞ ≥ 0.
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On the other hand, let us prove that the zero spread LOB model having
positive liquidation costs is the suﬃcient condition for a constant time varying shape
function q(t), satisfying q(s) ≥ q(t)e−2ρ(t−s).
If the matrix Λ is positive definite, its minors
det((Λi,j)0≤i,j≤n) =
1
q(t0)
n￿
i=1
1
q(ti)
(1− aia˜i), 1 ≤ n ≤ N
are positive, which implies the condition (5.3.3).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Concluding remarks
In this thesis, there were two main parts of research involved. First, in Chap-
ter 2, the study was set up to explore the LOB resilience. The analysis was based
on a market microstructure model proposed by Rosu [74]. Rather few investigations
dealt with the resilience eﬀect in the framework of a LOB from a game theoretical
point of view. Second, in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, we worked on a new cross-impact LOB
model by extending the LOB-based market impact model proposed by Obizhaeva
and Wang [65] to include the two-side resilience. The diﬀerence between the ex-
isting LOB based market impact model and our cross-impact LOB model was the
inclusion of the resilience eﬀect on both bid and ask sides of the order book. In
addition, our cross impact LOB model is the first to incorporate the bid-ask spread
into the optimal execution strategy and market irregularity.
Chapter 2 verified order book resilience under a game theoretical model. We
recapitulated the stochastic trading game in both the one-side case and the general
case formulated in Rosu [74]. The main contribution of this chapter was that we
proved the existence of the same side resilience in Proposition 2.2.3 in a mathe-
matically rigourous way, by reinterpreting the same side resilience and the opposite
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side resilience in terms of the temporary price impact and permanent price impact.
That was an essential step for verifying the existence of the resilience, since the price
adjustment in this continuous time stochastic trading game is taking place instanta-
neously, while the resilience eﬀect is a time-related feature of a LOB. We rewrote the
solution for the recursive system of the sellers’ utility function in Proposition 2.2.2
and then provided a proof of same side resilience in four steps by investigating
the asymptotic behaviour of the diﬀerence of the price impact functions under the
assumption of fast decaying arrival rates of impatient buyers who submitted more
than one-unit order. We also constructed a counterexample of the same side resilient
where the fast decaying assumption did not hold.
In Chapter 3, we formulate of the cross-impact LOB model. Apart from
defining a trading strategy, a time-varying shape function and cost function, a crucial
part of the model formulation was the introduction of the limit order regeneration
on both ask and bid sides after a price shift created by market order. The same side
price impact was described by processes DA or DB with a same side resilience rate ρ.
The opposite side price impact was represented by processes LA or LB with a cross
impact resilience rate β. The total price impacts were then linear combinations of
the same side and opposite side price impacts. This new model successfully allowed
an endogenous non-zero bid-ask spread in the LOB based market impact models.
To the best of our knowledge, this model was the first one to model non-zero spread
and two-side resilience eﬀect in the market impact model framework. Moreover, in
section 3.2 we indicated the generality of the cross-impact LOB model by replicating
two existing LOB models under our model setting-ups. By sending the cross impact
resilience rate β to infinity, we succeeded in replicating the zero-spread LOB model.
The one-sided LOB model was also replicated here if the cross impact resilience
rate β was set to be zero. At the end of this chapter, we provided three market
irregularity definitions. We proved that for cross-impact LOB models, the absence
of transaction-triggered price manipulation (TTPM) implied the positivity of the
liquidity costs (PLC) and the positivity of liquidity cost lead to the absence of price
manipulation strategy (PMS) in Proposition 3.3.4.
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In Chapter 4 we applied the cross-impact LOB model for studying the opti-
mal execution problem. We proved the existence of optimal execution strategy under
the cross-impact LOB framework in four cases: model of volume impact reversion in
discrete time, model of volume impact reversion in continuous time, model of price
impact reversion in discrete time and model of price impact reversion in continuous
time. We found that for any strategy in the admissible set, the zero-spread cost is
a lower bound of the cross-impact cost. Furthermore, we proved that the minimum
costs of the zero-spread LOB model is a lower bound of the minimum cost of the
cross-impact LOB model. The relationship between cost functions of zero-spread
LOB model and cross-impact LOB model was presented in Proposition 4.1.2 and
Corollary 4.1.3. With the help of the costs relationship between models, we trans-
ferred the problem of proving existence of optimal solution under the cross-impact
LOB model to the existence problem under the zero-spread LOB model. For dis-
crete time cases, we proved the coerciveness of cost functions and solved the optimal
strategy by the method of Lagrange multiplier. Then we took the continuous ana-
log of the discrete time optimal strategy and proved the optimality via verification
argument. A by-product of this process was that we obtained suﬃcient conditions
for absence of PMS and TTPM under the zero-spread LOB model. They were
summarised in Table 4.1. Our results contributed to the zero-spread LOB model
literature by generalising the optimal trading strategy and absence conditions of
market irregularities since a general form of shape function was used. Under the
assumption of a constant time-varying shape function, we presented some numerical
examples of optimal strategies under the cross-impact LOB model. As a result, the
relationships between respectively the optimal strategy and the depth function, the
cross impact resilience rate, the same side resilience rate were explicitly investigated.
Figure 4.4 suggested that as the cross impact resilience rate increased, more opposite
side orders were used under the LOB model with TTPM. Figure 4.6 suggested that
as the same side resilience rate increased, the optimal strategies were less volatile.
In Chapter 5 we addressed the regularity problems of market impact model
when one cannot obtain closed-form optimal solutions of the execution problem like
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in Chapter 4. We answered the questions raised by Fruth et al. [31]: might it be
true that the LOB model with non-zero spread exclude these price manipulations.
We found that the cross-impact LOB models possess non-zero spread, but it is still
profitable to manipulate prices. We proved that the profitability of the price ma-
nipulation strategies depends on the resiliency of the order book and the dynamics
of the shape function. The conditions of the absence of three market irregularities
were presented in Proposition 5.1.1, Proposition 5.1.2, Proposition 5.2.1, Propo-
sition 5.3.1 and Proposition 5.3.2. According to these propositions, we concluded
that market irregularity conditions under zero-spread LOB models were weaker than
those under the cross-impact LOB models.
6.2 Further research
We have argued in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 that there are both the same side
resilience and opposite side resilience in the limit order book market, nevertheless,
there are much less theoretical studies on the resilience eﬀect than on other features
of the order book. The game theoretical models are still introducing a rather large
amount of free parameters, most of which cannot be measured directly. We may
resort to the stochastic models of the limit order book. It would be desirable to be
able to model the dynamic bid-ask spread endogenously, via the various order flows
of the trading within. More market microstructure research are needed to help with
explaining and identifying the after-shock price formation.
From perspective of optimal execution problem, it is certainly a challenge
to come up with a mathematically tractable model that cover all three layers of
order splitting. A first step could be to add the choice of limit order into the
optimal execution strategy. Apart from the studies about the second layer execution
discussed in Chapter 1, we believe that the combination usage of limit orders and/or
dark liquidity inside the spread can be a research direction. Indeed, the resilience
eﬀect is the process of regeneration of limit orders inside the after-price-shock spread.
160
There is still a gap for this optimisation problem.
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